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1Abstract
In this paper, we research provably secure signature schemes with multiple
signers. Signature scheme for multiple signers is an extension of digital signa-
tures in which the signers are associated with a document and the validity of
the document is guaranteed by all the signers. This primitive is an important
primitive from viewpoints of basic cryptographic theory and applications.
In this paper, we discuss signature schemes for multiple signers in the fol-
lowing terms: (1) we propose optimized schemes for applications, and (2) we
consider mathematical properties toward a provably secure generic construc-
tion. The reason is as follows. First, generally speaking, security proof is a
dicult task, and there are several papers whose proposed scheme is broken
later. Hence, we shed light on the properties for proving security in order
to make a proof easy. Meanwhile, applications in the real world are con-
structed under various specications, and these specications are dierent
for each application. Thus, we also construct optimized schemes satisfying
the specications. More specically, we focus on following schemes.
Optimized Construction We propose ordered multisignature schemes, a
structured multisignature scheme, a BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme
and a certicateless aggregate signature scheme as optimized constructions.
Ordered multisignatures [30] are a variant of multisignatures where sign-
ers guarantee the signing order among a group of the signers in addition to
an improvement of the eciency. By adopting these signatures to routing
protocols, we can overcome DDoS attacks or provide in-band network fault
localization. We give the details in Chapter 3.
Structured signatures [19] are an extension of ordered multisignatures.
Whereas the ordered multisignatures deal with only a sequential process, the
structured signatures deal with both the sequential process and a parallel
process of multiple signers. The structured signatures have been expected
to extend the content-editing system. We give the details in Chapter 4.
BGP-aiding aggregate signatures are a variant of aggregate signatures
where these are specied which is designed for secure-border gateway pro-
tocol (S-BGP) [52]. Although aggregate signatures have been proposed for
the BGP security, state-of-the-art schemes have a gap with a specication of
the border gateway protocol [79]. We specify requirements of an aggregate
signature scheme for the BGP security and call such a scheme BGP-aiding
aggregate signature scheme. We also propose an instantiation of BGP-aiding
aggregate signature scheme. We give the details in Chapter 5.
2In Chapter 6, we focus on certicateless cryptosystem [2]. Certicateless
cryptosystem is a hybrid primitive of the conventional public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) and ID-based cryptosystem [86], and is a recent primitive. We
discuss a signature scheme for multiple signers in the certicateless cryp-
tosystem, and this primitive is suitable in ID federation in cloud service.
Toward Generic Construction We propose an unrestricted aggregate
signature scheme as a general consideration of signature scheme for multiple
signers. Existing signature schemes for multiple signers allow signers to sign
only once. The reason of the restriction comes from security: more precisely,
if the signers sign multiple times, then the security cannot be proven. Sig-
nature scheme allowing signers to sign multiple times is considered as the
most generic construction of digital signature and is called unrestricted ag-
gregate signatures. We discuss a construction of the unrestricted aggregate
signatures and their property to prove security. We found a fact that all
the schemes described above includes the properties and so these are prov-
ably secure. Namely, these schemes can be constructed from an unrestricted
aggregate signature scheme. We give the details in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In this paper, we research provably secure signature schemes with multi-
ple signers. In the recent electronic society, communication protocols such
as SSL are crucial, and these protocols are constructed from cryptographic
primitives such as public key cryptography. Provable security of a crypto-
graphic scheme is to mathematically prove that an adversary have to solve
some problem which is computationally infeasible to solve in order to break
the scheme. In other words, we can analyze security of the scheme by un-
derstanding a security proof. Security of several cryptographic protocols
such as ISO/IEC 9796-2 was not proven, and such schemes were broken
even after these were standardized. By proving the security, cryptographic
primitives are guaranteed to be secure even against any unknown attack.
Provable security is crucial for modern cryptography in a theoretical and
also practical sense. In such a framework, we focus on digital signature.
Digital signature is a cryptographic framework to guarantee the validity of
an electronic document, and each signer has a pair of a secret key and a
public key. A signer signs the document by the secret key, and the validity
of a signature is publicly veriable by the public key. Veriability of digital
signatures supports all of elements for information security, i.e., conden-
tiality, integrity and availability. Integrity is to guarantee the validity of
the data and corresponds to a well-known capability of a digital signature
scheme. Condentiality is provided by an encryption scheme in general, but
can be also provided via an access control by user authentication. An au-
thentication scheme is constructible from any digital signature scheme. For
availability, we can utilize cloud computing, and cloud services are based
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on the authentication scheme or availability of networks. Threats against
the networks are denial-of-service (DoS) attack or route hijacking, but these
can be overcome by digital signatures. Namely, the digital signatures are
applicable in many situations. A signature scheme for multiple signers we
discuss in this paper is a generic extension of a digital signature scheme to
the multiuser setting, and is an important primitive from viewpoints of basic
cryptographic theory and applications.
In this paper, we discuss signature schemes for multiple signers on the
following terms: (1) we propose optimized schemes for applications, and
(2) we consider mathematical properties toward a provably secure generic
construction. The reason is as follows. First, generally speaking, security
proof is a dicult task, and there are several papers whose proposed scheme
is broken later. Hence, we shed light on the property for proving security
in order to make a proof easy. Meanwhile, applications in the real world
are constructed under various specications, and these specications are
dierent for each application. Thus, we also construct optimized schemes
satisfying the specications.
1.2 Security Threats in Real World
There are many security threats in the real world. For instance, we describe
several ones in the white paper by ENISA [22].
Distributed Denial of Service Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an
attack where an attacker sends a large amount of packets to a server in
order to bring down the server. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is
a variant of DoS attack where a large number of computers in multiple
networks participate in this attack. A feature of DDoS attack is that the
computers send the packets by controlling a malicious third party, and so
owners of the computers cannot notice a fact that they participate in the
attack. It is dicult for a system provider to distinguish access by the attack
and access by a normal user.
Network Management In order to utilize services in the real world,
network access is crucial. A malicious user can prevent users fro, utilizing
any service by causing network failure such as an injection of a fake path.
For instance, there is a case of YouTube hijacking [80].
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Malicious Insider In general, a malicious provider can access any data
stored in a server and so can potentially have an impact on the integrity.
Security against such a malicious provider is a new security issue which has
never been considered in a conventional environment.
Cooperation between Dierent Cloud Each service provider has a
dierent domain and policy. Hence, in a large scale network, services may
become unavailable due to dierent providers.
1.3 Signature Scheme for Multiple Signers
Signature scheme for multiple signers is a cryptographic primitive for e-
ciently operating digital signature. Its denition is that resulting signature
is shorter than n individual signatures, and so the main motivation is for
reducing the signature size and the verication cost. Currently, another
motivation is also for an extension of its capability in addition to the im-
provement of the eciency. The existing signature schemes for multiple
signers are classied into following two schemes.
Multisignatures Multisignatures [48] allow n signers to sign a common
data, and researches of signature schemes for multiple signers were started
from this primitive. Currently, many researchers focus on aggregate signa-
tures described below, and so there are few researches of standard multisig-
natures.
Aggregate Signatures Aggregate signatures [17] allow n signer to sign
n individual documents and compress these signatures into a single short
signature. The aggregate signatures have an advantage for allowing each
signer to deal with dierent data and so are called generalized multisigna-
tures. In recent years, aggregate signatures have been proposed as researches
of signatures for multiple signers.
1.4 Goal of This Work
The goal of this work is following two constructions: (1) we propose opti-
mized schemes for applications, and (2) we consider mathematical properties
toward a provably secure generic construction. In both multisignatures and
aggregate signatures, there is no denition such as including all the existing
schemes, and an individual denition exist for each capability. In addition,
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these schemes are applied to devices with a low computational power, and
so an optimized construction for each application is crucial. In particu-
lar, for the rst goal, we construct schemes sucient for overcoming the
problems described above. Meanwhile, there is no scheme including all the
existing schemes, because the multiuser setting is a general extension of a
conventional digital signature scheme and includes many possible capabili-
ties. Thus, for the second goal, we construct a more generalized scheme for
supporting the other schemes by shedding light upon the properties for the
security proof. More specically, we focus on following schemes.
1.4.1 Optimized Construction
Ordered Multisignatures Ordered multisignatures [30] are a variant of
multisignatures where signers guarantee the signing order among a group
of the signers in addition to an improvement of the eciency. By adopt-
ing these signatures to routing protocols, we can overcome DDoS attack or
provide in-band network fault localization. We give the details in Chapter
3.
Structured Multisignatures Structured signatures [19] are an exten-
sion of ordered multisignatures. Whereas the ordered multisignatures deal
with only a sequential process, the structured signatures deal with both the
sequential process and a parallel process of multiple signers. The structured
signatures have been expected to extend the content-editing system. We
give the details in Chapter 4.
BGP-Aiding Aggregate Signatures Aggregate signatures have been
proposed for secure-border gateway protocol (S-BGP) [52]. However, state-
of-the-art schemes have a gap with a specication of the border gateway
protocol [79]. We propose an aggregate signature scheme which is designed
for BGP and called the scheme as BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme.
We give the details in Chapter 5.
Certicateless Aggregate Signatures Certicateless cryptosystem [2]
is a hybrid primitive of the conventional public key infrastructure (PKI)
and ID-based cryptosystem [86], and is a recent primitive. In this paper,
we also discuss a signature scheme for multiple signers in the certicateless
cryptosystem, and this primitive is suitable in ID federation in cloud service.
We give the details in Chapter 6.
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1.4.2 Toward Generic Construction
Unrestricted Aggregate Signatures Existing signature schemes for
multiple signers allows signers to sign only once. The reason of the re-
striction is for security: more precisely, if the signers sign multiple times,
then the security cannot be proven. Signature scheme allowing signers to
sign multiple times is considered as a most generic construction of digi-
tal signature and is called unrestricted aggregate signatures. We discuss a
construction of the unrestricted aggregate signatures and their properties to
prove security. Through constructing the schemes described above, we found
a fact that these schemes include the properties and so these security are
provable. Namely, these schemes can be constructed from an unrestricted
aggregate signature scheme. We give the details in Chapter 7.
1.4.3 Paper Organization
In the rest parts of this paper, we describe some knowledges to understand
this work in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we discuss an ordered multisignature
scheme. In Chapter 4, we discuss a structured multisignature scheme. We
propose a BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme in Chapter 5, and then
propose a certicateless aggregate signature scheme In Chapter 7, we de-
scribe an unrestricted aggregate signature scheme. Finally, in Chapter 8,
we describe conclusion.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Mathematical Notions
2.1.1 Notation
We introduce the notation used in this paper. Let n denote the number of
signers. We denote bym a message to be signed, by i a signature generated
by the ith signer, by pki a public key of the ith signer, by ski a secret key of
the ith signer and by ? an error symbol. We denote by jxj the size of any
set x, by a k b a concatenation of elements a and b, from which a and b can
be recovered.
2.1.2 Group
A group is a set G along with a binary operation  for which the following
conditions hold:
 (Closure) For all g; h 2 G, g  h 2 G.
 (Associativity) For all g1; g2; g3 2 G, (g1  g2)  g3 = g1  (g2  g3).
 (Existence of an Identity) There exists an identity e 2 G such that for
all g 2 G, g  e = e  g = g.
 (Existence of Inverse) For all g 2 G there exists an element h 2 G such
that g  h = h  g = e. Such an h is called an inverse of g.
We denote by (G; ) a group G along with a binary operation . (G; ) is
a commutative group if, for all g; h 2 G, g  h = h  g holds. Otherwise,
we say (G; ) is a non-commutative group. When G has a nite number
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of elements, we say G is a nite group and let #G denote the order of the
group. Here, we say that the order of g 2 G is the smallest positive integer
i with gi = 1. If G is a group, a set G  G is a subgroup of G if H itself
forms a group under the same operation associated with G. If there exists an
element g 2 G that has order a where a is the order of G, then the subgroup
G0 = fg1; g2;    ; gag generated by g is identical to G. In this case, we call
G a cyclic group and say that g is a generator of G.
2.1.3 Ring
A ring is a set R along with binary operation +;  for which the following
conditions hold:
 R is a commutative group with +.
 (Closure) For all g; h 2 R, g  h 2 R.
 (Associativity) For all g1; g2; g3 2 R, (g1  g2)  g3 = g1  (g2  g3).
 (Distributivity) For all g1; g2; g3 2 R, g1  (g2 + g3) = g1  g2 + g1  g3.
We denote by (R;+; ) a ring G with operations + and . (R;+; ) is a
commutative ring if, for all g; h 2 G, g  h = h  g holds. Otherwise, we say
(R;+; ) is a non-commutative ring.
2.1.4 Homomorphism
2.1.5 Denition of Group Homomorphism
Let (G1; ) and (G2; ) be groups. A (group) homomorphism is a function
f : G1 ! G2 from G1 to G2 for which the following condition hold:
8a; b 2 G1; f(a  b) = f(a)  f(b):
2.1.6 Denition of Ring Homomorphism
Let (R1;+; ) and (R2; y; ) be rings. A (ring) homomorphism is a function
f : R1 ! R2 from R1 to R2 for which the following condition hold:
8a; b 2 R1; f(a+ b) = f(a) y f(b); f(a  b) = f(a)  f(b)
2.2 Series-Parallel Graph
In this section we recall the denition of a series-parallel graph [12]. In
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we utilize the series-parallel graph to represent a
structure of signers. The denition is dened as follows:
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Denition of Series-Parallel Graph
Let G be a set of graphs. A series-parallel graph is a graph generated by
recursively applying either a serial graph or a parallel graph in an arbitrary
order. More specically, a series-parallel graph G(I; T ), which starts at the
initial vertex I and terminates at the terminal vertex T , is dened as follows:
G(I; T ) is generated either by the following step 1 or step 2.
1. With a unique label i in G, Gi(Ii; Ti) is composed of one edge connect-
ing Ii and Ti. We call such a graph an atomic graph and denote it by
i 2 G.
2. For the step 2, either the following step (a) or step (b) is executed.
(a) (Parallel Graph) Given n graphs Gi(Ii; Ti) for 1  i  n, con-
struct G(I; T ) by setting I = I1 = I2 =    = In and T = T1 =
T2 =    = Tn.
(b) (Serial Graph) Given n graphs Gi(Ii; Ti) for 1  i  n, construct
G(I; T ) by setting I = I1; T1 = I2;    ; Tn 1 = In and Tn = T .
Intuitively, in the above denitions, constructing G(I; T ) means com-
positions of n atomic graphs i 2 G for i = [1; n] either as a serial one
or a parallel one.
Composition of Graphs
For two graphs 1; 2 2 G, we dene a composition of parallel graphs as
1 [ 2 and the composition of serial graphs as 1 \ 2. In other words,
1 [2 means to construct G(I; T ) by setting I = I1 = I2 and T = T1 = I2,
and 1\2 means to constructG(I; T ) by setting I = I1; T1 = I2 and T2 = T .
We denote by T (i) a set of graphs connecting to the initial vertex Ii of ith
graph in a way such that T (i) = fx j Ii = Tx^1  x < i^Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng,
by I(i) a set of graphs connecting to the terminal vertex Ti of ith graph in
a way such that I(i) = fx j Ti = Ix ^ i < x  n ^ Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng,
by fajgj2T (i), for all a, all aj for j 2 T (i). In other words, for all graphs,
the composition of a graph i and  j for j 2 T (i) can be denoted by
 i := i \
S
j2T (i)  j

= i \  T (i) where
S
x means iterations of the
operation [ for all x. Similarly, Tx can be dened as iteration of \.
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Weight of Graph
We dene a weight function !i( n) that represents a weight of each label i
for a graph  n. Intuitively, !i( n) means the number of paths including an
edge with a label i from Ii to Tn for  n. From Lemma 2.3 in [90], the weight
of a graph consisting of n edges is !i( n)  3# n=3 for any graph  n, where
# n means the number of the edges in  n.
2.3 Bilinear Maps
Denition 1 (bilinear maps). Let G and GT be groups of the same prime
order p, and g be a generator of G. A map e : G  G ! GT is called a
bilinear map if the following conditions hold: G and GT are groups of the
same prime order p and g is a generator of G:
Bilinearity For all u; v 2 G and a; b 2 Zp, e(ua; vb) = e(u; v)ab;
Non-degeneracy We have e(g; g) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the identity element
of GT ;
Ecient Computability There is an ecient algorithm to compute e(u; v)
for any u; v 2 G.
Such a group G equipped with a bilinear map is called a bilinear group.
In this paper, we assume that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) for
bilinear groups is hard. We call (p;G;GT ;e) a pairing parameter.
2.4 Security Assumption
2.4.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let p be a prime number. The discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group
G with given generator g is to compute logg h given a random element h 2 G
as input. In this paper, we assume the discrete logarithm problem as one-
way function. We say this problem as DLP for short. Formally, we dene
the problem as follows:
Denition 2 ((t; )-DLP assumption). We dene the discrete logarithm
problem with a security parameter 1k as the problem of computing a from
a given (p; g; ga) in G2 with uniformly random ainZp. We say that the (t; )-
DLP assumption holds in G if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that can solve the DLP problem in G with probability greater
than  within execution time t.
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2.4.2 Computational Die-Hellman Assumption
The computational Die-Hellman (CDH) assumption is dened as follows.
Denition 3 ((t; )-CDH assumption). We dene the computational Die-
Hellman (CDH) problem in bilinear groups with a security parameter 1k as
the problem of computing gab from a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ;e) and a
given (g; ga; gb) 2 G3 with uniformly random a; b 2 Zp as input. We say that
the (t; )-CDH assumption holds in G if there is no probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm that can solve the CDH problem inG with probability greater
than  within execution time t.
2.4.3 Identity-based Sequential Aggregate Signature CDH
(IBSAS-CDH) Assumption
We recall the denition of the ID-based sequential aggregate signature CDH
(IBSAS-CDH) assumption [15]. This is an interactive assumption, and
Boldyreva et al. proved the hardness of this problem in [15]. The assumption
is dened as follows:
Denition 4 ((t; q; )-IBSAS-CDH Assumption). We dene the IBSAS-
CDH problem with a security parameter 1k as the problem of computing,
from a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e) and a given tuple (g; ga1 ; ga2 ; gb1 ; gb2)
with uniformly random (a1; a2; b1; b2 2 Zp) as input, a tuple of (grxga1b1gma2b2 ,
gr; gx) for randomly generated numbers (r; x) Zp under the setting that an
oracleOIBSAS CDH
g;ga1 ;ga2 ;gb1 ;gb2
that takesm 2 Zp as input and returns (grxga1b1gma2b2 ,
gr; gx) for any (r; x) Zp is available, where the element m involved in each
query should be dierent from the element m involved in the nal output.
We say that the (t; q; )-IBSAS-CDH assumption holds if there is no proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the IBSAS-CDH problem
with probability greater than  within execution time t. Here the prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm can generate at most q queries to the
oracle.
2.5 Provable Security
Provable security is a method to analyze security of a cryptographic scheme.
Provable security consists of two steps, i.e., a denition of security and a
construction of a reduction algorithm. First, we formalize a notion that a
cryptographic scheme is broken as a Turing machine, and then show that any
dicult problem which is an unsolved problem in the current technology can
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be solved by utilizing the Turing machine, which is an adversary. This notion
is called reduction and an algorithm to solve the dicult problem is called
reduction algorithm. Constructing such a reduction algorithm means that
the unsolved problem can be solved, and so the start for constructing the
reduction is a wrong statement. Namely, we can show that an assumption
in which the adversary exists is wrong and nobody breaks the scheme.
2.6 Programmable Hash Function
We briey recall the notion of programmable hash functions [40] without
formal denition. A programmable hash function is a keyed group hash
function that can behave in two indistinguishable ways, depending on how
the key is generated. If the ordinary key generation algorithm is used, then
the hash function fullls its normal functionality. The alternative trapdoor
key generation algorithm outputs a key that is indistinguishable from the one
output by the ordinary algorithm. It furthermore generates an additional
secret information that depends on user-specied generators g and h from a
group G. This trapdoor information makes an input possible to relate the
output of the hash function H to g and h. In particular, for any input x,
one obtains integers ax and bx such that the relation H(x) = g
axhbx 2 G
holds. The Waters hash function [95] used in the Waters signature scheme
is an instantiation of programmable hash functions with multi-generators.
2.6.1 Waters Hash Function
The Waters hash function is an instantiation of the programmable hash
functions, and this constructions was proposed by Waters [95]. The pro-
grammable hash functions described above has been proposed after the Wa-
ters hash function. The Waters hash function consists of ` + 1 generators,
where ` is the length of a message, and many CDH-based schemes have been
proposed via the function. We briey recall the construction of the Waters
hash function.
Waters Hash Function: Let G be a group family. Choose `+ 1 gen-
erators (u0; u01;    ; u0`) 2 G`+1. Then, for all message m = (m1;    ;m`) 2
f0; 1g`, compute H(m) = u0Q`i=1 umii .
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2.7 Conventional Public Key Cryptosystem vs. ID-
based Cryptosystem
Public key cryptography is a cryptosystem which gives each user two keys, a
secret key and a public key. The secret key is utilized to generate signatures
while the public key is published to verify the signatures. These are random
strings, and so we need a mechanism to clarify a relation between these
keys and their owner. Currently, public key infrastructure (PKI) has been
utilized as such a mechanism. In PKI, users are given certicates to guar-
antee the relation between the keys and the owners by a trusted third party
called certication authority (CA). This mechanism has been implemented
in a web browser, and we can utilize it without without an expertise. The
main problem in PKI is the management cost for the certicates. The cost
is expensive in that it involves certicate revocation, distribution and veri-
cation of public keys. This problem in PKI is called certicate management
problem.
An approach to bring down the cost is ID-based cryptosystem [86]. ID-
based cryptosystem allows users to utilize any string such as user's ID as
public keys. In general, ID is unique information for each user and is publicly
known. Thus, the cost to manage the certicates can be reduced. However,
ID-based cryptosystem has an inherent problem, called key escrow problem,
in which a key generation center (KGC) knows secret keys for all users in
the system. This problem occurs because the secret keys of all the users are
computed from KGC's master secret key and strings published by the users.
This implies that the KGC must be trusted in ID-based cryptosystem. In
other words, malicious KGC's can easily operate contents of the users and
ID-based systems intrinsically contain such an insider's threat. In fact, we
cannot always trust KGC's since malicious KGC's who do not honestly run
the algorithm exist [56].
Conventional public key cryptosystem via PKI and ID-based cryptosys-
tem have individual advantages respectively, and we do not know that which
one is the better cryptosystem. We know only a fact that conventional public
key cryptosystem provides the level-3 security described in the next section
while ID-based cryptosystem provides the level-1 security. On the other
hand, ID-based cryptosystem may provide more applications as described
in Chapter 5, and so we have to choose these cryptosystems carefully.
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2.8 Girault's Security Level for Cryptosystem
In a security notion in public key cryptosystems, Girault [38] dened three
security levels for a trusted authority as follows:
level-1 KGC knows a secret key for any user, and can impersonate the user
with the secret key without being detected.
level-2 KGC does not know a secret key for any user, but can impersonate
the user with the secret key without being detected by generating a
fake secret key.
level-3 KGC does not know a secret key for any user. In addition, KGC
cannot impersonate the user with the secret key even by generating a
fake secret key since its impersonation can be detected.
2.9 Multisignatures and Aggregate Signatures
Multisignatures are a tool which can eciently deal with signatures gener-
ated by multiple signers. Suppose that the number of signers is n, the total
size of signatures in a multisignature scheme is less than n times of the size
in a single signature scheme used, while in a trivial scheme, it is just n times
of the size in the single signature scheme. As a basic model of an attack
against multisignatures, the adaptively chosen message and active insider
attack [73, 67] has been dened. Shortly, an adversary can execute the fol-
lowing scenario. First, during the key-generation phase, the adversary can
register colluding signers adaptively as insiders. Second, during the signing
phase, the adversary can conspire with the valid signers, and can generate
signing queries to honest signers adaptively. The goal of the adversary is to
forge a multisignature including at least one target signer. The security of
most multisignature schemes is proved against this attack.
Aggregate signatures are known as generalized multisignatures in which
each signer among a signing group signs an individual document, whereas
the multisignatures allow signers to sign a common document. Currently,
the main approach of signatures scheme for multiple signers is for the aggre-
gate signatures. The security of the aggregate signatures can be discussed
similarly as that of the multisignatures.
2.9.1 Notions of Security Model
There are four meta models as security of multisignatures, i.e., certied key
model [13], key registration model [81], key verication model [5], and plain
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public key model [10]. These models provide dierent levels of security, and
we briey describe each model below.
The certied key model is a model assuming that each signer knows
a secret key corresponding to an own public key. This model implicitly
consider a situation in which an attack during the key-generation phase
called rogue-key attack [67], and the security proof is easy relatively to other
models. Although this model is the weakest model in the above models, the
assumption that the signer knows the secret key can be realized by well-
known protocols such as the Schnorr identication scheme [84]. Thus the
security of the most schemes has been proven under the model.
The key registration model is a model forcing signers to execute an iden-
tication scheme with a trusted party when they generate a pair of keys in
order to obtain certicates of the keys. Intuitively, this model includes an
identication implicitly assumed in the certied key model, and overcome
the rogue key attack. Thus this model provides a stronger security than the
certied key model.
The key verication model is a model forcing signers to execute an iden-
tication scheme similarly as the key registration model but in this model
the signers generate their certicates by themselves. This model essentially
makes the assumption of the key registration model in that the trusted party
is unnecessary, and so this model is a better one than the key registration
model.
The plain public key model is a model assuming only that each signer
has a public key. In this model, signers only utilize given public keys, and
a fact that they generate the keys honestly is no longer guaranteed. The
reason why the plain public key model was proposed is due to the current
mechanism of PKI. Whereas the rogue key attack can be overcome by the
identication protocols, the existing specications of PKI do not support
such a protocol according to the paper [10]. Thus, the authors of the pa-
per [10] pointed out that security of the multisignatures should be proven
extra protocols such as the identication scheme. The plain public key model
provides the security under such a scenario and so this is the strongest model
in signature scheme for multiple signers.

Chapter 3
Ordered Multisignatures
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
The current Internet design aims to provide high security for routing pro-
tocols without decreasing availability. A main approach to provide such
a capability is to combine the routing protocols with cryptography. For
instance, secure-border gateway protocol (S-BGP) [52] or border gateway
protocol security (BGPSEC) [59] are inter-domain routing protocols with
digital signatures where each autonomous system (AS) signs its own path
information. These protocols can prevent route hijacking by a virtue of the
digital signatures, and is currently under consideration for standardization
by IETF. Whereas cryptographic tools are expected to drastically extend a
capability of network systems, they increase costs of network systems. In-
deed, there are 36,000 ASes in the Internet [25], and in such a large scale
network the cryptographic tools often force a large amount of loads against
AS routers. In fact, developments of the above technologies have been pre-
vented due to ballooning memory of the routers [89]. In this work, we try
these problems in the point of view for cryptography. Namely, our goal is
to propose a provably secure cryptographic scheme, which is practical even
for large scale networks in terms of storage of memory, bandwidth overhead
and scalability.
Multisignatures [48] in which n signers sign a message and compress n
individual signatures into a single short signature are expected as a cryp-
tographic approach to overcome such an overloading problem, because this
primitive is suitable for devices with low-computational power and small
storage such as routers in a term of compressing the signatures. Among
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the multisignatures, ordered multisignatures [30], where signers also guar-
antee the signing order in addition to the eciency improvement of ordinary
multisignatures [48], have been expected to provide more useful systems [14]
such as the data-plane security of border gateway [32] protocol or a detection
of network faults.
However, there is no practical scheme whose security is proven under
the well-known assumption such as the CDH assumption without random
oracles. While an important point for the routing applications is simply the
eciency, we should also take into account the security from the following
two reasons. Firstly, Canetti et al. [20] showed that there are signature and
encryption schemes that are provably secure in the random oracle model [11]
but become insecure in an implementation of the random oracles. This result
indicates that the security should be proven without random oracles, i.e.,
in the standard model. Secondly, strong cryptographic assumptions may
be broken by developments of the computer science such the algorithm by
Cheon [24], and hence the security of a cryptographic scheme should be
proven under a weaker assumption. Although there are several schemes in
such an approach, the existing schemes require a large memory and hence
is undesirable for its underlying purpose.
In this paper, we propose ecient and secure ordered multisignature
schemes. Our schemes are provably secure under the CDH assumption with-
out the random oracles [20] and fairly practical.
3.1.2 Our Contribution
We propose two provably secure ordered multisignature schemes without
aggregate signatures under only the standard assumptions, i.e., the CDH
problem without the random oracles. One of the schemes consists of the
Waters hash function [95], and another scheme consists of the chameleon
hash function [53]. Both of our schemes are relatively more ecient than
the existing schemes in the sense that the number of elements of public keys
and the number of bilinear maps, whose cost is heavy, are independent of
the security parameter. Although several parts of the computations depend
on the number of signers, these values are quite lesser than the security pa-
rameter to be used, i.e., the number of the signers is at most 20 as described
in Section 3.6 while the security parameter is set to be at least 160 for 80-bit
security. Hence, the proposed schemes are ecient in a practical scenario.
Our main approach is to eliminate the use of aggregate signatures [17].
While any aggregate signature scheme gives rise to an ordered multisigna-
ture scheme [14], the existing aggregate signature schemes under the CDH
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Table 3.1: Evaluation of the schemes: We denote by ` the message length,
by P the computational cost of one bilinear map, by E the computational
cost of one exponentiation, by H the computational cost of one map-to-
point, by L(p) the binary length of p, by k the security parameter, by ROM
the random oracle model, by AS aggregate signatures and by OMS ordered
multisignatures. Typical values for these parameters are L(p) = 176 on a
symmetric pairing for 80-bit security, ` = 176, n = 20. and, with Type A
curve in PBC library [65] according to [47], the cost per one P is 2:2078
msec, the cost per one E is 2:5591 msec and the cost per one H is 5:8960
msec.
Schemes
Computational
Cost for Verier
Signature
Size
Public
Key
Public
Parameter
Proof
Model
ECDSA [93] 2nE 2nL(p) L(p) L(p) -
BGOY07 [14] 3P + nE +H 2L(p) 3L(p) L(p) ROM
LOSSW06 [64] 3P 2L(p) (`+ 2)L(p) L(p) Standard
AGH10 [1] (`+ 3)P + 2E 2L(p) + k L(p) (`+ 5)L(p) Standard
Our WH
Scheme 4P + nE 3L(p) 3L(p) (`+ 3)L(p) Standard
Our CH
Scheme 4P + (4 + n)E 3L(p) + 2k 3L(p) 6L(p) Standard
assumption in the standard model are inecient since either the number
of the bilinear maps or the number of elements of public key depends on
the message length. Namely, utilizing these schemes in routers is imprac-
tical. Hence, we construct ordered multisignature schemes from scratch
without the aggregate signatures. Meanwhile, in this approach as described
in Section 3.3, there is some technical problem [14] that random numbers
for simulating the signing oracle cannot be controlled because there are rel-
atively more signature components in the ordered multisignatures than that
in ordinary multisignatures.
We found that the problem can be overcome by giving individual ran-
dom numbers to each component of ordered multisignatures, where the size
of these values is independent of the number of signers. In this methodology,
each random number is not aected by another one, and the signing oracle
can be simulated as long as either random number is a known value. Intu-
itively, we can consider in this methodology a security proof of the ordered
multisignatures as the combination of security proofs of two individual sig-
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nature schemes for a single signer. Under this observation, we propose two
schemes, one with the Waters hash and the other with the chameleon hash.
We give the detail of this idea in Section 3.3.
In both schemes, the signature size and the number of bilinear maps are
independent of the number of signers. In the Waters-hash-based scheme,
even though the size of the public parameter depends on the message length,
this scheme is a stateless signature scheme where the signer does not need to
maintain state. On the other hand, the chameleon-hash-based scheme is a
stateful signature scheme where the signer must maintain state, but the size
of the public parameter in this scheme is quite small. The former scheme is
stateless and hence the security can be guaranteed via a more generic setting.
The later scheme is stateful but the memory storage becomes smaller. The
computational time of Waters-hash-based scheme is lesser than one-tenth
of that of the AGH10 scheme, and the memory size of routers with the
chameleon-hash-based scheme becomes one-percent in comparison with the
LOSSW06 scheme.
3.1.3 Applications
Data Plane Security in BGP One of possible applications of ordered
multisignatures is an improvement of S-BGP [52]. Feamster et al. [32]
pointed out that an AS router should reject packets from invalid sources.
They called such a new capability the data-plane security, and an advantage
of the data-plane security is that packets are certainly forwarded along with
the own path information.
According to Boldyreva et al. [14], ordered multisignatures seem to be
suitable for the data-plane security: more specically, in order to provide the
data-plane security, ASes can sign the data packets by using an ordered mul-
tisignature scheme where the signing order represents the actual forwarding
path and the packets themselves correspond to messages. Each packet is
signed by egress routers of ASes forwarding it, and the egress routers insert
their signatures and public key information into each data packet. Ingress
routers receiving the packets forward only packets with valid ordered mul-
tisignatures that followed an authenticated path, where the routers check
that the validity of the signing order of the signatures with their own path
information. If the verication algorithm rejects the signatures, the ingress
routers will eliminate the packets. This approach is expected to prevent
several attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In comparison with
ordinary signatures such as ECDSA, by a virtue of an aggregation of the
signatures, the overloads of the routers can be reduced by 120n where n is
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the number of ASes.
In-Band Network Fault Localization Network faults may introduce
packet losses or degradations of the performance, and they also negatively
aect the network troubleshooting. To address this problem, Motiwala et
al. [69] proposed a method detecting the faults, called in-band network fault
localization. In the system, data packets include probe packets for recording
the IP address of routers along the path. More specically, probe packets
consist of three parts, i.e., (1) Flow, (2)Incr and (3)Router ID, and each part
counts (1) the sequence number for this packet, (2) the number of packets
lost by a router and (3) the hash of the router that lost packets, respectively.
These values are also given to each router, and a router will nd a dierence
in the values in the packets and the one stored at the router if any packet is
lost. Main technical problems in this system are security and performance.
One of threats is that a router forges the values in the packets in order
to avoid that its trustworthiness is downgraded. In order to get rid of
such a situation, data packets should be signed by ordered multisignatures.
In comparison with standard signatures, their performances are drastically
remedied using ordered multisignatures within O(n) from O(n2), where each
router corresponds to a signer, probe packets correspond to messages to be
signed.
3.1.4 Related Work
The rst multisignature scheme was proposed by Itakura and Nakamura [48],
and the security was formalized by Ohta and Okamoto [73] and Micali et
al. [67]. After, four security models have been proposed, i.e., the certied key
model [13], the plain public key model [10], the key registration model [81],
and the key verication model [5]. Among these models, the certied key
model is suitable for considering properties in the security proof since the
other models force to discuss too much complicated security.
The rst ordered multisignature scheme was proposed by Doi et al. [30],
and many such schemes without aggregate signatures [14, 19, 43, 51, 61, 62,
68, 90, 100] have been proposed. An important result is the order exibility
in [68] where neither order of signers nor signers themselves need to be
designated beforehand. Schemes which do not meet the order exibility have
a restriction on the number of signers, i.e., about 8 signers for 80-bit security
as shown in [90]. Meanwhile, these schemes are based on the well-known
assumptions such as the DLP or the CDH problem. However, as described
in Section 7.1, there is no scheme without the random oracles. To the best of
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our knowledge, in order to construct such an ordered multisignature scheme,
there is an aggregate signature scheme in advance.
Meanwhile, an aggregate signature scheme, which is a generalized mul-
tisignature allowing each signer to sign an individual document, was pro-
posed by Boneh et al. [17] while Mitomi and Miyaji [68] was individually pro-
posed an older scheme with such a message exibility. Aggregate signatures
give rise to ordered multisignatures where each signer signs a concatenation
of a common message and a list of signers, and several aggregate signature
schemes in the standard model have been proposed [1, 55, 54, 64, 82, 85].
Among them, the schemes whose security is based on the well-known prob-
lem such as the CDH problem are only in [1, 64]. However, the number
of computations of the bilinear maps in the AGH10 scheme [1] and the
number of elements of the public key in the LOSSW06 scheme [64] depend
on the security parameter, which are quite large. Thus, these schemes are
inecient.
As approaches for combinations of digital signatures and routing proto-
cols, Kent [52], Zhao et al. [108], and Boldyreva and Lychev [16] have pro-
posed the following results. Kent [52] proposed S-BGP, and BGPSEC [59]
is a protocol such as a specication of this protocol. After, Zhao et al. [108]
proposed a path-authentication protocol with aggregate signatures as a vari-
ant of S-BGP. Boldyreva and Lychev [16] formalized several threats of the
routing protocols and showed the relation between the unforgeability of dig-
ital signatures and the security.
3.2 Denition of Ordered Multisignatures
In this section, we dene a syntax of an ordered multisignature scheme and
the security. Ordered multisignatures are a natural extension of multisigna-
tures where the signatures guarantee not only messages but also the signing
order, and its signing procedure is not interactive but sequential among a
group of signers. In other words, each signer signs any common message one
by one and a case that multiple signers sign in parallel is out of the scope
of this primitive.
3.2.1 The Syntax
An ordered multisignature scheme consists of the following algorithms. In
this chapter, we dene  i := pk1 k    k pki to be the signing order from the
rst signer to ith signer where  0 := ;, and denote by j ij the number of
signers in  i.
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Setup Given security parameter 1k, generate a public parameter para.
Key Generation Given para, generate a secret key ski and its correspond-
ing public key pki.
Signing Given a secret key ski, a public key pki, a messagem, a multisigna-
ture 0 from the previous signers, and a signing order  i 1, generate a
signature . In any problem occur, output an error symbol ?. Finally,
set  i =  i 1 k pki and output the signature  on m in  i, where for
i = 1 set  1 = pki as an initial value.
Verication Given m, ,  n and fpkigni=1, output accept or reject.
The correctness of the ordered multisignature scheme is dened as fol-
lows. In an ordered multisignature scheme, we say that the scheme is
correct if, for all para; ski and pki given by Setup and Key Genera-
tion, Verication(m;Signing(ski; pki;m; 
0;  i 1);  i; fpkjgij=1) outputs
accept.
3.2.2 Security Model
In this model, there exist an adversary A and a challenger C. Our model is a
variant of the certied key model [13]. The certied key model assumes that
each user knows a secret key corresponding to its own public key. Although
there are models providing stronger security such that there is no such an
assumption, these models constrict understanding properties to prove the
security due to the complicated analysis. Meanwhile, in majority of the
existing schemes, the public key corresponding to a secret key x is gx, and a
knowledge of the secret key is easily guaranteed by the Schnorr identication
scheme [84]. Hence, PKI-based security based on the certied key model is
realistic.
C has a list L of certied keys that is used to certify users' own public
keys. A can know all secret keys corresponding to public keys included in
L except for the one given by C to a target signer. A's advantage is equal
to the probability that C outputs accept in the following game. Similarly
as the existing model of ordered multisignatures [14], our security model
guarantees authenticity of the message signed by an honest signer and its
position i in a path, but not which signers signed before or will sign after the
i-th signer. We do not consider switching of the positions among colluding
malicious signers. For instance as shown in [14], there are malicious signers
corresponding to pk1 and pk3 colluding each other against an honest signer
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corresponding to pk2. Signers corresponding to pk1 and pk3 may be able
to compute some signature  on m in  2 = pk1 k pk2 after obtaining 
on m in  3 = (pk3 k pk2) k pk1. According to [14], this setting seems to
be acceptable in the application described in Section 7.1.3. Hereinafter, we
denote by x(i) the value of the ith query for all x. C interacts with A as
follows:
Initial Phase Generate a public parameter para by Setup and a a pair of
challenger keys (sk; pk) by using Key Generation. Then, register
pk in L, and run A with para and pk as input.
Certication Query Given (ski; pki) by A check that ski is a secret key
corresponding to pki, and then register pki in L if so. Otherwise,
return ?.
Signing Query Given a signing query (m(h); 0; pk;  i(h) 1) by A of the
target signer pk for all i 2 [1; n], check that the following conditions
hold for the query: Verication algorithm outputs accept;  i(h) 1
does not include pk; for j = [1; i  1], pkj in  i(h) 1 is certied in L;
j i(h) 1j < n. If all the conditions hold, run Signing(sk; pk;m(h); 0,
 i(h)), and return  and  i(h) =  i(h) 1 k pk. Otherwise, return ?.
Output After iterating over the above steps, A outputs a forgery (m; ;  n),
where let the target signer with pk be the ith signer in  n. Check
that the following conditions hold for the given forgery: Verication(m,
;  n; fpkigni=1) outputs accept; (m; i) =2 f(m(h); i(h))gqsh=1 holds;  n
includes pk; for j = [1; n], pkj in  n is included in L. If all these
conditions hold, then output accept. Otherwise, output reject.
Denition 5. We say that an adversary A breaks an ordered multisignature
scheme with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ) if a challenger C outputs accept in the security
game described above within an execution time t and with a probability
greater than . Here, A can generate at most qc certication queries and at
most qs signing queries, ` is the length of the message output by A, and n
is the number of signers included in the forgery.
3.3 Our Basic Approach
In this section, we discuss mathematical properties to prove the security of
ordered multisignatures under the standard assumptions. First, we recall
the observation by Boldyreva et al. [14] as technical problems, and then
describe our approach to overcome them.
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3.3.1 Technical Problem
Boldyreva et al. [14] proposed the CDH-based ordered multisignature scheme
based in the random oracle model, and one might think that an ordered mul-
tisignature scheme without random oracles can be constructed from their
scheme. However, as described in Section 7.1 according to [14], they alleged
that if the Waters multisignature scheme by Lu et al. [64] is substituted
for a part of the random oracle in their ordered multisignature scheme,
the approach to prove the security no longer seems to work. More speci-
cally, a simulator for the security proof without random oracles requires a
new component including random numbers to simulate the signing oracle in
comparison with that with the random oracles. Here, we note that ordered
multisignatures have two components, i.e., a message and the signing or-
der. Consider that any random number included in a signature is re-utilized
in the newly additional component in order to reduce the signature size.
The additional component is embedded an unknown value, which is an in-
stance of the CDH problem. Then the proof simulator has to compute with
the random number, which is unknown for the simulator. Intuitively, the
simulation becomes unworkable due to interference between these unknown
values, i.e., the random number and the instance.
In the existing approaches to overcome this problem, a signature com-
ponent is compressed into a single one by utilizing aggregate signatures.
Intuitively, the approach allows the proof simulator to deal with only a sin-
gle component, and hence the interference between the random number will
never occur. However, the aggregate signatures bring a degradation of the
eciency since these requires a large redundant space in public parameters
in order to allow each signer to deal with variable messages. Thus, we have
to solve the problem without utilizing the aggregate signatures.
3.3.2 Our Strategy
Our main strategy is to utilize two properties, called the dual re-randomization
and the full aggregation.
The proof in [14] is based on the re-randomization technique. Our idea
is to separate an algebraic structure of the signature equation into three
components, i.e., secret keys, a message and the signing order, and to give
individual random number to the message component and the signing order
component in order to dually execute the re-randomization. We call this
technique dual re-randomization. Intuitively, the re-randomization for each
component is executed in parallel. In this strategy, while the signing oracle
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can be simulated as long as the re-randomization for either component is
available, another random number is not aected by the random number
simulating the oracle. In other words, our proof can be considered as simu-
lations of the ordinary signatures in a dual way, and hence we can avoid the
interference between the random numbers.
Meanwhile, another important property, the full aggregation, is a prop-
erty such that the size of the random part in the signatures is independent of
the number of signers. The full aggregation provides the eciency and also
makes a security proof easy. In particular, even if the dual re-randomization
is available, the proof simulator needs component-wise reduction cost un-
less achieving the full aggregation. This implies that the eciency of the
security reduction is degraded in the exponential order with respect to the
number of the signers. In other words, by compressing the random numbers
as small as possible, a perspective of the security proof with multiple signers
comes closer to a proof of ordinary signatures for a single signer, and thus
the security can be eciently proven.
Under these observations, we can construct ordered multisignature schemes
without random oracles from the Waters hash function and the chameleon
hash function respectively.
3.4 Waters Hash Realization
In this section, we propose an ordered multisignature scheme with the Wa-
ters hash function. We assume that there exists a trusted center to generate
a public parameter.
3.4.1 The Construction
A message m in this scheme will be dealt with as a bit-string f0; 1g` for all `
and we denote bymi the ith bit of the messagem. We can let the `-bit string
be the output of a collision-resistant hash functions H : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g`.
Setup Given 1k, generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e), random gener-
ators g1; g2 2 G and ` + 1 generators (u0; u1;    , u`) 2 G`+1. Output
(p;G;GT ;e; g1; g2; u0; u1;    ; u`) as a public parameter para.
Key Generation Given (p;G;GT ; e; g; u0, u1;    , u`), choose random num-
bers i; ti; vi  Zp, and set Ai = gi1 ; Ti = gti1 and Vi = gvi1 . Output
(gi2 ; ti; vi) as a secret key ski and (Ai; Ti; Vi) as its corresponding pub-
lic key pki.
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Signing Given (ski; pki;m; 
0;  i 1), parsem as `-bit strings (m1;    ;m`) 2
f0; 1g`, 0 as (Si 1; Ri 1;Wi 1) and  i 1 as a set fpkjgj2[1;i 1] of
public keys, where pki = (Ai; Ti; Vi) for all i. If i = 1, i.e., for the
rst signer in the signing group, then set (Si 1; Ri 1;Wi 1) = (1; 1; 1)
and fpkjgj2[1;i 1] = ; and the following verication step is skipped.
Next, check that  i 1 includes pki. If so, output ?. Otherwise, ver-
ify that the received signature 0 is a valid signature on m in  i 1
by using Verication for n = i   1. If Verication outputs reject,
abort the process and output ?. Otherwise, generate random numbers
ri; wi  Zp and compute as follows:
Ri = Ri 1  gri1 ; Wi =Wi 1  gwi1 ;
Si = Si 1  gi2
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ari W iti+vii
0@ Y
j2[1;i 1]
T jj Vj
1Awi :
Finally, set  i =  i 1 k pki, then output m,  = (Si; Ri;Wi).
Verication Given (m;;  n; fpkigni=1), parsem as an `-bit string (m1;    ,
m`) 2 f0; 1g`,  as (Sn; Rn;Wn), and extract each signer's public key
(Ai; Ti; Vi) from fpkigni=1. Then, check that all of fpkigni=1 are distinct,
and output reject if not. Otherwise, verify that the following equation
holds:
e(Sn; g1)
?
= e
 
g2;
nY
i=1
Ai
!
e
0@Rn; u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1A e Wn; nY
i=1
T ii Vi
!
:
If not, output reject. Otherwise, output accept.
3.4.2 Security Analysis
We now prove that the proposed scheme is secure in the standard model.
Theorem 6. The proposed ordered multisignature scheme is the (t; qc; qs; `,
n; )-secure if (t0; 0)-CDH assumption in G holds, where
t0 = t+ (2qc + nqs + n)te; 0 =

16e(`+ 1)qs(qs + 1)
;
te is the computational cost for one exponentiation and e is base of natural
logarithm.
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Proof. We assume that there exists an adversary A who breaks the proposed
scheme with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ). Then, we build an algorithm B that solves the
CDH problem. In this proof, we assume, without the loss of generality, that
there exists exactly one signer, the target signer, for which A does not know
the secret key. B has the list L of certied-keys, and for all x, we denote
the value of the j-th query by x(j). The details are given below in Initial
Phase. B interacts with A as follows:
Initial Phase: Given a challenge value (g; ga; gb) for the CDH problem
and a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e), B sets L = ;, d = 4qs, g1 = g and
g2 = g
b. Then, B chooses s  f0;    ; `g, `-length vectors xi  Z`d and
yi  Z`p, x0  Zd, and y0  Zp. Here, we dene polynomials F (m) =
(p   ds) + x0 +P`i=1 ximi and J(m) = y0 +P`i=1 yimi. B also sets u0 =
g0p ds+x
0
2 g
y0
1 and ui = g
0xi
2 g
yi
1 as the generators for the public parameter, i.e.,
u0
Q`
j=1 u
mj
j = g
F (m)
2 g
J(m). Finally, B generates random numbers k  [1; n]
and ti  Zp, and then sets T  = (ga)t , V  = (ga) tkgv , and A = ga
as the public key of the target signer. This means that B implicitly sets
a value that includes ab as the target signer's signatures. Then, B runs A
with (p;G;GT ; e; g1; g2; u0; u1;    ; u`; Ai; Ti; Vi).
Certication Query: For any signer, A generates a secret key ski =
(gi2 ; ti; vi) and its corresponding public key pk = (Ai; Ti; Vi), and then pro-
vides ski and pki to B. B checks that e(gi2 ; g1) = e(g2; Ai), Vi = gvi1 , and
Ti = g
ti
1 . If all these equations hold, pki is registered in L. Otherwise, the
output is ?.
Signing Query: Given a signing query (pk;m(h);  i(h) 1; 
0) generated
by A for the target signer, B checks that F (m(h)) 6= 0_i(h) 6= k holds where
i(h) is a position of the target signer for h-th query, and aborts the process if
the condition does not hold. Otherwise, B chooses random numbers (r; w) 
Zp and computes either one of the following cases:
(Case 1) F (m(h)) 6= 0 : Compute as follows:
Ri(h) = g
r(ga)
  1
F (m(h)) ; Wi(h) = g
w;
Si(h) = (g
a)
  J(m(h))
F (m(h))
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar0@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw gPj2[1;i(h) 1] j2 :
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From Initial Phase, the following equation holds:
Si(h) = g
ab

(gb)F (m
(h))gJ(m
(h))
  a
F (m(h))
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar0@i(h)Y
j=1
T jj Vj
1Aw
g
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
= g
a+
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar  aF (m(h)) 0@i(h)Y
j=1
T jj Vj
1Aw :
This (Si; Ri;Wi) becomes a valid signature.
(Case 2) F (m(h)) = 0 ^ i(h) 6= k : Compute as follows:
Ri(h) = g
r; Wi(h) = g
w(gb)
  1
t(i(h) k) ;
Si(h) = (g
b)
  v
t(i(h) k)

(ga)i
(h)t(ga) t
kgv
w0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar
(Wi(h))
P
j2[1;i(h) 1](jtj+vj)g
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2 :
From Initial Phase, the following equation holds:
Si(h) = g
abg
 ab t(i(h) k)
t(i(h) k) (gb)
  v
t(i(h) k)

(ga)i
(h)t(ga) t
kgv
w0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar
(Wi(h))
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] jtj+vjg
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
= gab

gat
(i(h) k)+v
  b
t(i(h) k)

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kgv
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j=1
u
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j
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P
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P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
= gab

(T )i
(h)
V 
w  b
t(i(h) k)
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
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j
1Ar
(Wi(h))
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] jtj+vjg
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
= g
a+
P
j2[1;i(h) 1] j
2
0@u0 Y`
j=1
u
mj
j
1Ar0@i(h)Y
j=1
T jj Vj
1Aw  bt(i(h) k) :
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This (Si; Ri;Wi) becomes also a valid signature.
Output: After iterating over the steps described above, A outputs a
forgery  = (Sn; Rn;W n) on a message m in the signing order  n.
If F (m) 6= 0 _ i 6= k holds in the forgery output by A where i is
the position of the target signer, then B aborts. Otherwise, B can solve the
CDH problem via the forgery by A as follows. If the verication equation
holds and F (m) = 0 ^ i = k holds, then S can be written as follows:
S = g
a+
Pn
i=1^i6=i i
2

(gb)F (m
)gJ(m
)
r0@(ga)t(i k)gv nY
i=1^i 6=i
T ii Vi
1Aw
= g
a+
Pn
i=1^i6=i i
2

gJ(m
)
r0@gv nY
i=1^i6=i
T ii Vi
1Aw :
Then, gab can be obtained from
S
g
Pn
j=1^j 6=i j
2 (R
)J(m)(W )v
+
Pn
i=1^i 6=i (iti+vi)
:
B knows all the secret values except for ab and so can compute the above
values. If B's guess is correct, B can solve the CDH problem. Therefore, the
probability is given as follows:
0    Pr [E1] Pr [E2] ;
E1 =
" 
qs^
h=1
F (m(h)) 6= 0
!
^ F (m) = 0
#
;
E2 =
"
qs^
h=1

i(h) 6= k

^ i = k
#
;
and i(h) is the position of the target signer for the signing queries. E1 is
analyzed in a manner similar to the proof in [95], and E2 is analyzed in
a manner similar to the proof in [14]. Therefore, Pr [E1] =
1
16qs(`+1)
and
Pr [E2] =
1
e(qs+1)
. Thus, the probability is 0 = 16e(`+1)qs(qs+1) . Addition-
ally, the execution time of B is that of A plus two exponentiation computa-
tions for Certication Query, n exponentiation computations for Sign-
ing Query for qs times, and n exponentiations for the nal step. Therefore,
t0 = t+ (2qc + nqs + n)te holds, where te is the computational time for one
exponentiation computation.
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3.5 Chameleon Hash Realization
In this section, we propose an ordered multisignature scheme with the
chameleon hash function. This scheme utilizes the synchronized setting [1,
36], and the data size of the public parameter becomes smaller than the
scheme in the previous section.
3.5.1 The Construction
A message m in this scheme will be dealt with as an element m in Zp, and
we can also utilize a collision-resistant hash functions H : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk
to obtain m. In this scheme, we assume that signers are given the value
s = clock() as a common input to the following signing algorithm. It keeps
as internal state sprev denoting the last time period on which it issued a
signature.
Setup Given 1k, generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e), seven genera-
tors (g; u; h; d; c; z; y) 2 G7, and a pseudo-random function (PRF) key
K. Output (p;G;GT ; e; g; u; h; d; c; z; y;K) as a public parameter para
where PRF : f0; 1g ! Zp be a pseudo-random function family.
Key Generation Given (p;G;GT ; e; g; u; h; d; c; z; y), choose random num-
bers i; ti; vi  Zp, and set Ai = gi ; Ti = gti and Vi = gvi . Output
(i; ti; vi) as a secret key ski and (Ai; Ti; Vi) as its corresponding public
key pki.
Signing Given (ski; pki;m; 
0;  i 1), parse 0 as (Si 1; Ri 1;Wi 1; fxjgi 1j=1; s)
and  i 1 as a set fpkjgi 1j=1 of public keys, where pki = (Ai; Ti; Vi) for
all i. If i = 1, i.e., for the rst signer in the signing group, then
set (Si 1; Ri 1;Wi 1) = (1; 1; 1), [1; j   1] = ;, s = clock() and
x := PRFK(m), and the following verication step is skipped. Next,
check that  i 1 includes pki and that sprev = s or s  2k. If so, output
?. Otherwise, verify that the received signature 0 is a valid signature
on m in  i 1 by using Verication for n = i   1. If Verication
outputs reject, abort the process and output ?. Otherwise, record
the current time period as sprev := s, generate two random numbers
(ri; wi) Zp. Then, compute as follows:
Ri = Ri 1  gri ; Wi =Wi 1  gwi ;
Si = Si 1  (umhxd)i

cdlg(s)ezsy
ri
W iti+vii
0@ Y
j2[1;i 1]
T jj Vj
1Awi :
42 CHAPTER 3. ORDERED MULTISIGNATURES
Finally, set  i =  i 1 k pki, then output m,  = (Si; Ri;Wi; x; s).
Verication Given (m;;  n; fpkigni=1), parse  as (Sn; Rn;Wn; x; s), and
extract each signer's public key (Ai; Ti; Vi) from fpkigni=1. Then, check
that all of fpkigni=1 are distinct, and output reject if not. Then, check
that 2k > s > 0 and m = PRFK(m), and output reject if not.
Otherwise, verify that the following equation holds:
e(Sn; g)
?
= e
 
umhxd;
nY
i=1
Ai
!
e

cdlg(s)ezsd;Rn

e
 
nY
i=1
T ii Vi;Wn
!
:
If not, output reject. Otherwise, output accept.
3.5.2 Security Analysis
We now prove that the proposed scheme is secure in the standard model.
The proof is similar to that of the Theorem 6 described in Section 3.4.
Theorem 7. The proposed ordered multisignature scheme is the (t; qc; qs; `,
n; )-secure if (t0; 0)-CDH assumption in G holds, where
t0 = t+ (2qc + (6 + 5n)qs + n+ 2)te; 0 =

e2(qs + 1)2
;
te is the computational cost for one exponentiation and e is base of natural
logarithm.
Proof. In this proof, the setting is almost the same as that in Theorem 4
except that The main strategy of the proof is based on the Hohenberger-
Waters technique [42]. In particular, B rst guess a value l in the range 1
to k where k is the security parameter. This represents a guess that A will
forge on some index s such that l = dlg(s)e. In the original proof in [42],
the proof consists of two steps, i.e., l = s and l = dlg(s)e. However, in
this proof, we can consider only the case of l = dlg(s)e. The reason is that
signatures can be simulated by either component in comparison with the
proof in [42]. Even if l which is one of the abort conditions of the proof
in [42] holds, the proof in this section works via the re-randomization of the
signing order part, i.e., i(h) 6= k. B interacts with A as follows:
Initial Phase: Given a challenge value (g; ga; gb) for the CDH prob-
lem and a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e), B sets L = ;, and d = gb,
and chooses l  [1; k], k  [1; n] and (xu; xh; xz; xc; xy)  Zp. B also
picks a PRF key K and sets u = gxu ; h = gxh ; z = gxz , c = gbgxc and
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y = (gb) lgxy as the public parameter. Then, B sets the public key of the
target signer similarly as the proof of Theorem 4. Finally, B runs A with
(p;G;GT ; e; g; u; h; d; c; z; y;K;Ai; Ti; Vi).
Certication Query: This step is exactly the same as that in Theorem
4.
Signing Query: This step is almost the same as the proof in Theorem
4, but in this proof the condition that B aborts is whether dlg(s(h))e 6=
l _ i(h) 6= k holds or not. Given a query (pk;m(h);  i(h) 1; 0), B aborts
the process if the condition does not hold. Otherwise, B chooses random
numbers (r; w) Zp and computes either one of the following cases:
(Case 1) dlg(s(h))e 6= l : Compute as follows:
Ri(h) = g
r(ga)
1
dlg(s(h))e l ; Wi(h) = g
w;
Si(h) = (g
a)xum+xhx

gr(ga)
1
dlg(s(h))e l
xcdlg(s(h))e+xzs(h)+xy
(gb)r(dlg(s(h))e l) 
0@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw i(h) 1Y
j=1
(umhxd)j :
From Initial Phase, the following equation holds where r0 := r  
a
dlg(s(h))e l :
Si(h) = (u
mhxd)a

gxcdlg(s
(h))ezs
r0
(gxy)r
0
gabg
 ab dlg(s(h))e ldlg(s(h))e l
(gb)r(dlg(s(h))e l)
0@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw i(h) 1Y
j=1
(umhxd)j
= (umhxd)a

gxcdlg(s
(h))ezs
r0
(gxy)r
0
g
b(dlg(s(h))e l)

r  adlg(s(h))e l


0@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw i(h) 1Y
j=1
(umhxd)j
=
i(h) 1Y
j=1
(umhxd)j (umhxd)a

cdlg(s
(h))ezs
(h)
y
r00@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw :
These values become a valid signature.
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(Case 2) dlg(s(h))e = l ^ i(h) 6= k : Compute as follows:
Ri(h) = g
r; Wi(h) = g
w(gb)
  1
t(i(h) k) ;
Si(h) = (g
a)xum(ga)xux(gb)
  v
t(i(h) k)

(ga)i
(h)t(ga) t
kgv
w


cdlg(s
(h))ezs
(h)
y
r
(Wi(h))
P
j2[1;i(h) 1](jtj+vj)
0@i(h)Y
j=1
(T jj Vj)
1Aw

i(h) 1Y
j=1
(umhxd)j :
The computation is almost the same as that of Theorem 4, and we
skip the detail of the computation. These values become also a valid
signature.
Output: After iterating over the steps described above, A outputs a
forgery  = (Sn; Rn;W n ; x; s) on a message m with signing order  n.
If l 6= dlg(s)e _ i 6= k holds in the forgery output by A where i is
the position of the target signer, then B aborts. Otherwise, similarly as the
proof of Theorem 4, B can solve the CDH problem via the forgery by A. In
particular, if the verication equation and l = dlg(s)e ^ i = k hold, then
S can be written as follows where i corresponds to a:
S =

(gxu)m

(gxh)x

gb
a nY
i=1^i6=i

um

hx

d
j


gbgxc
dlg(s)e
gxzs
 
g bl

gxy
r0@(ga)t(i k)gv nY
i=1^i6=i
T ii Vi
1Aw
=

(gxu)m

(gxh)x

gb
a nY
i=1^i6=i

um

hx

d
j 
(gxc)dlg(s
)e gxzs

(gxy)
r

0@gv nY
i=1^i6=i
T ii Vi
1Aw :
Then, gab can be obtained from
S=
Qn
i=1^i6=i
 
um

hx

i d
j
(ga)xum
+xhxi (R)xcdlg(s)e+xzs+xy(W )v
+
Pn
i=1^i 6=i (iti+vi)
:
3.6. DISCUSSION 45
The success probability and the execution time of B can be obtained
similarly as the proof of Theorem 4, where the probability is as follows:
Pr
"
qs^
h=1
(dlg(s)e 6= k) ^ (i = k) ^
qs^
h=1

i(h) 6= k

^ (i = k)
#
:
The probability can be analyzed as E2 in the proof of Theorem 4, and
therefore the probability is 0 = 
e2(qs+1)2
. Similarly, the execution time of B
is t0 = t+ (2qc + (6 + 5n)qs + n+ 2) te holds, where te is the computational
time for the exponentiation computation.
3.6 Discussion
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed schemes with
the LOSSW06 scheme, the AGH10 scheme, and ECDSA as a naive approach
in terms of the memory size of routers, the communication cost and the
verication time.
We evaluate the memory size by summations of the public parameter,
a signature and public keys of the signers, where the number of the signers
is at most 60000. As described in Section 7.1, there are 36000 ASes, and
the maximized value for 16-bit AS number is 65535. Hence, we should
evaluate the memory size for such a scale. Let the security parameter be
128-bit security, i.e., the size of an element in G is 256 bits. Although
the authors of the AGH10 scheme described the Naccache approach [70]
to reduce the parameter size, the approach brings down the eciency of
the security reduction. Hence, we do not consider the Naccache approach.
Under these conditions, we give the result in Fig.3.1(a).
For the communication cost, we evaluate the performances by summa-
tions of a single ordered multisignature and subject key identier of the
public keys, where the size of the subject key identier is based on the se-
curity level. Here, let the number of signers be 20. The reason of 20 signers
is, as shown in [49], because a distance between any two ASes can be fully
covered by 20 hops. We give Fig.3.1(b) as the detail.
For the verication time, we utilize the benchmark of PBC library [65]
as a typical value, where the values we referred to here is the type A curve
shown in the TEPLA web page [47]. According to [47], the computational
time per a bilinear map is 2.2 msec and the computational time per a scalar
multiplication, i.e., an exponentiation, is 2.55 msec. These values are on 80-
bit security which is dierent from the above setting, because the existing
library providing symmetric pairings is only the type A curve in PBC library.
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The evaluation of the verication is for an expected value rather than a
measured value. We give Fig.3.1(c) as the estimation result.
Under these conditions, we conclude our schemes are better than the
other schemes consisting of aggregate signatures. The LOSSW06 scheme re-
quires a large amount of memory, and this scheme is unavailable in routers.
The required size of memory for our schemes are less than one-percent rela-
tively to that of the LOSSW06 scheme. Meanwhile, in the AGH10 scheme,
the total computational delay is quite large. In general, we can consider only
three hops, i.e., Internet service provider (ISP), national Internet registry
(NIR) and ISP. Even in such a network, the delay by the AGH10 scheme is
larger than one-sec, and so this scheme is impractical.
In our schemes, the chameleon-hash-based scheme requires smaller mem-
ory than the Waters-hash-based scheme for a small number of signers. How-
ever, the chameleon-hash-based scheme also requires state-information, and
the security cannot be proven if the same state-information is re-used. Hence,
the Waters-hash-based scheme is based on more standard assumptions.
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(a) Size of Required Memory of the Schemes
(b) Communication Cost of the Schemes
(c) Verication Time of the Schemes
Figure 3.1: Loads of Routers: We evaluate the performances of our schemes
with the existing schemes, ECDSA, the AGH10 scheme and the LOSSW06
scheme. We denote by Our WH Scheme as the scheme based on the Waters
hash function, and by Our CH scheme as the scheme based on the chameleon
hash function.

Chapter 4
Structured Multisignatures
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
Verifying the signing order is sometimes desirable in multisignatures, and
ordered multisignatures described in Chapter 3 is such a primitive. However,
in the real world, relationship among a group of signers is more complicated.
For example, for a group in a company consisting of a boss and his/her subor-
dinates, the boss should sign a document after the subordinates have signed
it. A scheme providing the verication of such a complicated structure is
called structured multisignature scheme [30]. This primitive is an extension
of the ordered multisignatures and has been expected. Many such schemes
have been proposed so far [19, 30, 48, 61, 62, 72, 90, 94, 102]. Whereas the
history of structured multisignature scheme is long, there are few schemes
with the provable security. To the best of our knowledge, only the scheme
by Tada [90], called Tada03 scheme for short, achieves the provable security
with the reduction to DLP. However, the Tada03 scheme has a restriction
in the number of signers to guarantee the security. In particular, there is an
attack called attack-0 [90] that signatures of any signer can be forged via
an algebraic structure representing the signing group. In this chapter, we
construct a structured multisignature scheme without such a restriction.
4.1.2 Our Construction
In this chapter, we propose a structured multisignature scheme, which is
provably secure under DLP assumption, without restriction in the number
of signers. Our basic idea to remove the restriction is to utilize a ring homo-
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morphism. The vulnerability of the Tada03 scheme against the attack-0 is
due to its algebraic structure: more precisely, the signature equation in the
Tada03 scheme includes some coecient depending on a signing group and
an adversary can manipulate the coecient to forge a signature. In order to
resist this attack, we extend the algebraic structure to the ring homomor-
phism. Ring is an extended notion of group and a cryptographic scheme
based on the ring homomorphism provides more possible applications. We
consider that the ring homomorphism allows us to remove the coecient
developed in the Tada03 scheme, and thus can construct a structured mul-
tisignature scheme without the restriction. In the proof of the security, we
adopt to prove in the random oracle model. Through this proof, we adopt
the same strategy with the paper [90] to prove the security. In this strategy,
we have reduce the security of the structured multisignature scheme into the
multi-round identication scheme.
As an instantiation of the proposed scheme, we adopt the non-commutative
ring homomorphism by Chida et al. [26]. In recent years, homomorphic en-
cryption based on algebraic structure such as ring homomorphism is antici-
pated for securing cloud computing and is extensively studied [92, 36, 87]. It
is an interesting question whether ring homomorphism can be positively ap-
plied to other applications such as multisignature schemes. However, these
are inecient, and the ring homomorphism in [26] consists of simple op-
erations utilizing matrix. Thus, we focus on only the ring homomorphism
in [26].
Through this chapter, we dene two signer structures, parallel struc-
ture [19] and serial structure [19]. Intuitively, parallel structure means that
the signing order does not have any meaning, and serial structure means
that the signing order have some meaning. So, in the example of the group
between the boss and the subordinates, we say the structure between the
boss and the subordinate is serial structure. Similarly, we say the struc-
ture among the subordinates is parallel structure. Our proposed scheme
uses non-commutative operation for the serial structure and commutative
operation for the parallel structure.
4.1.3 Related Work
Keys in the rst multisignature scheme by Itakura et al. [48] are only valid
for restricted structures of signers. Later Okamoto [74] proposed the rst
multisignature scheme which species the signing order of a group of signers
without any restriction on the structure of signers. However, these schemes
do not truly the signing group. The rst structured multisignature scheme
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was proposed by Doi et al. [30]. After, many structured multisignature
schemes have been proposed in [19, 61, 62, 72, 90, 102, 94]. They are roughly
classied into two categories, the DLP-based, including the bilinear map,
schemes [19, 61, 62, 72, 90, 102, 94] and the permutation-based scheme [30].
Among them, the permutation-based scheme is unsuitable in complicated
structures such as hierarchical structure and requires a large parameter in
comparison with the DLP-based construction. Hence, we discuss the DLP-
based construction in this work.
In DLP-based scheme, the scheme by Burmester et al. [19], called the
BDD+00 scheme for short, the scheme by Li et al. [61], called the LZL04
scheme for short, and the scheme by Lin et al. [62], the LWZ03 scheme for
short, have no order exibility described in the paper [68], and hence these
are more restricted in the number of signers in comparison with that in the
Tada03 scheme. The security of the scheme by Wang et al. [94], called the
WOMOD07 scheme for short, and that of the scheme by Ohmori et al. [72],
called the OCSN96 scheme for short, are not rigorously proven in the sense
of no reduction algorithm. Hence, the best exsiting scheme scheme is the
Tada03 scheme. However, the security of the Tada03 scheme is proven in
a case that the number of the signers is restricted in order to prevent the
attack-0 described in [90].
4.2 Non-commutative Ring Homomorphism
We dene a group homomorphism and a ring homomorphism, and then
explain the non-commutative ring homomorphism by Chida et al. [26].
4.2.1 Homomorphism
Denition of Group Homomorphism Let (G1; ) and (G2; ) be groups.
A (group) homomorphism is a function f : G1 ! G2 from G1 to G2 for which
the following condition hold:
8a; b 2 G1; f(a  b) = f(a)  f(b):
Denition of Ring Homomorphism Let (R1;+; ) and (R2; y; ) be
rings. A (ring) homomorphism is a function f : R1 ! R2 from R1 to R2 for
which the following condition hold:
8a; b 2 R1; f(a+ b) = f(a) y f(b); f(a  b) = f(a)  f(b)
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4.2.2 Non-commutative Ring Homomorphism by Chida et
al.
We recall the ring homomorphism by Chida et al. [26]. First, we recall
operations and then recall a function.
Denition of Operations Let R and S be nite rings which consist of
the following conditions:
R =

Zp 1 Zp 1
0 Zp 1

and S =

Zp 1 hgi
0 Zp 1

; (4.1)
where p is a large prime and g 2 Zp. Addition ' _+', multiplication '' and
addition 'y', multiplication '' are dened in rings R; S, respectively. We
denote them by (R; _+;); (S; y; ). Those operations are dened as follows:
_+ :

a1 x
0 a2

_+

b1 y
0 b2

=

a1 + b1 x+ y
0 a2 + b2

(4.2)
 :

a1 x
0 a2



b1 y
0 b2

=

a1  b1 a1  y + b2  x
0 a2  b2

(4.3)
y :

a1 x
0 a2

y

b1 y
0 b2

=

a1 + b1 x  y
0 a2 + b2

(4.4)
 :

a1 x
0 a2



b1 y
0 b2

=

a1  b1 ya1  xb2
0 a2  b2

(4.5)
Denition of Function A concrete one-way function F : R! S is dened
as follows:
F

a b
0 c



a mod p  1 gb mod p
0 c mod p  1

(4.6)
The one-way function F : R ! S is shown to be a non-commutative ring
homomorphism in [26].
4.3 Structured Multisignature Scheme
In this section, we dene structures of signers, a syntax of structured mul-
tisignature scheme and the security model.
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4.3.1 Signer Structure
In this subsection, we dene structures of signers. We dene two struc-
tures as the relation for a group of signers, serial structure and parallel
structure, and consider a series-parallel graph described in Chapter 2 as a
signer structure. Here, an edge of a series-parallel graph corresponds to
a signer, and a unique edge for the graph corresponds to a unique index
representing the position of each signer in any structure, i.e., an index i in
 n corresponds to pki which is the ith signer in the signer structure. We
denote by  n a signer structure consisting of n signers, by T (i) a set of
signers connecting to the initial vertex Ii of ith signer in a way such that
T (i) = fxjIi = Tx ^ 1  x < i ^ Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng, by I(i) a set of sign-
ers connecting to the terminal vertex Ti of ith signer in a way such that
I(i) = fxjTi = Ix ^ i < x  n ^ Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng, by fajgj2T (i), for all
a, all aj for j 2 T (i). We also dene an operation _ where i _ n means
extractions of indexes from  n.
4.3.2 Syntax
In this subsection, we introduce a syntax of structured multisignature scheme.
We assume that each signer pki has each hash function fi and hi as random
oracles.
Setup Given a security parameter 1k as input, output a public parameter
param.
Key Generation Given para, output a secret key ski and its correspond-
ing public key pki.
Signing Given a message m, a structure  i, signatures j for j 2 T (i) and
ski as input, generate a multisignature i on m for a structure  i. Output
i.
Verication Given (m; i; fpkjgij=1; i) as input, output accept or reject.
4.3.3 Security of Structured Multisignature Scheme
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of the security of the structured
multisignature scheme. This model have been proposed in [90]. We adopt
this model as adversary model to prove the security. In this model, we allow
an adversary A to collude signers to obtain signatures from them.
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Adversary Given a public parameter param and public keys fpkigni=1 of
all signers, an adversary A who has access to random oracles Fi and Hi for
i 2 [1; n] executes the following steps at most h times.
1. A chooses i signers and then generate a structure  (h)i generated by i
signers and a message m(h).
2. A generates a signature (h)j 1 in the structure  (h)j by colluding signers,
where j 2 T (i), and then asks the i-th signer to sign m(h).
3. A obtain a signature (h)i on the message m(h) in the structure  (h)i .
After at most qs iterations from step 1 to step 3, A outputs a forgery
on a message m in the signer structure  i , where it holds (m
;  i ) =2
f(m(h);  (h)i )gqsh=1 and Verication algorithm outputs accept on m in  i .
Denition 8. An adversary A breaks a structured multisignature scheme
with (t; qs; QF ; QH ; n; ) where QH means qF1 ;    ; qFn and QH means qH1 ,
   ; qHn if A which does not know ski can output a forgery that meets the
conditions described above with a success probability greater than  within
an execution time t in the above game. Here, A can send a query at most qs
times, qFi query to Fi and qHi query to Hi. A structured multisignature is
(t; qs, Qf ; Qh; )-secure if there is no adversary who can break a structured
multisignature scheme with (t, qs; Qf ; Qh; ).
4.3.4 Other Attacks
In this section, we describe two attacks, rogue key attack [67] and attack-
0 [90].
Rogue Key Attack According to Micali et al.[67], DLP-based schemes
such as the scheme in Section 3.2 of the paper [67] may possess weakness
related to key setup. An adversary who is a member of a signing group gen-
erates a public key as a function of other signers' public keys. For example,
let the number of signers be n, a public parameter be (p; g), each signer's
secret key be xi and its public key be yi = g
xi mod p, and adversary's secret
key be xa. Then, the adversary computes the following equation as a public
key ya.
ya =
 
n 1Y
i=1
yi
! 1
 gxa(modp): (4.7)
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In this case, the adversary can easily forge a multisignature for the group
of signers, because xa ends up being the group's secret key corresponding a
public key
Qn
i=1 yi of the whole group.
Attack-0 In order to prevent this attack, the number of signers in [90] is
restricted. In their scheme, the verication equation is as follows:
gXi =
Y
i2 n

Reii y
di
i
wi
(modp); (4.8)
where (p; g) mean the public parameter, Xi and Ri mean the signature value,
yi means each signer's public key, ei and di mean hash values, and wi means
a weight of the graph. The weight wi of the graph is the number of path
passing through IDi in the whole structure  n. Hence, colluding signers
may be able to construct a graph such that wi is zero modulo q. Then for
any message m and for any structure  n, the colluding signers may easily
cancel out the target signer's signature. To avoid this attack, it must hold
wi < q for any  n. From Lemma 2.3 in [90], the weight of graph consisting
of n signers is wi  3n=3 for any graph  n. Hence, n < 3log 3 log q must hold
to prevent this attack. Thus, the number of signers is restricted in [90].
4.4 Multi Round Identication Schemes
In this section, we describe a syntax of multi round identication scheme
and its security model. These are used for analyzing the security of the
proposed scheme. We note that Multi Round Identication algorithm
described below is an interactive algorithm between a prover and a verier:
in particular, the prover executes steps for generating random numbers and
4.4.1 Syntax
Setup Given a security parameter 1k as input, output a public parameter
para.
Key Generation Given para as input, generate n pairs of secret key ski
and its public key pki.
Multi Round Identication Given a signer structure  n generated by
n signers and a random string m as message, repeat the following steps for
i = 1 to n.
56 CHAPTER 4. STRUCTURED MULTISIGNATURES
1. Extract a subgraph  i from  n and generates random number Ri and
then generate a signature j for all j such that  j   i.
2. Generates random numbers (di; ei), where di and ei are responses of
random oracle queries hi and fi respectively.
3. Generate i  F (m; ei; di; fXjgj2T (i);  i; ski).
After these iterations, Check if this multi-round identication is valid.
4.4.2 Attack Model for Multi Round Identication Scheme
Security of multi round identication scheme is dened as follows. The pro-
cess of the game is almost the same as that of the structured multisignature
scheme, and hence we omit the detail. The goal of the game is that, given
system parameter para and all signers' public keys pki, an adversary A exe-
cutes the following security game with an honest verier V . Then, A passes
to the verication for any  n 2 G.
4.4.3 Denition of the Security
Denition 9. Adversary A breaks a multi round identication scheme with
(t; ) if A who does not know a secret key xi of a prover can pass to the
security game with an honest verier V for any signer structure  n consisting
of n signers with the success probability greater than  within the execution
time t. Here, A is a passive attacker which does not act as a verier with
true prover.
Denition 10. A multi round identication scheme is (t; )-secure if there
is no adversary who can break the scheme with (t; ).
4.5 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a structured multisignature scheme. First, we
explain the proposed structured multisignature scheme, then explain the
multi round identication scheme.
4.5.1 Structured Multisignature Scheme
In this scheme, each signer pki has hash functions Hi : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gq; Fi :
f0; 1g ! f0; 1gq. We assume an existence of a trusted center that gener-
ates system parameters. Without loss of generality, we assume that each
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multisignature is processed by pki in the order from signer ID1 to IDn. We
also assume each signer appears only once in a signer structure, so that each
signer executes the signature generation only once for the generation of one
multisignature.
Setup Given a security parameter 1k, generate a large prime number p
and q such that qj(p   1), and choose an element g of order q from Zp and
pseudo-random function (PRF) keys K1;K2. Then, return (Zp; g; q;K1;K2)
as a public parameter para where PRF : f0; 1gf0; 1gf0; 1g ! Zq be
a pseudo-random function family.
Key Generation Given para, generate a random number xi 2 Zq as ski.
Then compute yi = g
xi mod p, and choose hash functions Hi : f0; 1g ! Zq
and Fi : f0; 1g ! Zq as pki. Return (xi; yi;Hi; Fi).
Signing Given a messagem, previous signers' signatures j and structures
 j for j 2 T (i) and ski, execute the following steps.
Check if  i consists of only ith signer. If not, execute the verication of
each j by using the verication algorithm, and abort the process if there
is invalid signature for j . If this signer is the rst signer, i.e.,  i 1 =, then
the verication process is skipped.
Then, compose  T (i) := [j2T (i) j as the composition structure of  j for
j 2 T (i). Then, compose  i :=  T (i) \ i. If this signer is the rst one,
set i to  i. Then, choose a random number ri;2  Zq and compute Ri;2 =
gri;2 mod p. Set Ri;1 = PRFK1(m;Ri;2;  i) and Ri;3 = PRFK2(m;Ri;2;  i),
and then compute as follows:
S0 

ai;1 eixi + diri;2 mod q
0 ai;3



ai;1 vi
0 ai;3

; (4.9)
where ai;1 = fi(m;Ri;1;  i); ai;3 = hi(m;Ri;3;  i), ei = fi(m;R1;2 k Rj;2;  i)
and di = hi(m;R1;2 k Rj;2;  i). Then, compute Si = (
P
_+;k2T (i) Sk)  x0
where
P
_+;k2T (i) denotes the summation by _+ for k 2 T (i). If this signer
is the rst one, set Si = S
0. Set Ri;j = (R1;j ; R2;j ;    ; Ri;j) for j 2 [1; 3].
Then, output (Si; fRi;jgj2[1;3]) as i. If there are j signers at the terminal
for  i, then the whole signature i consists of Si =
Pj
_+;k=1
Sk and Ri;j =
(R1;j ; R2;j ;    ; Ri;j) for j 2 [1; 3].
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Verication Check if the following congruence holds:
F (Sn) 

a1;1 y
e1
1 Rd11;2
0 a1;3

1

a2;1 y
e2
2 Rd22;2
0 a2;3

2   
n 1

an;1 y
en
n Rdnn;2
0 an;3

; (4.10)
where i means the addition y if the relation between ith signer and i+1th
signer is a parallel structure, otherwise, the multiplication . In addition,
for the calculation of the right hand side of the congruence, y operation is
searched and any found y operation is computed at rst one by one until all
y operations are computed. Then all  operations are computed one by one
from the leftmost  operation until the rightmost one.
4.5.2 Multi Round Identication Scheme
To analyze the proposed scheme, we consider two multi round identication
schemes as follows. The rst one considers identications of all signers for
all signing structures. The second one considers identications of signers for
a xed signer structure. There are two entities, a prover P and a verier
V , and Multi Round Identication is an interactive algorithm among
them. We also assume an existence of a trusted center to generate a public
parameter para.
Scheme-A
The following scheme is a multi round identication scheme for all signing
structures.
Setup Given a security parameter 1k, generate a big prime number p and
q such that qj(p   1). Then, choose an element g of an order q from Zp.
Output (Zp; g; q) as para.
Key Generation Given para, generate n pairs of a secret key xi 2 Zq
and a public key yi such that yi = g
xi mod p, where n is the number of
signers. Return fyigi=1; ;n.
Multi Round Identication Given  n consisting of n signers and a
random string m as a message, repeat the following step from i = 1 to n.
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1. Extract  i from  n and generate a random number ri;2. Then, com-
puteRi;2 = g
ri;2 , Ri;1 = PRFK1(m;Ri;2;  i) andRi;3 = PRFK2(m;Ri;2,
 i).
2. Generate random numbers ai;1; ai;3; di and ei, where ai;1; ai;3; di and ei
are responses of random oracle queries hi and fi respectively.
3. Compute as follows:
S0 

ai;1 eixi + diri;2 mod q
0 ai;3



ai;1 vi
0 ai;3

; (4.11)
Compute Si = (
P
_+;j2T (i) Sj)  S0 where
P
_+;j2T (i) means the sum-
mation of _+ for j 2 T (i).
After these iterations, for (m; fRn;jgj2[1;3]; Sn;  n) where Rn;j = (u1;j ;    ; un;j),
check if the following equation holds:
F (Sn) 

a1;1 y
e1
1  ud11;2
0 a1;3

1

a2;1 y
e2
2  ud22;2
0 a2;3

2    n 1

an;1 y
en
n  udnn;2
0 an;3

;
where the rule for the operation i is the same as described for the congru-
ence (4.11).
Scheme-B
The following scheme is a multi round identication scheme with a xed
signing structure, and the signing structure is declared beforeMulti Round
Identication algorithm.
Setup This step is the same as that in Scheme-A.
Key Generation This step is the same as that in Scheme-A.
Structure Declaration P chooses a signer structure  n with n signers
and publishes  n.
Multi-Round Identication This step is the same as that in Scheme-A.
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4.5.3 Reduction Lemma
In this subsection, we recall the reduction lemma [73]. We reduce the secu-
rity of the structured multisignature scheme into the security of the multi
round identication scheme.
Denition 11. We say that a multi round identication scheme has the
perfect zero-knowledge property, if there is a polynomial-time machine S
with input all public key yi and any  n consisting of n signers, which satises
the following equation:
X
;;;

Pr

(Rn;j ;En;Dn; Sn) [P (Xn;  n); V (Yn;  n)] :
(Rn;j ;En;Dn; Sn) = (; ; ; )

 Pr

(R0n;j ;E0n;D0n; S0n) S(Yn;  n) :
(R0n;j ;E0n;D0n; S0n) = (; ; ; )

= 0;
where (Rn;j ;En;Dn; Sn)  [P (Xn;  n); V (Yn;  n)] means (Rn;j ;En;Dn; Sn)
is obtained by the execution of Scheme-B between P (Xn;  n) and V (Yn;  n),
En means feigi=1; ;n, Dn means fdigi=1; ;n, Xn means fxigi=1; ;n and Yn
means fyigi=1; ;n.
Lemma 12. Scheme-B has the perfect zero-knowledge property.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is almost the same as that in [90].
Since Scheme-B has the perfect zero-knowledge property, we can obtain
the following ID-reduction lemma similarly with the papers [73, 90].
Lemma 13 (Reduction Lemma). Let 1  1q (qH1(qF1(qH2(   (qFn(2
n+1
qn 1
+qs) + 1)    ) + 1) + 1) + 1).
1. If A1 breaks the proposed scheme with (t1; qs; QF ; QH ; 1), then there
exists A2 who breaks the scheme with (t1; qs;1;1; 2), where 2 = Hn
and 1means n-tuple (1;    ; 1). Here, let H0 = 1; Fi =
Hi 1  1q
qFi
; Hi =
Fi  1q
qHi
.
2. If A2 breaks the proposed scheme with (t1; qs;1;1; 2), there exists A3
who breaks the scheme with (t3; 0;1;1; 3), where t3 = t +O(qs) and
3  2   qsq .
3. If A3 breaks the proposed scheme with (t3; 0;1;1; 3), there exists A4
who breaks a multi-round identication scheme corresponding to the
proposed scheme with (t3; 3).
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is almost the same as Lemma 4.6 in the paper [90].
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4.5.4 Hierarchical Heavy Row Lemma
We adopt the ideas of the hierarchical structures of a boolean matrix and
heavy row introduced in [73] in order to prove the security of our scheme. We
assume that there is a cheater A who can break a multi round identication
scheme with (t; ).
Denition 14. The possible outcomes of the execution of a cheater A and
an honest verier V are denoted by a boolean matrixHi(r; e1; d1;    ; ei 1; di 1;
ei; di;    ; en; dn). The rows of the matrix correspond to all possible choices
of r; e1; d1;    , ei 1; di 1, where r is a random tape and e1; d1;    , ei 1; di 1
are outputs of hash functions. The columns of the matrix correspond to all
possible choices of ei; di;    ; en; dn. Its entries are 0 if V rejects A's proof,
and 1 if V accepts A's proof. A slightly dierent boolean matrix with an
upper script + is dened by H+i (r; e1; d1;    ; ei 1; di 1; ei; di;    ; en; dn),
where the dierence is the place of ei. Finally, a boolean matrix with-
out any upper or lower script is dened by H(r; e1; d1;    ; ei 1; di 1; ei; di;
   ; en; dn; ), where all of r; e1; d1;    ; ei 1; di 1; ei; di;    ; en; dn are placed
on the left of the ";" mark.
Denition 15. A row of matrix Hi is i-heavy if the fraction of 1's along
the row is at least =2i, where  is the success probability of A. A row of
matrix H+i is i-heavy if the fraction of 1's along the row is at least =2i+1.
Lemma 16 (Hierarchical Heavy Row Lemma). If the 1's in H are located
in 1-heavy rows of H1, 2-heavy rows of H2;    ; (i   1)-heavy rows of Hi 1
simultaneously, then they are also located in i-heavy rows of Hi and H+i
with a probability of at least 12 .
Proof. The proof is shown in Lemma 12 in [73].
4.5.5 Security of the Proposed Scheme
First, we show the security of the multi round identication scheme. The
following lemma holds for Scheme-A, because of the denition of multi round
identication adversary.
Lemma 17. If there is an adversary who can break the multi round iden-
tication scheme with (t; ), then there is an algorithm which can solve the
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DLP problem at n times with (t(n); (n)) where
t(n) = (t+ tmri)
2(2n+1) + 3  2n+1(n  1) + 1
3
; (4.12)
(n) =

1  1
q

1
2
2n+n 2
p0()
 
nY
i=1
pi()
2i 1
!
(pn+1())
n 1; (4.13)
tmri is the execution time of the identication scheme, and
p0() =

1  (1  ) 1

; (4.14)
pi() =
 
1 

1  
2i
 2i

!
: (4.15)
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A4 which can break a multi
round identication scheme with (t; ). Then, we construct an algorithm
B which can break the DLP assumption by using A4. From the deni-
tion of boolean matrix (Denition 14), the possible outcomes of the ex-
ecution of A4 and an honest verier V are denoted by boolean matrix
Hi(r; e1; d1;    ; ei 1; di 1; ei; di;    ; en; dn). To nd each secret key, we take
the following strategy.
1. Probe random entries in H to nd an entry a(0) with 1.
2. We denote by H(0)1 the rows where a(0) is located in H1. After a(0) is
found, probe random entries in H(0)1 to nd another entry a(1) with 1.
3. This step is repeated for j 2 [2; n]. We denote by H(i)j the row of
Hj where a(i) is located for each i 2 [0; n(j   1)   1], where for k 2
[0; n] the function n(k) denotes the total number of entries which have
already been found until the execution of this step is nished. After
a(0);    ; an(j 1) 1) are found, probe random entries to nd another
entry a(n(j 1) 1+i) with 1 for i 2 [1; n(j   1)].
4. We denote by H+n the row of H+n where a(i) is located for each i 2
[0; n   2]. After the kth step for k 2 [0; n], probe random entries in
H+(i)n to nd another entries a0(i) with 1 for i 2 [0; n  2].
After the above steps, we can obtain 2n + n  1 simultaneous equations.
Here, in the simultaneous equations, we have 2n unknowns which consist
of n secret keys fxigni=1 and n random numbers fri;2gni=1. In addition, we
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have more unknowns by the execution of the above steps. Therefore, the
total number of unknowns is 2n+n 1. Since the number of the unknowns is
equal to the number of equations, B can nd the value of xi and ri with the
probability of 1  1q which is the probability that the simultaneous equations
are regular. The success probability (n) and the calculation time t(n) of B
can be written by the denition of the adversary, Denition 15 and Lemma
16 as follows. In the above probing step,
1. Find the entry by probing in H 1= times.
2. Find the entry by probing in H1 2= times.
3. For j 2 [2; n], nd the entry by probing in Hk 2k= times.
4. For each i 2 [0; n  2], nd the entry by probing in H+n 2n+1= times.
Therefore, the execution time can be written as follows:
t(n) =
t+ tmri

0@1 + nX
j=1
22k 1 + 2n+1(n  1)
1A
= (t+ tmri)
2(2n+1) + 3  2n+1(n  1) + 1
3
;
where tmri means the execution time of the multi round identication scheme.
Similarly, the success probability can be written as follows:
(n) =

1  1
q

p0()
0@ nY
j=1
(
1
2
pj())
2j 1
1A1
2
pn+1()
n 1
=

1  1
q

1
2
2n+n 2
p0()
 
nY
i=1
pi()
2i 1
!
(pn+1())
n 1;
where, for all i, the following equation holds:
pi() =
 
1 

1  
2i
 2i

!
:
The following theorem can be obtained from the above lemma and the
reduction lemma.
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Theorem 18. If there is an adversary who can break the proposed struc-
tured multisignature scheme with (t; qs; QF ; QH ; ), then there is an algo-
rithm which can solve the DLP at n times with (t(n); (n)), where
t(n) = (t+ tmri + ts)
2(2n+1) + 3  2n+1(n  1) + 1
33
;
(n) =

1  1
q

1
2
2n+n 2
p0()
 
nY
i=1
pi(3)
2i 1
!
(pn+1(3))
n 1 ;
tmri is the execution time of the multi round identication scheme, ts is the
simulation time of qs signatures, and
p0() =

1  (1  3)
1
3

;
pi() =
 
1 

1  3
2i
 2i
3
!
:
Discussion about Known Attacks
In this subsection, we discuss the security about known attacks described in
section 4.3.4.
Rogue Key Attack To prevent this attack, Bellare and Neven proposed
a simple solution such that the exponent of each public key is always dier-
ent by using hash function, except with negligible probability in [10]. We
have adopted this idea to the proposed scheme, and so our scheme can be
prevented the eect of attacking key generation.
Attack-0 As explained in 4.3.4, colluding signers may be able to construct
a graph such that the weight wi of the graph is zero mod q so that the
target signer's signature is cancelled out in the verication equation (8). In
contrast, the verication congruence (11) of our scheme does not include the
weight wi of graph. This property can be obtained by the operation on the
ring homomorphism by Chida et al. [26]. Moreover, multisignatures in our
scheme are computed by Si = (
P
_+;j2T (i) Sj)  S0. For the multiplication
, the (1,1)-element of P _+;j2T (i) Sj and the (2,2)-element of S0, which are
random numbers, are multiplied to the (1,2)-elements of
P
_+;j2T (i) Sj and S
0,
respectively. As a result, the (1,2)-element of the matrix in the right hand
of the verication congruence (11) can be written as
Q
i

yeii  udii;2
P
 A
,
4.6. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 65
Table 4.1: Performance evaluation for n signers
Security Order Signer Restriction in the
Assumption Flexibility Structure number of signers
BDD+00 [19] (DLP) No
Serial,
Parallel No
LZL04 [61] CDH No
Serial,
Parallel No
MM00 [68] (DLP) Yes Serial Yes
OCSN96 [72] (DLP) Yes Serial Yes
Tada03 [90] DLP Yes
Serial,
Parallel No
WOMOD07 [94] CDH Yes
Serial,
Parallel Yes
Our scheme DLP Yes
Serial,
Parallel Yes
where A is a term
Q
 a;j for j 2 f1; 3g,  selected in this product is
determined by the given  n and  6= i. Although A may be determined only
by colluding signers' variables a;j , each a;j in the product is a hash value.
Since hash functions Fi and Hi for computing a;l are collision resistant, the
probability that adversaries nd appropriate hash values that cancel out the
signature of target signer is negligible if q is enough large. In other words,
the probability that
P
A becomes zero mod q is negligible without the
restriction on the number of signers.
4.6 Evaluation of the Proposed Scheme
We compare the proposed scheme with DLP-based schemes in [19, 61, 68,
72, 90, 94] with respect to security assumption, order exibility, signing
structure and restriction of the number of signers. We showed the result as
Table.2. Concerning the security assumption, the BDD+00 scheme [19], the
MM00 scheme [68], the OCSN96 scheme [72], the Tada03 scheme [90] and
our scheme are based on the DLP assumption, and only the Tada03 scheme
and our scheme are proven as dicult as solving the DLP (unproven schemes
are shown with (DLP)). We discuss about the property among them. As
shown in Table 4.2, the BDD+00 scheme, the LZL04 scheme, the OCSN96
scheme, the Tada03 scheme, the WOMOD07 scheme and our scheme deal
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with both the serial structures and the parallel structures. In contrast with
the Tada03 scheme, our proposed scheme has no restriction in the number
of signers since our scheme can prevent the attack-0 without restricting the
number of signers.
Chapter 5
BGP-Aiding Aggregate
Signatures
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Motivation
Overview A problem for designing the Internet is injections of false in-
formation in routing information of autonomous systems (ASes) in border
gateway protocol (BGP) [79]. For instance, in 2008, the incident called
YouTube Hijacking [80] occurred where a path information to Youtube [104]
was mistakenly replaced with that to Pakistan Telecom. One of approaches
to resist these threats is to guarantee the validity of the path information,
and secure-border gateway protocol (S-BGP) [52] or border gateway protocol
security extension (BGPSEC) [59] have been focused as such technologies.
However, there are two problems preventing development of the technology.
One of the problems is overloads for routers [89], and the routers require a
large amount of memory such as several tens of giga bytes. Another problem
is a packet limitation of BGP. The limitation is 4096 bytes [79], and the to-
tal size of the packets including signatures and informations of public keys
has to be smaller than the limitation. Nevertheless, there are 65,535 AS
numbers (ASNs) [46] and their public key information. Hence BGP security
from the existing technologies is impossible since the total size of the public
keys are linear. In this paper, in order to address these problems, we design
a practical and provably-secure scheme for securing BGP.
An aggregate signatures scheme [17] is a cryptographic approach against
this problem, and the scheme allows n signers to generate n signatures on
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n individual messages and to combine all of these signatures into a single
short signature. For instance, by utilizing aggregate signatures, each router
signs its own routing table and aggregates their signatures with ones given
from other routers into a short signature. Hence, many researchers have
alleged that a key application of aggregate signatures is for BGP security.
However, we point out problems of these schemes in the interoperation of
BGP in two points of view.
The rst point is a gap between recent development of aggregate signa-
tures and a realistic setting of BGP security. More specically, as indicated
in the latest researches [15, 18, 35, 37, 54, 55], the state-of-the-art aggre-
gate signature schemes are intended for sequential aggregate signatures [66]
with aggregate-signing where each signer aggregates signatures at the same
time as signing. Meanwhile, recent BGP technologies are intended for mul-
tipath [4, 88]. That is, there are multiple paths between any routers in
order for improvements of the availability and the throughput. Intuitively,
this means that sequential aggregate signatures disallow to aggregate sig-
natures between paths, and an individual signature is generated for each
path. Unfortunately, developments of aggregate signatures in recent years
is inapplicable for the key application. Here, the gap occur in the case of
multipath BGP which is the latest technology for BGP. We note that the
sequential aggregate signatures are applicable for the traditional BGP secu-
rity [52] and that these signatures give rise to many practical applications
such as certicate chain.
The second problem is the eciency. BGP security apparently becomes
practical by aggregate signatures. However, according to a specication
of BGP security extension [58], subject key identiers (SKIs), which are
unique identiers of public keys, are included in a BGP packet. Hence, the
packet limitation is still a major problem even if the aggregate signatures
are available.
5.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we discuss an aggregate signature scheme which is the best
practice in routing security and call such a scheme BGP-aiding aggregate
signature scheme. In particular, contributions of this work is as follows: (1)
we describe requirements of BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme; (2) we
propose the modied-Gentry-Ramzan scheme.
Requirements of a BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme are as follows:
(a) the size of signatures is xed with respect to the number of signers; (b)
any third party can compress individual signatures into a single short sig-
nature, and (c) the scheme is an ID-based scheme. For the rst reason,
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Figure 5.1: BGP Multihoming
BGP has a restriction in the packet size, which is 4,096 bytes, and hence
the size of signatures has to be independent of the number of signers. For
the second reason, sequential aggregate signatures, which are a mainstream
in recent schemes, allows only signers who have secret keys to compress
signatures, and hence an individual signature is generated for each path in
the multi-path setting. This property brings down the improvement of the
eciency by aggregate signatures. In the light of a specication of BGP, an
aggregation of signatures without secret keys, called general aggregation, is
crucial. The general aggregation essentially support the multi-path. Finally
we describe the third reason. In the specication of BGP, packets include
subject key identier to identify public keys utilized to sign. Even if the size
of signatures is xed, we have to consider the restriction in the packet size
since the the number of the subject key identier becomes linear. Crypto-
graphic scheme suitable in such an environment as conventional framework
is ID-based cryptosystem. In ID-based cryptosystem, each user can utilize
any string as a public key, and hence the user can easily manage a certicate.
We note that ID-based signatures have high anity with BGP security in
the sense that certicates become unnecessary.
In this work, we modify the scheme by Gentry and Ramzan [36], called
GR06 scheme for short, to t into BGP. In the existing schemes, there are
several schemes which have a similar capability as the requirements of the
BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme, but trivially utilizing these schemes
may have a vulnerability. In particular, there is a potential vulnerability
against by increasing the number of signers, and hence we have to consider
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a restriction in the number of the signers. Only the modied-GR06 scheme
is available in such a situation.
5.1.3 Related Work
In this section, we describe several works in terms of aggregate signatures
and combinations of digital signatures and BGP security.
Aggregate signatures [17] are a general variant of multisignatures [48].
The most famous one in this framework was proposed by Boneh et al. [17]
while an older scheme with such a message-exibility was proposed by Mit-
omi and Miyaji [68] individually. There are three types of aggregate signa-
tures, i.e., general one [17], sequential one [66] and synchronized one [36].
The rst scheme of the general type was proposed by Boneh et al., and this
type requires an interactive process. After, the rst sequential scheme was
proposed by Lysyanskaya et al. [66], and this type allows each signer to ag-
gregate by sequentially passing the aggregate from one signer to the next.
In the sequential type, the signers can execute signing generations and their
aggregation at the same time, and hence the trac in the whole network
can be reduced. Synchronized aggregate signatures were dened by Gentry
and Ramzan [36], and Ahn et al. [1] gave a more detail denition. The
synchronized type allows signers to share state-informations, and signatures
with the same state-information can be aggregated. The scheme discussed
in this paper has the properties of all the three schemes.
There are several works with respect to BGP security introducing digital
signature schemes. Zhao et al. designed a system combining an aggregate
signature scheme with BGP, and evaluated
5.2 BGP and Its Security Extension
In this section, we describe BGP and S-BGP as its security extension.
5.2.1 Border Gateway Protocol
Overview
Border gateway protocol is a path vector routing protocol. The current
Internet is a large network that links together smaller networks to each
other, and each network is called an autonomous system (AS). In recent,
there are 36,000 ASes in the Internet [25]. Each AS has a unique number
represented by a unique 2-byte as an AS number (ASN), and manages its
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Figure 5.2: Update Message of BGP
subnetworks described as IP prexes which are ranges of IP addresses. ASNs
are assigned in blocks by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Recursively, RIRs assign ASNs from
IANA within their designated areas.
More specically, routers executing BGP are called BGP speakers. The
BGP speakers maintain connections called BGP sessions with neighboring
speakers, and send an update message to advertise a new preferred route to
its prex. The message consists of attribute information, and the important
ones are IP prex and AS path. An AS path is a sequence of AS numbers
that species a sequence of ASes in the network, and especially the last AS
in the sequence is called the originator of this route. The BGP speakers
keep routes in routing information basis (RIB). One Adj-RIBs-In per keeps
received routes from the peer, and Loc-RIB records all preferred routes for
each prex. Hereafter, we dene the Adj-RIBs-In and Loc-RIB as a routing
table for the BGP speaker. Ordinarily, when each speaker adds a new route,
a Loc RIB of the speaker replaces a previously preferred route with the new
one.
We give the detail of a packet in BGP in Fig.5.2.1. The limitation of
the packet is 4096 bytes, where the size of the header is 19 bytes, the length
information of the path is four bytes and the rest of 4,073 bytes is variable
space for the path information.
Multi-Path Routing
In recent BGP, the multi-path is adopted from following viewpoints. The
Detail of advantages of the multi-path has been described in [91].
Higher Network Capacity By utilizing the multi-path, it is possible to
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Figure 5.3: Update Message of BGPSEC
push more trac through the network, because the trac ow through
any path that has available capacity.
Improved Response to Path Changes If any path becomes failed, BGP
reroutes packets through alternate routes. However, its convergence
time in the single path setting may be measured in minutes, and this
means that a part of the network becomes unavailable. The conver-
gence time should be improved as fast as possible, and the multi-path
setting has a potential advantage to improve the response time to sec-
onds [29].
Enhanced Security Man-in-the-middle attacks are much harder to achieve,
because a single interception point is insucient and an attacker needs
to be located along the multiple paths. In addition, even if denial-of-
service attacks occurs, the multi-path setting allows operators to move
the trac to alternative paths. Hence, the multi-path BGP also has a
potential advantage against denial-of-service attack.
5.2.2 Security Extension
BGP is vulnerable to malicious actions such as an advertisement of a fake
path, because BGP speakers fully depend on the routing information send
from neighboring speakers. Hence, authentication mechanisms are required
to guarantee the validity of route advertisements. Origin authentication con-
siders whether the originating AS controls the claimed IP address ranges.
Path authentication conrms that all the ASes are authorized to advertise
the routes to destination IP address blocks. S-BGP and BGPSEC were
proposed as such protocols. Address attestations are for origin authentica-
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Figure 5.4: BGPSEC path Attribute
tion, and route attestations are for path authentication. To support signing
and verication processes, S-BGP and BGPSEC require PKI. In particular,
ASes have their own X.509 as certicates of public keys. A route attesta-
tion is signed by a BGP speaker to authenticate the existence and position
of an AS number in an AS path. Such an attestation is nested, and each
BGP speaker signs the AS path in sequence. At rst, the speaker signs the
origin BGP speaker signs the AS number of the origin autonomous system,
the prex, and the intended receiver. The next signer is the recipient of
this route attestation, and signs the concatenation of the new AS path, the
prex, and intended recipient. The process goes on until the entire AS path
is signed.
We give the detail of a packet of BGPSEC in Fig. 5.2.2. According
to [58], the construction is almost the same as that of BGP-4, which is the
conventional BGP, except for AS path attribute information are replaced to
BGPSEC path attribute in Fig. 5.2.2.
5.3 Aggregate Signatures
we describe several related works in terms of ID-based aggregate signatures
and structured signatures.
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5.3.1 Exiting Schemes
Although many aggregate signature schemes have been proposed [1, 6, 9,
17, 35, 55, 54, 64, 66, 71, 85], there are few ID-based aggregate signature
schemes [6, 14, 15, 31, 36, 94]. The famous schemes are the general scheme
by Bagherzandi and Jarecki [6], the synchronized scheme by Gentry and
Ramzan [36] and the sequential scheme by Boldyreva et al. [14, 15], where
the scheme in [14] was broken by Hwang et al. [45] but the bug was xed
in [15]. Unfortunately, all of these schemes except for the scheme by Wang et
al. [94] cannot deal with a complicated structure such as that in structured
signature schemes. Only the scheme by Wang et al. can deal with the
structures, but, this scheme is remarkably inecient in the sense that both
the signature size and the number of computations of the bilinear maps
increase linearly. Hence, we judge that there is, in essence, no ID-based
structured aggregate signature scheme. We note that an open problem of
ID-based aggregate signatures is to construct a scheme without random
oracles.
Whereas researches for ID-based aggregate structured signatures are few,
several schemes have been reported in the framework of the conventional
public key cryptography [19, 30, 61, 62, 90, 100]. The oldest one was an RSA-
based structured signature scheme by Doi et al. [30], and then Burmester et
al. [19] proposed the rst DLP-based scheme. These schemes hierarchically
classify their handling structures, i.e., a serial structure as a relation among
vertical relationships and a parallel structure as a relation among horizontal
relationships, and these schemes can deal with the same structures as that
of our scheme. In this approach, Mitomi and Miyaji [68] dened the order
exibility as a desirable property. In the schemes with no order exibility,
the number of signers are drastically restricted. To the author's knowledge,
the schemes meeting this capability have been proposed only in [90, 100].
Among them, the scheme with the xed size signature is only the one by
Yamamoto and Ogata [100]. Nevertheless, the scheme is inecient because
the number of computations of the bilinear maps increases linearly.
5.3.2 Application to BGP Security
Since aggregate signatures allow each signer to sign an individual document
and to compress these signatures, many researchers have focused on BGP
as its key application. For instance, by utilizing aggregation signatures in
BGP, BGPSEC path attribute can be written as Fig. 5.5. The size of the
signatures which is the main problem in the conventional schemes becomes
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Figure 5.5: BGPSEC path Attribute with Aggregate Signatures
xed, and so a large number of paths can be constructed.
5.4 BGP-Aiding Aggregate Signatures
In this section, we describe the existing gap between the recent routing
security and aggregate signatures and a notion of BGP-aiding aggregate
signatures. Then, we dene a syntax of a BGP-aiding aggregate signature
scheme and its security. In this chapter, we utilize the following notations.
We denote byM an message space and by ID an ID space. We also denote
by IDi 2 f0; 1g the ith signer, by mi 2 f0; 1g message to be signed by
IDi, by i a signature generated by IDi, by mpk a master public key, by
msk a master secret key, and by ski a secret key of IDi.
5.4.1 Technical Gaps between Routing Security and Recent
Aggregate Signatures
Recent researches for aggregate signatures aim to construct sequential ag-
gregate signatures [15, 18, 35, 37, 54, 55]. Unlike other types of aggre-
gate signatures, the sequential aggregate signatures allow signers to avoid
to broadcast signatures, and the trac of the network can be decreased.
Even with such a positive property, we judge the sequential aggregate sig-
natures are unsuitable in BGP under the multi-path setting. In particular, a
sequential aggregate signature scheme utilizes aggregate-signing where each
signer signs and aggregates at the same time instead of an ordinary signing
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Table 5.1: Evaluation of Proposed Scheme
We compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the existing
ID-based aggregate signature schemes with respect the computational cost
for ith signer, the computational cost for a verier with n signers and the
signature size. We denote by P the computational cost of a bilinear map,
by E the computational cost of an exponentiation computation, by H the
computational cost of a map-to-point, by L(p) the binary length of a prime
number p, by L(N) the binary length of a composite number N , and by k
as a security parameter. Typical values for these parameters are L(p) = 176
on a symmetric pairing for 80-bit security, ` = 176, n = 20, and, with
Type A curve in PBC library [65] according to [47], the cost per one P is
2:2078 msec, the cost per one E is 2:5591 msec and the cost per one H is
5:8960 msec. For Multihoming, \Applicable" means that the scheme is ap-
plicable to multihoming, but \Not" means that the scheme is not applicable.
Relate Work
Signature
Size
Number of
Rounds Multihoming Cryptosystem
BG10 [6]
2L(N) + 2k
+ log n 2 Applicable IBC
BGLS03 [17] L(p) 1 Applicable PKI
BGOY10 [15] 3L(p) - Not IBC
DZXH09 [31] (n+ 1)L(N) - Not IBC
GR06 [36] 2L(p) + k 1 Applicable IBC
GLOW12 [37] 5L(N) - Not IBC
WOMOD07 [94] 2nL(p) - Applicable IBC
Modied GR06 2L(p) + k 1 Applicable IBC
algorithm. In other words, the sequential aggregate signature scheme re-
quires each signer to provide a secret key. In this case, while an individual
signature is generated for each path, these signatures cannot be aggregated.
Thus, we consider that the sequential aggregate signature scheme has a gap
from a realistic network environment. Meanwhile, in order to remove the
restriction in the number of ASes from BGP, we have to consider subject
key identiers which become a new bottleneck.
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Figure 5.6: BGPSEC path Attribute with ID-based Aggregate Signatures
5.4.2 Requirements of BGP-Aiding Aggregate Signatures
As described in the previous section, the main discussion of aggregate sig-
natures for BGP is how to aggregate signatures for dierent paths. In this
section, we discuss capability required in BGP of aggregate signatures, and
review the existing schemes.
ID-based Signature Scheme The packet size of BGP is restricted in
4,096 bytes, and the total size of data including signatures and subject key
identiers must be smaller than this value. In the conventional public key
cryptosystem, a public key is given as a random string and a subject key
identier is necessary in order to distinguish the public key of each user. In
general, the size of the subject key identiers is twenty bytes and is ignored
for constructing a cryptosystem. However, these data become a problem
for a small packet space such as BGP, and so these should be removed. As
known cryptographic primitives, we can utilize ID-based cryptography [86].
For instance, by utilizing an ID-based signature scheme, each AS can utilize
its AS number as a public key. This approach allows ASes to remove the
subject key identiers from the packets, and hence the packets can be written
in Fig. 5.4.2.
We also discuss the advantage of ID-based cryptography from the aspect
of an operation side. ID-based cryptography is sometimes misunderstood as
a method to remove certicates since any string can be utilized as a public
key. The certicates are used in order to specify a utilized cryptographic
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algorithm and its parameter, and so are necessary even if an ID-based cryp-
tosystem is utilized [49]. Meanwhile, since a key generation center cannot
choose a string corresponding to a public key, constructing trust in a re-
lation between each user and its corresponding ID information is a crucial
task [77]. Nevertheless, we note that the certicates become unnecessary in
BGP security by utilizing the ID-based cryptosystem, because in this frame-
work ASes can utilize a standardized data format specied for BGP packets.
In addition, AS numbers are decided by IANA in advance, and trust in the
relation between users and ID can be established via the trust in IANA.
General Aggregation General aggregation allows any third party to ag-
gregate generated signatures, and ordinary schemes such as the rst ag-
gregate signature scheme [17] adopts the method. Intuitively, the method
requires an interactive process of signers, and is considered as an inecient
approach. Hence, in recent researches an alternative method, sequential
aggregation, has been studied [15, 18, 35, 54, 55, 71]. Among these two
methods, we judge that general aggregation is suitable for the multi-path:
in particular, each AS can combine signatures given from each path and
then can sign path information of the combined networks.
5.4.3 Denition of Signer Structures
In this subsection, we dene structures of signers. The denition is almost
the same as that in Chapter 4, and recall the denition. We dene two
structures as the relation for a group of signers, serial structure and parallel
structure, and consider a series-parallel graph described in Chapter 2 as a
signer structure. Here, an edge of a series-parallel graph corresponds to
a signer, and a unique edge for the graph corresponds to a unique index
representing the position of each signer in any structure, i.e., an index i in
 n corresponds to IDi which is the ith signer in the signer structure. Here,
we also give each edge a space storing a message to be signed together with an
ID of each signer 1. Hereafter, we denote by  n a signer structure consisting
of n signers, by T (i) a set of signers connecting to the initial vertex Ii of ith
signer in a way such that T (i) = fxjIi = Tx ^ 1  x < i^Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng,
by I(i) a set of signers connecting to the terminal vertex Ti of ith signer
in a way such that I(i) = fxjTi = Ix ^ i < x  n ^ Gx(Ix; Tx)   ng, by
fajgj2T (i), for all a, all aj for j 2 T (i). We also dene an operation _ where
i _ n means extractions of indexes from  n.
1This graph can be implemented via both a two-dimensional array representing rela-
tions among the graph of the graph and an array to store the messages.
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5.4.4 The Syntax
A BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme consists of the following four
algorithms:
Setup Given a security parameter 1k, output a master secret key msk and
its corresponding master public key mpk.
KeyGeneration Given msk;mpk and a signer's ID information IDi, out-
put a secret key ski.
Signing Given mpk; ski, a message mi 2M, an ID IDi 2 ID, for k 2 T (i)
the previous signers' structures  k consisting of # k signers with # k
messages and their signatures k = (Sk; Rk), and possibly some state
information s as input, compose  T (i) := [k2T (i) k and then compose
 i :=  T (i) \ i where i contains mi and IDi. Generate an aggre-
gate signature i in the composed structure  i with the signatures
fjgj2T (i), and output ( i; s; i). If any input is an error, then output
an error symbol ?.
Verication Given (mpk; fIDigi _ n ;  n; s; n) as input, output accept or
reject.
5.4.5 Denition of the Security
The following model allows an adversary A to execute adaptively-chosen-
message attack and adaptively-chosen-identity attack [23]. This model is a
natural extension of the existing ID-based aggregate signature schemes [14,
36]. In this model, players are a challenger C and the adversary A with a
security parameter 1k as input. We denote by x(h) h-th query for all x in
the following game:
Setup C runs Setup to obtain msk and mpk, and gives mpk to A.
Key Generation Given any information ID
(h)
i 2 ID chosen by A, C gen-
erates
ski  KeyGeneration(msk;mpk; IDi) and returns sk(h)i .
Signing Query A chooses a state information s, i signers fID(h)j gj2[1;i] and
i messages fm(h)j gj2[1;i], and decides a signer structure  (h)i . Then, A
generates (fID(h)j gj _ k ;  
(h)
k ; k; s) for k 2 T (i), and sends a query
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m
(h)
i ;
n
(fID(h)j gj _ k ;  
(h)
k ; k)
o
k2T (i)
; s

to C. Then, generate
i  Signing

mpk; ski;m
(h)
i ; ID
(h)
i ;
n
( 
(h)
k ; k)
o
k2T (i)
; s

. C re-
turns i.
Output A outputs a forgery  in  n consisting of fIDi gni=1 and fmi gni=1
with a state information s. C checks that the following conditions
hold; Verication((mpk; fIDi gi _ n n; s; n)) outputs accept; For
some i, 1  i  n, A did not query IDi to KeyGeneration; Each
IDi does not appear more than once in  

n; For some i, 1  i  n,
A did not query (mi ; f kgk2T (i)) and s to Signing. A wins if all
of these conditions hold. Here, we do not consider that A wins if s
has been queried in Signing, even if (mi ; f kgk2T (i)) has never been
queried.
Denition 19. An adversary A breaks a BGP-aiding aggregate signa-
ture scheme with (t; qs; qk; qh; n; ) if A who does not know msk can win
the above game with a success probability greater than  within an exe-
cution time t. Here, A can query to Signing with C at most qs times,
KeyGeneration(msk; ) at most qk times and qh random oracle queries,
and n is the number of signers included in the forgery. We say that an ag-
gregate signature scheme is (t; qs; qk; qh; n; )-secure if there is no adversary
who breaks the scheme with (t; qs; qk; qh; n; ).
5.5 Instantiation of the Signature Scheme
We focus on the GR06 scheme [36]. This scheme is an ID-based aggregate
signature scheme and closes to the requirements of the BGP-aiding aggregate
signature scheme. In this section, we propose the modied-GR06 scheme as
an instantiation of BGP-aggregate signature scheme, and prove the security.
5.5.1 Construction of the Modied-GR06 Scheme
Our scheme is a synchronized scheme, and uses a state information s as
one-time information similarly as the schemes in [1, 36].
Setup Given a security parameter 1k, generate (p;G;GT ;e) as a pairing
parameters, and choose a generator g 2 G and a random number
 2 Zp. Then set A = g, and choose hash functions H1 : f0; 1g 
5.5. INSTANTIATION OF THE SIGNATURE SCHEME 81
f0; 1g ! G, H2 : f0; 1g ! G and H3 : f0; 1gf0; 1gf0; 1g ! Zp.
Finally, output (p;G;GT ; e; g; A;H1;H2;H3) as mpk and  as msk.
Key Generation Given signer's IDi, compute values g

i;j where gi;j =
H1(IDi; j) for j = f0; 1g, and return these values as a secret key
ski of IDi.
Signing Given (IDi;mi; fjgj2T (i); f jgj2T (i); s), check the validity of the
given signatures by using Verication with n = j for j 2 T (i). If any
output is invalid, output ?. Otherwise, compose  i =
 [j2T (i) j \
i where i stores IDi and mi, and compute gs = H2(s) and ci =
H3(IDi;  i; s). Then, generate a secret random number ri  Zp and
compute as follows:
Si  gris gi;0(gi;1)ci
Q
j2T (i) Sj ; Ri  gri
Q
j2T (i)Rj :
If IDi is the rst signer, set  1 = 1 and fjgj2T (1) = 1, and choose s
that it has never used before. The signature is i = (Si; Ri; s). Then
output ( i; s; i). If there are k signers fIDkgk2T (n) as the last signers
of the whole signing group, then the whole structure is  n = [k2T (n) k
and the whole signature is (Sn =
Q
k2T (n) Sk; Rn =
Q
k2T (n)Rk; s).
Verication Given (mpk; fIDjgj _ n ;  n; s; n), compute as follows:
e(S; g)
?
= e(R; gs)e
 
A;
nY
i=1
(gi;0(gi;1)
ci)!i( n)
!
;
where gs = H2(s), gi;j = H1(IDi; j) for j 2 f0; 1g and ci = H3(IDi;  i; s).
If the above equation holds, then output accept. Otherwise, output
reject.
5.5.2 Security Proof of the Modied-GR06 Scheme
In this subsection, we prove the security of proposed scheme. In this proof,
we reduce the security of the hardness of the CDH problem in G. The main
proof is similar as that in [36].
Theorem 20. Suppose that the (t0; 0)-CDH assumption holds in G and
hash functions are modeled as random oracles. Then the proposed scheme
is (t; qs; qk; qh1 ; qh2 ; qh3 ; n; )-secure, where
t = t0   (5qs + 2qk + 2qh1 + qh2) te +O(n);  = 0
e3 (qk + qh1(qs + qh3) + 3)
3
27
;
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e is the base of natural logarithm and te is the computational time for one
exponentiation computation.
Sketch. We assume that an adversary A who breaks the proposed scheme
with (t; qs; qk; qh1 ; qh2 ; qh3 ; n; ) exists, and then construct an algorithms B
to solve the CDH problem in G by utilizing A as a subroutine. In this proof,
we utilize the Coron technique [27]: in simulations of the random oracles, B
uses random coins with some probability  to set 1 on these coins, and  is
optimized later in order to complete the proof. B also has lists of the random
oracles, H1-list [; ; ; ; ; ], H2-list [; ; ; ] and H3-list [; ; ; ; ; ]. Given a
challenge (g; ga; gb; p;G;GT ; e) of the CDH problem, the CDH challenge for
short, B interacts with A as follows:
Setup Set A = ga and send (p;G;GT ; e; g; A;H1;H2;H3) as mpk to A.
H1-Hash Query Given (IDi; j) chosen by A for j = f0; 1g, execute the
following steps. Here, if IDi was already queried as H1-query, retrieve
gi;j from H1-list. Generate a random coin H1-coini  f0; 1g with the
probability  and random numbers i;j;1; i;j;2  Zp. If H1-coini = 0,
then compute gi;j = g
i;j;1 ; otherwise, compute gi;j = g
i;j;1(gb)i;j;1 .
Then, record (H1-coini; IDi; j; i;j;1; i;j;2; gi;j), and return gi;j to A.
H2-Hash Query Given s chosen by A, execute the following steps. If s was
already queried as H2-query, retrieve gs from H2-list. Else, generate a
random coin H2-coink  f0; 1g with the probability  and a random
number   Zp. If H2-coink = 0 then set gs = (gb); otherwise, set
gs = g
. Record (H2-coink; s; ; gs) and return gs to A.
H3-Hash Query Given (IDi;  i; s) chosen by A, execute the following
steps. If (IDi;  i; s) was already queried as H3-query, retrieve ci from
H3-list. Otherwise, check that H1-coini and H2-coinj for the given
query at rst. If H1-Hash Query and H2-Hash Query have been
never executed for the given query, execute these oracle simulations
before. Generate a random coinH3-coinl  f0; 1g with the probability
, and execute as follows:
1. If H1-coini = H2-coinj = 1 and H3-coinl = 0, check that H3-list
contains (ID0i;  
0
i; s
0) such that (IDi;  i; s) 6= (ID0i;  0i; s0) holds
with IDi = ID
0
i. If so, abort the process. Otherwise, set ci =
 i;0;2i;1;2 .
2. If H1-coini = 0 or H2-coinj = 0 or H3-coinl = 1, generate a
random number di  Zp and set ci = di
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Record (H3-coinl; IDi;  i; s; di; ci) in H3-list and return ci to A.
Key Generation Given IDi by A, check H1-coini for IDi in H1-list. If
IDi has never been queried, execute H1-Hash Query with IDi. If
H1-coini = 0 then set g
a
i;0 = A
i;0;1 and gi;1 = A
i;1;1 , and return gai;j
where j = f0; 1g. Otherwise, abort the process.
Signing Given (IDi;mi; fkgk2T (i); f igk2T (i); s) by A, execute the follow-
ing steps. Here, if the verication algorithm outputs reject for any sig-
nature in the given query, return ?. Otherwise, execute the following
steps:
 If H1-coini = 0 for IDi in H1-list, then generate a secret ran-
dom number ri  Zp, and compute Ri  gri
Q
k2T (i)Rk, ci =
H3(IDi;  i; s) and Si  Ai;0;1(Ai;1;1)cigris
Q
k2T (i) Sk. Here,
Ai;j;1 = gai;j holds for j = f0; 1g, and hence these values are
accepted as a valid signature. Return (Si; Ri; s).
 If H1-coini = 1 and H2-coink = 0, then generate a secret random
number ri  Zp, and computeRi  gri(ga) 
(i;0;2+i;1;2ci)

Q
k2T (i)Rk,
ci = H3(IDj ;  i; s) and Si  Ai;0;1(Ai;1;1)cigris
Q
k2T (i) Sk. Here,
these values can be written as follows:
Si = (g
i;0;1)a ((gi;1;1)a)ci

(gb)i;0;2 i;0;2
a 
(gb)i;1;2 i;1;2
aci
gris
Y
k2T (i)
Sk
=

gi;0;1(gb)i;0;2
a 
gi;1;1(gb)i;1;2
aci 
(gb)
r a(i;0;2+i;1;2ci)


Y
k2T (i)
Sk
= gai;0(g
a
i;1)
cig
r a(i;0;2+i;1;2ci)

s
Y
k2T (i)
Sk:
Hence, these values are accepted as a valid signature. Return
(Si; Ri; s).
 If H1-coini = H2-coink = 1 and H3-coinl = 0, then generate a se-
cret random number ri  Zp, and compute Ri  gri
Q
k2T (i)Rk,
ci = H3(IDi;  i; s) and Si  Ai;0;1(Ai;1;1)cigris
Q
k2T (i) Sk. Here,
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these values can be written as follows:
Si = (g
i;0;1)a ((gi;1;1)a)
  i;0;2
i;1;2

(gb)i;0;2
a
(gb)
 i;1;2 i;0;2i;1;2
a
gris
Y
k2T (i)
Sk
=

gi;0;1(gb)i;0;2
a 
gi;1;1(gb)i;1;2
a  i;0;2i;1;2 grs Y
k2T (i)
Sk
= gai;0(g
a
i;1)
cigrs
Y
k2T (i)
Sk:
Hence, these values are accepted as a valid signature. Return
(Si; Ri; s).
 If H1-coini = H2-coink = H3-coinl = 1, then abort the process.
Output Given a forgery (fIDigi _ n ;  n, s; n) by A, check that for the
given forgery any indexes (i; k; l) exist such thatH1-coini = H2-coink =
H3-coinl = 1 holds. If not, abort the process. Otherwise, compute as
follows, where  is a set of indexes such that H1-coini = 1: 
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.
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B's success probability 0 can be obtained as follows. Let aborth3 be the
event that B aborts for H3-Hash Query, abortk be the event that B aborts
for Key Generation, aborts be the event that B aborts for Signing, and
aborto be the event that B aborts for Output. Each probability can be
obtained as follows:
Pr[aborth3 ] = ((1  )qh1 + (1  )qh2 )qh3  (1  )qh1qh3 ;
Pr[abortk] = (1  )qk ;
Pr[aborts] = ((1  )qh1 + (1  )qh2 + (1  )qh3 )qs  (1  )qh1qs ;
Pr[aborto] = 
3:
These are independent events, and B can always solve the CDH problem in
G if any event does not occur. Therefore, the following equation holds:
0 = Pr[aborth3 ] Pr[abortk] Pr[aborts] Pr[aborto]
  (1  )qh1qh3 (1  )qk(1  )qh1qs3
Finally, we optimize . We dene a function f() = (1  )qh1qh3 (1 )qk(1 
)qh1qs3. By computing its derived functions, the function has an extremum
opt =
3
qh1 (qs+qh3 )+qk+3
. Then, the following equation holds from the deni-
tion of .
0    f(opt)
=  

qh1(qs + qh3) + qk
qh1(qs + qh3) + qk + 3
qh1 (qs+qh3 )+qk  3
qh1(qs + qh3) + qk + 3
3
From the denition of the base of natural logarithm, i.e., limx!1

x
x+1
x
=
1
e , we can obtain the probability as follows:
0    1
e3
 27
(qh1(qs + qh3) + qk + 3)
3 :
The execution time of B is that of A plus two exponentiations for H1-Hash
Query, one exponentiation for H2-Hash Query, two exponentiations for
Key Generation, at most ve exponentiations for Signing and four ex-
ponentiations for Output. Thus, the following equation holds:
t  t+ (2qh1 + qh2 + 2qk + 5qs + 4)te;
where te is the computational time per exponentiation.
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Restriction on the Number of Signers
There is a possibility of the attack-0 described in Chapter 3 by utilizing the
property of the graph theorem against the proposed scheme. In particular,
colluding adversaries can cancel out a signature of a target signer from an
aggregate signature by generating a graph  n such that !i( n) = 0 mod
p holds. However, this probability can be easily estimated by the graph
theorem for all graph. As described in Chapter 2, the weight of the graph
consisting of n edges is bounded by 3n=3 [90], and hence n = log plog 33 can be
obtained. Thus, the value is about 300 for 80-bit security, and the value
for 128-bit security is about 969. Namely, the attack described above can
be prevented as long as the number of signers are less than these values.
One might think that this construction is insucient since restriction in the
number of signers is necessary. However, we describe the restriction does
not become a problem in a practical scenario.
5.6 Discussion
Table 5.2: AS Numbers for each RIR
(APNIC) [3] ARIN LACNIC RIPE NCC AfriNIC IANA Undecided
7830 25428 3839 25112 1277 1042 1008
Figure 5.7: Evaluation of ID-based Aggregate Signatures
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For 16-bit AS number, there are 65,535 ASes. All of these numbers
are not uniformly managed but each regional Internet registry (RIR) redis-
tributes its AS numbers to subnetworks. In an actual routing security, RIR
redistributed AS numbers and corresponding certicates via resource public
key infrastructure (RPKI) [57], and each AS executes the signing process by
the given resource certicate [58]. Namely, there is no problem in a practical
scenario as long as the total size of signatures obtained from the maximum
number of signers for each RIR is smaller than 4,096 bytes. The number of
ASes managed by each RIR in May 2013 is shown in Table. 5.2 [46].
The maximum number of the signers is given by the weight of the graph
as described in the previous section. For 128-bit security, the maximum
number of the signers given by the modied-GR06 scheme is 969, and hence
27 signatures are generated in ARIN whose number of ASes is 25428. In
Fig. 5.6, we give the communication cost. From this gure, we consider that
available BGP-aiding aggregate signature scheme is only the modied-GR06
scheme.

Chapter 6
Certicateless Aggregate
Signatures
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Motivation of CAS
Identity-based aggregate signatures provide many important applications
such as BGP security while these signatures have an inherent problem, called
key escrow problem, in which a key generation center knows secret keys of
all users in the system. This problem occurs because secret keys of all
the users are computed from KGC's master secret key and users' ID. This
implies that the KGC must be trusted in ID-based cryptosystem. In general,
an establishment of trust for an authority is a dicult task [78]. In fact,
ENISA pointed out that the most important threat in a cloud environment
is an existence of a malicious provider [22]. For instance, malicious KGC's
who does not honestly run the algorithm exist[56]. Hence, developments of
identity-based cryptosystem have been disturbed [77].
In order to overcome this problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed
the certicateless cryptosystem [2] which is a hybrid cryptosystem of PKI
and ID-based cryptosystem. In the certicateless cryptosystem, keys of each
user consists of a pair of secret key and public key depending upon both PKI
and ID-based cryptosystem. In particular, after given a secret value in ID-
based cryptosystem called partial private key, each user generates a secret
value which is a random number in PKI. Then the user sets a full secret
key from the secret value and the partial private key, and then sets a value
computed from the secret value in PKI and its ID as a corresponding public
89
90 CHAPTER 6. CERTIFICATELESS AGGREGATE SIGNATURES
key. 1 A sender/verier uses the public key for the encryption/verication of
data, and a receiver/signer uses the full secret key for the decryption/signing
of data. The certicateless cryptosystem has positive aspects of both PKI
and ID-based system. In particular, the condentiality or the validity of the
data of users are guaranteed even if the KGC is malicious, because the KGC
does not know the secret value generated by the user. In addition, the user
can implicitly conrm an owner of the public key without the certicate
since the user needs ID as the part of the public key to encrypt/verify the
data. Therefore, constructing certicateless cryptographic schemes such as
signature schemes is a meaningful work. In this chapter, we discuss an
aggregate signature scheme in the certicateless setting.
6.1.2 Contribution
In this chapter, we propose a certicateless aggregate signature scheme. Our
scheme is a variant of an escrow-free identity-based signature scheme rather
than a pure certicateless signature scheme, and achieves following prop-
erties: (1) our scheme achieves Girault's Level-2 security; (3) our scheme
is secure against the strongest adversary in the certicateless setting. We
describe the details below.
Certicateless cryptosystem does not need a certicate generated by CA
to verify a user's public key, so it does not have the certicate management
problem suered in conventional PKI-based cryptosystem. On the other
hand, it also solves the key escrow problem suered in ID-based cryptosys-
tems since a secret key generated by each user is an unknown value for a
malicious KGC. The security model used for the analysis of our scheme does
not capture an actively malicious KGC who generates a pair of a secret key
and its corresponding public key for any user. Namely, our proposed scheme
achieves Girault's Level-2 security. However, based on the idea of [98] pro-
posed by Wu et. al. in 2009, it is easy to modify our certicateless signa-
ture into a new kind of signature scheme named certicate-based signature
scheme [50, 60, 98] in which the Girault's Level-3 security can be achieved.
But, with this modication, the public key PKID of an entity ID will not be
able to update at any time without any assistance from KGC whereas this
is possible in our scheme. Therefore, here we only discuss how to protect
a certicateless signature scheme under the assumption that a secret value
1Several researchers avoid to view ID as public key in ID-based system since ID is not
a randomly generated value as set in the traditional PKI. Even so, ID-based system can
be judged as an answer to the question, "Is it possible to construct a public-key system
with a xed-value public key?" and we describe ID as a part of the public key.
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in either PKI or ID-based cryptosystem is kept secret and that malicious
activities of KGC are restricted not to fake a pair of secret and public keys
described above, i.e. security level-2. In other words, our scheme can resist
signature forgery unless KGC impersonates a target signer by generating a
key of the target signer.
Since public keys in certicateless cryptosystems are not certied by
trusted authorities, these public keys can be replaced by an adversary [44,
63]. According to Huang et al. [44], there are three types of the adversary,
normal, strong and super. The normal adversary cannot obtain signatures
of a target signer once he/she replaces the public key of the target signer.
The strong adversary can obtain signatures of the target signer by providing
a secret value corresponding to the replaced public key for a challenger in
the security model described in section 6.2.2. The super adversary can also
obtain signatures of the target signer but without providing the secret value
for the challenger. During the attack, the super adversary can replace a
public key pkA of a target signer Alice with a public key pkB of another
target signer Bob while such an attack cannot be performed by the strong
adversary that cannot compute a secret key corresponding to pkB. This
means that the super adversary can access Alice as a black box knowledge
extractor for the secret value of Bob without being detected by Bob, because
in this scenario signatures, which are output of Alice, are computed from
the secret value of Bob. Namely, the adversary trying to forge a signature
of the target signer can obtain secret-key related information without being
detected by the target signer. In this sense, the super adversary can be
judged as the strongest adversary among three types of adversaries.
6.1.3 Application
As applications of certicateless cryptosystem, we focus on ID-federation
services for cloud computing. The main motivation of certicateless cryp-
tosystem is for a situation that (1) ID-based cryptosystem is suitable and (2)
the insider threat is an inherent problem. As the existing applications of au-
thentication for cloud computing, Yang et al. [101] suggested to combine an
ID-federation service such as OpenIDConnect [75] and identity-based cryp-
tography. In the combining system, each user can utilize an identity-based
scheme, with an ID information registered in the ID-federation service, for
authentication between multi-domain clouds. However, as described above
identity-based cryptosystem has the key escrow problem as the inherent
problem. In the system in [101], each cloud has an individual key gener-
ation center and this center generates a secret key for the ID information.
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The key escrow problem means that these key generation centers may be
malicious, and thus certicateless cryptosystem is more suitable for this sys-
tem. Meanwhile, since certicateless cryptosystems require a key including
a random number, each user has to provide any information such a subject
key identier. Hence, we also note that certicateless cryptosystem is un-
suitable for applications such as S-BGP where total size of data must be
decreased.
6.1.4 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the existing certicateless aggregate signature
schemes have been proposed in [21, 39, 99, 106, 107, 105]. The security of
schemes in [21, 39] have never been proven against the super adversary [44].
The security proof in [99] is wrong and this scheme becomes insecure against
the super adversary. The schemes in [106, 107, 105] are secure against the
super adversary, but only the scheme in [105] achieves the xed size of
signatures. However, in the scheme [105] guarantee of relation between user's
identity and its public key seems to be weak, and we consider that the scheme
is insucient in the sense that users may be confused for distinguishing
public keys.
6.2 Certicateless Aggregate Signature Scheme
In this section, we dene a syntax of certicateless aggregate signature
scheme.
6.2.1 Syntax
A certicateless sequential aggregate signature scheme consists of following
six algorithms.
Setup Given a security parameter 1k as input, generate a public parameter
param, a master secret key msk and its corresponding public key mpk.
Return param, mpk and msk.
User-Key-Gen Given param as input, generate a user secret key uski
and its corresponding user public key upki. Return uski and upki.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract Given param and msk and an identity
IDi as input, generate a partial private key di. Return di.
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Set-Key Given param;mpk; IDi; di; uski and upki, generate a full secret
key ski, and as a corresponding public key pki. Return ski and pki for IDi.
Signing Given param;mpk; ski; pki;mi, and IDi as input, generate a sig-
nature i and then return i.
Aggregation Given param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1; fmjgij=1 and fjgij=1,
return an aggregate signature  on fmjgij=1 for users fIDjgij=1.
Verication Given param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1; fmjgij=1 and an ag-
gregate signature  as input, check that i is a valid signature on fmjgj=1; ;i.
If not, return reject. Otherwise, return accept.
6.2.2 Security Model
In this section, we dene a security model of a certicateless aggregate sig-
nature scheme. Our security model is constructed by applying a notion of
super-adversary in [44] to the security model for sequential aggregate signa-
ture scheme in [66].
For certicateless signature scheme, we have to discuss two following
types of adversaries with dierent ability. In the security games, a challenger
C and each adversary who can access a random oracle exist as entities.
Type 1 This type of adversary, A1, is a dishonest user who does not have
the master secret key msk but can replace a public key upki of any user IDi
with any chosen value.
Type 2 This type of adversary, A2, is a malicious KGC who has msk but
cannot replace a public key of a target signer.
Denition of Oracles
In the security game in this chapter, we dene the following oracles. We
denote by x(j) j-th query to access the oracles for all x. Here, C has a
certicate list L to register users' information.
Create-User Given an identity IDi, if IDi has already been queried,
nothing will be output. Otherwise, run the algorithms User-Key-Gen
and Partial-Private-Key-Extract, and generate a user secret key uski,
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a corresponding user public key upki and a partial private keydi. Run Set-
Key, and then register (IDi; pki) in L. Return pki. In this case, we say
that IDi is created.
Public-Key-Replace Given IDi and pk
0
i chosen by an adversary, if IDi
has already been created, the original public key for IDi is replaced with
pk0i and re-register (IDi; pk
0
i) in L. Otherwise, return ?.
Secret-Value-Extract Given IDi, if IDi has already been created, out-
put a user secret key uski corresponding to an original user public key upki.
Otherwise, return ?. This oracle does not return the user secret key corre-
sponding to the replaced public key pk0i.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract Given IDi, if IDi has already been cre-
ated, return a partial private value di for IDi. Otherwise, return ?.
Sign Given (IDi; pki;mi), if IDi has already been created, return a sig-
nature i by Signing. Otherwise, return ?. Here pki may be either the
original public key generated by IDi or a public key replaced by the adver-
sary 2.
Game 1
This game is executed between C and A1.
Setup-Phase C runs Setup algorithm to obtain param;msk and mpk. C
runs A1 with input param and mpk.
Queries A1 can access all the oracles described in section 6.2.2 and obtains
the outputs from C.
Forgery A1 outputs a forgery (fIDjgj=1; ;n; fmjgj=1; ;n; n) and checks
that the following conditions hold.
 n is a valid signature on fmjgj=1; ;n under fpkj gj=1; ;n for fIDjgj=1; ;n.
2In the normal adversary, pki is required to be the original pubic key by IDi. On the
other hand, in the strong adversary, if pki is replaced, then the corresponding secret key
ski is required as the additional input. In this paper, by the ability of the super adversary,
the signing oracle requires only pki even if pki is replaced.
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 Exactly one IDi who has never been queried for Partial-Private-
Key-Extract oracle exists.
 Each IDi in fIDjgj=1; ;n does not appear more than once.
 For IDi , (mi ; IDi) =2 f(m(h)i ; IDi)g(qs)h=1 holds.
C outputs accept if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, C outputs reject.
Denition 21. A1 breaks a certicateless aggregate signature scheme with
(; qc; qr; qs; qp; qh; qsig; n; t) if C outputs accept in the above game with a
success probability greater than  within the execution time t, where A1
who does not know msk can generate at most qc create-user queries, qr
public-key-replace queries, qs secret-value-extract queries, qp partial-private-
key-extract queries, qh random oracle queries and qsig signing queries, and
n is the number of signers included in the forgery.
Game 2
This game is executed between C and A2.
Setup C runs Setup algorithm to obtain param;msk and mpk. C runs
A2 with input param;msk and mpk.
Queries A2 can access all the oracles described in section 6.2.2 and obtains
the outputs.
Forgery A2 outputs a forgery (fIDjgj=1; ;n; fmjgj=1; ;n; n) and check
that the following conditions hold.
 n is a valid signature on fmjgj=1; ;n in  n under fpkj gj=1; ;n.
 Exactly one IDi who has never been queried for secret-value-extract
oracle and public-key-replace oracle.
 Each IDi does not appear more than once in fIDjgj=1; ;n.
 For IDi , (mi ; IDi) =2 f(m(h)i ; IDig(qs)h=1g holds.
C outputs accept if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, C outputs reject.
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Denition 22. A2 breaks a certicateless aggregate signature scheme with
(; qc; qr; qs; qh; qsig; n; t) if C outputs accept in the above game with a success
probability greater than  within the execution time t, whereA2 can generate
at most qc create-user queries, qr public-key-replace queries, qs secret-value-
extract queries, qh random oracle queries and qsig signing queries, and n is
the number of signers.
6.2.3 Technical Problem for Constructing Certicateless Ag-
gregate Signatures Secure against Super Adversaries
Technical diculty for constructing certicateless is due to guarantee of a
relation between a user and its public key. This diculty notably aects
a security proof against the type 1 adversary. The adversary can replace
a public key and do not have to provide a secret key corresponding to the
replaced public key. Essentially, the security against the type 1 adversary
who is a dishonest user can be guaranteed as long as the adversary does
not know a partial private key di. In such a proof, a reduction algorithm
need to simulate the partial-private-key-extract oracle the signing oracle
without msk. If the adversary replace a public key of a target signer in
this situation, the reduction algorithm has to generate signatures of the
target signer without not only mski but also ski. Such a simulation is
dicult and complicated, and the success probability becomes quite low.
One might think that the reduction algorithm can return the signatures
by fully separating a partial private key di and a user secret key uski and
generating each signature individually, but such an approach does not allow
users to guarantee relations with their public keys. This means that there
is no advantage of utilizing use's ID information.
6.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a certicateless sequential aggregate signature
scheme. First, we briey describe our approach to prove the security and
then describe the construction.
6.3.1 Our Approach
Our approach is to input a concatenation of a user's ID and a user public
key upki as input of Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm. This has
a good eect on a relation between ID and the public key. Meanwhile,
a reduction algorithm can simulate signatures even if a public key pk is
6.3. PROPOSED SCHEME 97
replaced, because a part of ID and a user public key can be individually
simulated. In addition, even if an adversary can know a partial private key
di, the adversary cannot obtain a full secret key ski. In order to execute
this procedure, each user has to generate a pair of uski and upki before the
key generation center generate di. In the existing certicateless signature
schemes, such an ordering of the procedure is not considered and individually
generated keys are combined in Set-Key. By ordering these algorithms, we
can prove the security against the super adversaries. There is an escrow-free
ID-based signature scheme [101] as a similar approach, and our approach
can be also considered as an extension to a scheme for multiple signers.
6.3.2 Construction
In our scheme, we use state information s similarly with the paper [36].
The state information is one-time information such as time-stamp, and is
used to eciently aggregate the data size of signatures according to [36]. In
our scheme, Signing phase is run by each signer in turn, and the signature
is implicitly aggregated in Signing phase instead of an aggregate phase in
papers [17, 36, 105].
Setup Generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e), and generate a genera-
tor g  G and a random number a Zp. Then set A = ga, and choose hash
functions H1 : f0; 1g  f0; 1g!G, H2 : f0; 1g ! G, H3 : f0; 1g ! G, and
H4 : f0; 1g ! Zp. Finally, return (p;G;GT , e; g;H1;H2;H3;H4) as param,
A as mpk and a as msk.
User-Key-Gen Given param, generate a random number ti  Zp and
computes Ti = g
ti . Then return ti as a user secret key and Ti as a corre-
sponding user public key.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract Given (param;msk;mpk; IDi k Ti), com-
pute gi;j = H1(IDi k Ti; j) for j = f0; 1g and then compute gai;j . Return
gai;j , j = f0; 1g, as a a partial private key di for IDi.
Set-Key Given (param;mpk; IDi; di; uski; upki), set (g
a
i;0; g
a
i;1; ti) as a full
secret key ski and (IDi; Ti) as its corresponding full public key pki.
Signing Given (param;mpk;mi; IDi; ski), generate a string s that it has
never used before, and compute V = H2(s), Wi = H3(s k mi k IDi k Ti),
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ci = H4(s k mi k IDi k Ti). Generate a random number ri  Zp, and then
compute as follows:
Si = V
rigai;0
 
gai;1
ci W tii ; (6.1)
Ri = g
ri Ri 1: (6.2)
Return i = (Si; Ri; s).
Aggregation Given (param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1fmjgij=1; fjgij=1),
compute as follows:
S =
iY
j=1
Sj ; (6.3)
R =
rY
j=1
Rj : (6.4)
Return  = (S;R; s).
Verication Given (param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1; fmjgij=1; , parse 
as (S;R; s) and then verify that the following equation holds:
e(S; g)
?
= e(V;R)  e
0@ iY
j=1
gj;0g
cj
j;1; A
1A  iY
j=1
e (Wj ; Tj) ; (6.5)
where, for all j, gj;l = H1(IDj k Tj ; l) for l = f0; 1g, V = H2(s), Wj =
H3(s k mj k IDj k Tj), cj = H4(s k mj k IDj k Tj).
6.3.3 Correctness
From the signature equations , the following equation holds:
e (S; g) = e
0@V r iY
j=1

gaj;1(g
a
j;2)
cjW
tj
j

; g
1A
= e (V; gr)  e
0@ iY
j=1
gj;1(gj;2)
cj ; ga
1A iY
j=1
e
 
Wj ; g
tj

= e (V;R)  e
0@ iY
j=1
gj;1(gj;2)
cj ; A
1A nY
j=1
e (Wj ; Tj) :
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6.3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of the proposed scheme against adver-
saries described in Section 6.2.2. In particular, when the adversary breaks
the proposed scheme in each game, we construct an algorithm B to solve
CDH problem by using the adversary.
Theorem 23. The proposed scheme is secure against type 1 of the adver-
sary with (; qc; qr; qs; qp; qh1 ; qh2 ; qh3 , qh4 ; qsig; n; t) if (t
0; 0)-CDH assumption
holds, where
0 =

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

27
(qp + qh1 + qh4 + (qh1 + qh2 + qh4)qsig)
3 
1
e3
;
t0 = t+ te(2qh1 + qh2 + qh4 + qc + 2qp + 6qsig + 3n+ 1);
where te is the computational time for a single exponentiation.
Proof. This proof is based on the security proof in paper [36], and we dene
a probability  to set 1 for tossing a coin. To complete the proof, we nally
determine a concrete value of .
Given a CDH challenge (g; ga; gb; p;G;GT ; e), B who tries to solve CDH
problem sets mpk = ga and a certication list L = ;. This means that
B implicitly sets a as msk. Then B sets ID-list [; ] H1-list [; ; ; ; ; ],
H2-list [; ; ], H3-list [; ] and H4-list [; ; ; ; ] as empty, and run A with
g; ga as input. Here, without loss of generality, we assume that B executes
H1-query and H2-query before executing H3-query and H4-query, H1-query
before executing the create-user query and each random oracle query before
executing the signing oracle query.
H1-query Given a string IDi k Ti generated by A, check that H1-list
includes IDi. If so, return H1(IDi; j) from H1-list, where j = 0; 1. Oth-
erwise, toss a coin H1-coini  f0; 1g with probability . If H1-coini =
0, generate i;0; i;1  Zp and set 0i;0 = 0i;1 = 0. Otherwise, gener-
ate i;0; i;1; 
0
i;0; 
0
i;1  Zp. Set H1(IDi; j) = (gi;j (gb)
0
i;j ), and register
(IDi k Ti; H1-coini; i;0; i;1; 0i;0; 0i;1) on H1-list. Return H1(IDi; j) for
j = f0; 1g.
H2-query Given s generated by A, check that H2-list includes s. If so,
return H2(s) from H2-list. Otherwise, toss a coin H2-coink  f0; 1g and
generate   Zp. If H2-coink = 0, set V = (gb) as H2(s). Otherwise, set
V = g as (H2(s). Register (s;H2-coink; ) on H2-list and return H2(s).
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H3-query Given s k mi k IDi k pki generated by A, check that H3-list
includes s k mi k IDi k pki. If so, return H3(s k mi k IDi k pki) from
H3-list. Otherwise, generate   Zp and set H3(s k mi k IDi k pki) = g .
Register (s k mi k IDi k pki; ) on H3-list and return H3(s k  i).
H4-query Given s k mi k IDi k pki generated by A, check that H4-list
includes s k mi k IDi k pki. If so, return H4(s k mi k IDi k pki) from
H4-list. Otherwise, toss a coin H4-coinl  f0; 1g. If H4-coinl = 0, check
that H1-coini = H2-coink = 1 for s k Li. If so, check that s k Li 6= s k L0i
exists with IDi = ID
0
i. If so, aborts. Otherwise, set H4(s k mi k IDi k
pki) =  
0
i;0
0i;1
. Otherwise, generate d(i;k;l)  Zp. Set H4(s k mi k IDi k
pki) = d(i;k;l). Register (s; IDi;mi k IDi k pki;H4-coinl; d(i;k;l)) on H4-list
and return H4(s k mi k IDi k pki).
Create-User Given IDi generated by A, check that L includes IDi. If
so, return (IDi; Ti) from L. Otherwise, generate ti  Zp and set Ti = gti .
Then, retrieve H1(IDi k Ti; j) for j = f0; 1g from H1-list as gi;j , and register
(IDi; Ti) in L and (IDi; ti) in ID-list. Return H1(IDi; j) for j = f0; 1g and
Ti.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract Given IDi generated by A, check that
L includes IDi. If not, nothing will be output. Otherwise, check that
H1-coini = 1 holds. If so, abort. Otherwise, set g
a
i;j = (g
a)i;j and return
gai;j where j = 0; 1.
Public-Key-Replace Given IDi and T
0
i generated byA, re-register (IDi; T 0i )
in L and (IDi;?), where ? means an error symbol.
Secret-Value-Extract Given IDi generated by A, check that L includes
IDi. If not, nothing will be output. Otherwise, return ti from L. Here, if
the secret value corresponding to IDi in ID-list is nil, then nothing will be
output.
Signing Given fmjgj=1; ;i; fIDjgj=1; ;i;  i; i; s generated by A, check
thatH1-coini, H2-coink andH4-coinl. IfH1-coini = H2-coink = H4-coinl =
1, abort. Otherwise, compute a signature as follows. In the case that
H1-coini = 0, generate a random number r  Zp and pick the latest public
key Ti of IDI from L, which may be the original public key generated from
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Create-User or a false public key replaced by the adversary. Then, compute
as follows:
Si = V
r (ga)i;0 (ga)i;1ci (Ti)
 ; (6.6)
Ri = g
r; (6.7)
where V;  and ci are retrieved from H2-list;H3-list and H4-list. These
values become a valid signature. In the case that H1-coini = 1^H2-coini =
0, compute as follows:
Si =

(gb)
r
(ga)i;0 (ga)i;1ci (Ti)
 ; (6.8)
Ri = g
r (ga)
 
0
i;0+
0
i;1ci
 ; (6.9)
where ;  and ci are retrieved from H2-list;H3-list and H4-list. These
values become a valid signature since they can be written as follows:
Si =

(gb)
r
(ga)i;0 (ga)i;1ci (Ti)
 
 
(gb)a
0i;0+0i;1ci
((gb)a)
0i;0+
0
i;1ci
=

(gb)
r a0i;0+0i;1ci


gi;0(gb)
0
i;0
a 
gi;1(gb)
0
i;1
aci
W tii ;(6.10)
Ri = g
r a
0
i;0+
0
i;1ci
 : (6.11)
In the case thatH1-coini = H2-coini = 1^H4-coini = 0, compute as follows:
Si =

g
r
(ga)i;0 (ga)
i;1( 
0i;0
0
i;1
)
(Ti)
 ; (6.12)
Ri = g
r: (6.13)
These values become a valid signature since they can be written as follows:
Si =

g
r
(ga)i;0 (ga)
i;1( 
0i;0
0
i;1
)
(Ti)


(gb)
0
i;0
a0@(gb)0i;1( 0i;00i;1 )
1Aa
= V r

gi;0(gb)
0
i;0
a 
gi;1(gb)
0
i;1
a( 0i;0
0
i;1
)
W tii ; (6.14)
Ri = g
r: (6.15)
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Output Given a forgery (fIDjgj=1; ;n; fpkj gj=1; ;n; fmjgj=1; ;n; ) out-
put by A after iterations of the above queries, check that H1-coini =
H2-coini = H4-coini = 1 holds. If not, abort. Otherwise, B can ex-
tract the solution of CDH problem. Here, the forgery can be written as
S = V r
Qn
i=1

gai;0(g
a
i;1)
ci
Qn
i=1W
ti
i , R
 = gr since these are a valid signa-
ture. B computes as follows:
g0a =
0@ S(R)(Qnj=1^j 6=i T i )Qn
j=1(g
a)i;0(ga)i;1ci

1A
1
0
i;0
+0
i;1
ci
(6.16)
Since B knows all the values, B can compute the above equation. The
probability 0 that B solves can be obtained as follows:
0 = Pr[forge ^ abort ^ collide]
= Pr[abort]   Pr[forgejabort]  Pr[collidejabort] ;
where forge means an event that A succeeds in breaking the scheme, collide
means an event that A outputs (fmjgj; ;n;  n; n) such that it has previ-
ously been queried to Signing oracle and abort means an event that B aborts
the simulation with A. Pr[forgejabort] =  holds from denition of the ad-
versary and, from birthday paradox, Pr[collidejabort] can be obtained as
follows:
Pr[collidejabort] = qsig(qsig   1)
2p
(6.17)
In addition, Pr[abort] can be written as follows:
Pr[abort] = Pr[abortp ^ aborth4 ^ abortsig ^ after]; (6.18)
where abortp means the event that B aborts the simulation with A for
partial-private-key-extract query. Similarly, We denote by aborth4 an event
for H4 query and by abortsig one for signing query. Here abortx means
the event that B aborts the simulation with A during the x-query, where
x 2 fp; h4; sigg and each p; h4; sig stands for partial-private-key-extract, H4
and signing, respectively. after means that B aborts after A outputs the
forgery. Each event can be written as follows:
Pr[abortp] = (1  )qp ; (6.19)
Pr[aborth4 ] = (1  )qh1+qh2 ; (6.20)
Pr[abortsig] = (1  )(qh1+qh2+qh4 )qsig ; (6.21)
Pr[after] = 3; (6.22)
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where  is a probability that B tosses 1 for the coin tosses. To complete the
proof, we give the maximum value for . Let f() be the following function.
f() = (1  )qp (1  )qh1+qh2 (1  )(qh1+qh2+qh4)qsig 3
= (1  )qp+qh1+qh2+(qh1+qh2+qh4 )qsig 3: (6.23)
To be easily written, we denote a = qp + qh1 + qh2 + (qh1 + qh2 + qh4)qsig.
From the derived function, f is maximized at max =
3
a . Here, f(max) can
be written as follows:
f(max) =
27
a3

1  3
a
a
: (6.24)
From denition of base of natural logarithm, we can compute as follows:
lim
a!1

1  3
a
a
=
1
e3
; (6.25)
) 0 =

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

f1(opt)
=

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

 27
a3
 1
e3
: (6.26)
The execution time of B is the execution time of A plus two exponentiations
for H1-Query, one exponentiation for H2-Query, one exponentiation for
H4-Query, one exponentiation for Create-User queries, two exponenti-
ations for Partial-Private-Key-Extract queries, at most six exponenti-
ations for Signing queries, and 3n + 1 exponentiations in the nal step.
Therefore,
t0 = t+ te(2qh1 + qh2 + qh4 + qc + 2qp + 6qsig + 3n+ 1); (6.27)
where te is a computational time for a single exponentiation.
Theorem 24. The proposed scheme is secure against type 2 of the adversary
with (; qc; qs; qh1 ; qh2 ; qh3 ; qh4 , qsig; n; t) if and only if (t
0; 0)-CDH assumption
holds, where
0 =

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

27
(qs + (qh1 + qh2 + qh3)qsig)
3 
1
e3
; (6.28)
t0 = t+ te(2qh1 + qh2 + qh4 + qc + 6qsig + 3n+ 2); (6.29)
and te is the computational time for the nal result.
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Proof. This proof is based on the security proof in paper [100], and we also
dene a probability  to set 1 for tossing a coin. To complete the proof, we
nally determine a concrete value of .
In this proof, we assume that B executes H1-query and H2-query before
executing H3-query and H4-query, H1-query before executing the create-
user query and each random oracle query before executing the signing oracle
query. Given a CDH challenge value (g; ga; gb; p;G;GT ; e), B who tries to
solve CDH problem generates x Zp as msk, and sets A = gx as mpk and
a certication list L = ;. Then B sets ID-list [; ; ] H1-list [; ; ], H2-list
[; ; ], H3-list [; ; ; ] and H4-list [; ] as empty, and run A with g; x;A as
input.
H1-query Given IDi k Ti generated by A, check that H1-list includes IDi.
If so, return H1(IDi; j) from H1-list where j = f0; 1g. Otherwise, generate
(i;0; i;1)  Zp, and then set H1(IDi; j) = gi;j for j = f0; 1g. Register
(IDi k Ti; i;0; i;1) on H1-list, and return H1(IDi k Ti; j) for j = f0; 1g.
H2-query This execution is exactly the same as Game 1.
H3-query Given s k mi k IDi k pki generated by A, check that H3-list
includes s k mi k IDi k pki. If so, return H3(s k mi k IDi k pki) from
H3-list. Otherwise, generate   Zp and toss a coin H3-coinl  f0; 1g
with the probability . If H3-coinl = 0, set H3(s k mi k IDi k pki) =
g . Otherwise, H3(s k Li) = (g  (gb)) . Register (IDi; si k mi k IDi k
pki;H3-coinl; ) on H3-list and return H3(s k mi k IDi k pki).
H4-query Given s k mi k IDi k pki generated by A, check that H4-list
includes s k mi k IDi k pki. If so, return H4(s k mi k IDi k pki) from
H4-list. Otherwise, generate d(i;k;l)  Zp and set H4(s k mi k IDi k
pki) = d(i;k;l). Register (s k mi k IDi k pki; d(i;k;l)) on H4-list and return
H4(s k mi k IDi k pki).
Create-User Given IDi generated by A, check that L includes IDi. If
so, return (IDi; Ti) from L. Otherwise, toss a coin ID-coini  f0; 1g with
probability  and generate ti  Zp. If ID-coini = 0, set Ti = gti . Otherwise,
set Ti = (g
a)ti . Then, retrieve Hi(IDi k Ti; j) for j = f0; 1g from H1-list
as gi;j , Register (IDi; Ti) in L and -register (IDi; ID-coini; ti) in ID-list.
Return H1(IDi k; j) and Ti as IDi's public key pki.
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Secret-Value-Extract Given IDi generated by A, check that L include
IDi. If not, nothing will be output. Otherwise, check that ID-coini = 1
holds. If so, abort. Otherwise, return ti.
Signing Given a signing query (mi; IDi; pki; s) generated by A, check that
ID-coini, H2-coink and H3-coinl in the query with each list. If ID-coini =
H2-coink = H3-coinl = 1, abort. Otherwise, generate a random number
r  Zp and generate a signature as follows. In the case that H3-coinl = 0,
compute as follows:
Si = V
rgxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Ti) ; (6.30)
Ri = g
r; (6.31)
where V;  and ci are retrieved from H2-list;H3-list and H4-list. These
values become a valid signature since the following equation holds:
Si = V
rgxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Ti) = V rgxi;0  gxi;1ci (gxi)
= V rgxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Wi)xi ; (6.32)
where xi is a secret key corresponding to a public key Ti. In the case that
H3-coini = 1 ^H2-coini = 0, compute as follows:
Si =

(gb)
r
gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Ti) ; (6.33)
Ri = g
r (Ti)
  
 ; (6.34)
These values also become a valid signature since the following equation holds:
Si =

(gb)
r
gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Ti)
=

(gb)
r
gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (gxi) (gb)xi xi
=

(gb)
r
gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (gxi(g   b)xi) (gb) xi
=

(gb)
r xi

gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci g  gbxi
=

(gb)
r xi

gxi;0
 
gxi;1
ci (Wi)xi ; (6.35)
Ri = g
r  (gxi)   = gr 
xi
 : (6.36)
Here, we write r0 = r   xi . Then, the following equations can be written:
Si = (V )
r0 gbi;0

gbi;1
ci
(Wi)
xi ; (6.37)
Ri = g
r0 : (6.38)
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Output Given a forgery (fIDi gni=1; fmi gni=1; fpki gni=1; n) output by A,
check that ID-coini = H2-coini = H3-coini = 1 holds. If not, abort. Oth-
erwise, similarly with Game 1, B can extract the solution of CDH problem
from the forgery as follows:
gab =
0@ S(R)(Qnj=1^j 6=i T j )
(ga)ti
Qn
j=1 g
b
j;0(g
b
j;1)
ci

1A
1
tj
: (6.39)
Since B knows all the values, B can compute the above equation. Simi-
larly with Game 1, we can compute the maximum value for f() and the
computational time for B.
0 = Pr[forge ^ abort ^ collide]
= Pr[abort]   Pr[forgejabort]  Pr[collidejabort] :
Here, Pr[forgejabort] =  and Pr[collidejabort] = qsig(qsig 1)2p hold similarly
with Game 1. In addition, Pr[abort] can be written as follows:
Pr[abort] = Pr[aborts ^ aborth3 ^ abortsig ^ after]; (6.40)
where aborts means the event that B aborts the simulation with A for
Secret-Value-Extract. Each event can be written as follows:
Pr[aborts] = (1  )qs ; (6.41)
Pr[abortsig] = (1  )(qc+qh2+qh3 )qsig ; (6.42)
Pr[after] = 3; (6.43)
where  is a probability that B tosses 1 for its coin tosses. Similarly with
Game 1, we give the maximum value for . We dene f() as the following
function.
f() = (1  )qs (1  )(qc+qh2+qh3 )qsig 3
= (1  )qs+(qc+qh2+qhs )qsig 3: (6.44)
Here, we denote X = qs + (qh1 + qh2 + qh4)qsig for short. From the derived
function, f is maximized at max =
3
X . Therefore, similarly with Game 1,
the following equation can be obtained.
0 =

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

f1(max)
=

  qsig(qsig   1)
2p

 3
X3
 1
e3
: (6.45)
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The execution time of B can be also obtained similarly with Game 1. The
execution time of B is the execution time of A plus two exponentiations
for H1-Query, one exponentiation for H2-Query, one exponentiation for
H4-Query, one exponentiation for Create-User queries, at most six ex-
ponentiations for Signing queries, and 3n + 2 exponentiations in the nal
step. Therefore,
t0 = t+ te(2qh1 + qh2 + qh4 + qc + 6qsig + 3n+ 2); (6.46)
where te is a computational time in the nal step.
6.4 Construction Resisting the DoD Attack
Liu et al.[63] have pointed out a problem in distributing public keys in a
certicateless setting. Suppose an adversary replace a public key of any
user with other faked public key. Then an encryptor who cannot detect
the replacement, certicateless property, performs the encryption under the
faked public key. Such data encrypted under the faked public key cannot
be decrypted by the user correctly because the user does not know a secret
value corresponding to the replaced faked public key. This attack is called
Denial of Decryption (DoD) attack. In order to prevent this attack, they
have proposed a method to guarantee the validity of a public key without
the interaction with any trusted authority, i.e. self-generated-certicate. In
this method, each user guarantees the validity of a public key by generating
a certicate, signature, under a secret key corresponding to the public key.
DoD attack may also occur in digital signature scheme in that a digital
signature generated by any user is maliciously rejected by the replacement
of its own public key. In this approach, Wu proposed a digital signature
scheme with self-generated-certicate[97]. Since the user can detect the
replacement of the public key by the verication with the self-generated-
certicate, it can resist against malicious rejection of signature. However,
the construction with the self-generated-certicate cannot achieve level-3
security. In particular, the malicious KGC can still impersonate any user
by generating a pair of a secret key and a public key and its corresponding
self-generated-certicate by him-/herself.
The notion of self-generated-certicate can be applied to our scheme. In
paper [103], which is a previous version of this work, we proposed a CLOSAS
scheme with self-generated-certicate. In this section, we give the detail of
the construction. Although the following construction cannot be achieved
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level-3 security, the proposed scheme becomes more secure in the sense that
the scheme resist DoD attack.
Construction
Setup This algorithm is same as the scheme in section 6.3.2.
User-Key-Gen Given param, generate random numbers (ti;0; ti;1) Zp
and computes Ti;0 = g
ti;0 and Ti;1 = g
ti;1 . Then return (ti;0; ti;1) as a user
secret key uski and (Ti;0; Ti;1) as a corresponding user public key upki.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract Given (param;msk;mpk; IDi k Ti;0 k Ti;1),
compute gi;j = H1(IDi k Ti;0 k Ti;1; j) for j = f0; 1g and then compute gai;j .
Return gai;j for j = f0; 1g as a partial private key di.
Set-Key Given (param;mpk; IDi; di; uski; upki), set (g
a
i;0; g
a
i;1; ti;0; ti;1) as
a full secret key ski, and generate a random number r
0
i and state information
si. Then set m
0
i := IDi k Ti;1 and compute as follows:
S0i = V
r0i
i g
a
i;0
 
gai;1
c0i W 0ti;0i ; (6.47)
R0i = g
r0i ; (6.48)
where Vi = H2(si), Wi = H3(si k m0i) and c0i = H4(si k m0i). Set 0i =
(S0i; R
0
i; si), and then set (IDi; Ti;0; Ti;1; 
0
i) as a corresponding full public
key pki. Return (ski; pki).
Signing Given (param;mpk;mi; IDi; ski), generate a string s that it has
never used before, and compute V = H2(s), Wi = H3(s k mi k IDi k Ti;1),
ci = H4(s k mi k IDi k Ti;1). Generate a random number ri  Zp, and then
compute as follows:
Si = V
rigai;0
 
gai;1
ci W ti;1i ; (6.49)
Ri = g
ri Ri 1: (6.50)
Return i = (Si; Ri; s).
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Aggregation Given (param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1fmjgij=1; fjgij=1),
compute as follows:
S =
iY
j=1
Sj ; (6.51)
R =
rY
j=1
Rj : (6.52)
Return an aggregate signature  = (S;R; s).
Verication Given (param;mpk; fIDjgij=1; fpkjgij=1; fmjgij=1; , verify
that, for fIDjgij=1, the public key pkj is correct. In particular, parse the
signers' self-generated-certicates 0j in pkj as (S
0
j ; R
0
j ; sj) for j = [1; n], and
set m0j := IDj k Tj;1. Then, for j = [1; n], check if the following equation
holds:
e(S0j ; g)
?
= e(Vj ; R
0
j)  e

gj;0g
c0j
j;1; A

 e  W 0j ; Tj;0 ; (6.53)
where, for all j, gj;l = H1(IDj k Tj;1; l) for l = f0; 1g, Vj = H2(sj), W 0j =
H3(sj k m0j) and c0j = H4(sj k m0j). If not, output reject. Otherwise, parse
 as (S;R; s) and then verify that the following equation holds:
e(S; g)
?
= e(V;R)  e
0@ iY
j=1
gj;0g
cj
j;1; A
1A  iY
j=1
e (Wj ; Tj;1) ; (6.54)
where, for all j, V = H2(s), Wj = H3(s k mi k IDi k Ti;1), and cj = H4(s k
mi k IDi k Ti;1). If the above equation holds, output accept. Otherwise,
output reject.
Theorem 25. A self-generated-certicate in the proposed scheme is existen-
tially unforgeable if there is no adversary who breaks the proposed scheme
described in Section 6.3.2.
Proof (Sketch). Intuitively, if an adversary who can forge a self-generated-
certicate exists, then the adversary can also forge an aggregate signature
in the proposed scheme in this paper by using the forged self-generated-
certicate as a signature of the target signer. This result conicts with the
theorems described in the previous section.
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Table 6.1: Evaluation of the schemes: For the evaluation of the signing
cost and the verication cost, we denote by P the computational cost of
pairing, by H the computational cost of a map-to-point functions, by "
the computational cost of a single exponentiation, and by L(p) the binary
length of p. The relation with public key means a relation between ID and
a corresponding public key.
Schemes
Computational
Cost for Signer
Computational
Cost for Verier
Signature
Size
Relation with
Public Key
ZQWZ10 [105] 4"+ 5H
5P + 2n"
+(4n+ 3)H 2L(p) Weak
Proposed
Scheme 4"+ 2H
(3 + n)P + n"
+(3n+ 1)H 2L(p) Strong
6.5 Evaluation
We compare the performance of the proposed scheme with some existing
schemes with respect to the signing cost, the verication cost, the signature
size, type of the scheme and certicateless property. The result is shown in
table 6.1.
As shown in Table 6.1, our scheme has the same signature size as the
ZQWZ10 scheme [105]. In terms of the computational costs, our proposed
scheme is ecient in the signing cost, and the number of the map-to-point
function and the number of the exponentiations become less. Hence, our
scheme becomes quite faster over a curve, which is suitable in the bilinear
maps but is unsuitable in the map-to-point function and the exponentiations,
e.g., type A curve, which provides a symmetric pairing, in PBC library [65].
In addition, our scheme guarantees a stronger relation between user's ID
and its public key.
Chapter 7
Unrestricted Sequential
Aggregate Signatures
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Background
Overview Aggregate signature [17] allows each signer to generate a signa-
ture for an individual message and the generated signatures can be aggre-
gated later by anyone. If the aggregation of signatures is performed by the
signing algorithm at the same time as generating a new signature (especially,
if the aggregation of signatures needs the signing key), then such a scheme is
called sequential aggregate signature [66]. Besides its interesting mathemat-
ical structure, sequential aggregate signature also has practical importance
among aggregate signatures because of several potential applications such as
certicate chains in hierarchical public-key infrastructures. However, most
of the existing (sequential) aggregate signature schemes have a restriction
that a message or a signer cannot appear more than once during a sequential
signing process, which is not desirable in some applications described in Sec-
tion 7.1.3. To overcome the problem, Bellare et al. introduced the notion of
unrestricted aggregate signature [9] which is an aggregate signature without
the above-mentioned restriction. According to [17], a new problem arises
for proving the security in the unrestricted setting. To the authors' best
knowledge, all the existing unrestricted schemes without random oracles
require multilinear maps in order to prove the security [41, 82], and conse-
quently, these schemes are impractical.Therefore, it is an important prob-
lem from both theoretical and practical viewpoints to realize unrestricted
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sequential aggregate signature (in the standard model) without multilinear
maps, which is the motivation of our present work.
Plain Public Key Model vs. Certied KeyModel Signature schemes
with multiple signers such as aggregate signature schemes require special
care for the rogue key attack [67]. The rogue key attack is an attack that a
malicious signer chooses its public key as a function of that of honest signers
in such a way that it can then easily forge a signature in a signing group.
By utilizing such a key, rogue key attackers can easily forge signatures. In-
terestingly, the rogue key attackers do not know a secret key corresponding
to the rogue public key, because the value includes secret keys of victims.
Hence, one of possible way to prevent the rogue key attack is to utilize a
zero-knowledge proof of the secret key for a key registration [67]. The model
requiring a user to prove knowledge of its secret key during public key regis-
tration with a certicate authority (CA) is called the certied key model [13].
Bellare and Neven [10] pointed out a gap in which existing public key in-
frastructures (PKI) do not include such a protocol, and suggested the plain
public key model where key registration with a CA ensures nothing about
a party's possession or knowledge of a secret key. A security proof via the
plain public key model guarantees the strongest security for aggregate signa-
ture, and the scheme in [17] required the restricted setting in order to prove
the security in the plain public key model until Bellare et al. proved the
security in the unrestricted setting [9]. However, its proof is done in the ran-
dom oracle model and it is an open problem whether there is an unrestricted
sequential aggregate signature scheme in the plain public key model, which
is proven secure in the standard model. On the other hand, if we admit the
use of widely recognized protocols such as the Schnorr Identication [84] or
the Fischlin paradigm [34], the rogue key attack can be prevented. With
the use of such protocols, we only need to discuss the certied key model.
As in the plain public key model, it is not known whether there is an un-
restricted sequential aggregate signature scheme even in a weaker security
model, the certied key model, which is proven secure without multilinear
maps in the standard model. Therefore, in this paper, we adopt the certied
key model and study under the model a secure unrestricted sequential ag-
gregate signature scheme in the standard model. In the course of the study,
we identify that several schemes, which are secure in the restricted setting,
become insecure in the unrestricted setting even in the certied key model.
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Limitation of Straightforward Approach Roughly speaking, the dif-
culty to realize unrestricted sequential aggregate signature is that, when
a signer generates many signatures in a signing process, the same secret
key corresponding to the signer is used many times. Therefore, a \trivial"
approach is to use a new secret key for each signing operation to generate
and aggregate a new signature (cf., [1]). This approach essentially imitates
a situation that all signers are distinct. However, even for such a \trivial"
construction, there is a restriction that the signer cannot generate signa-
tures more than the number of keys. In the paper, we aim at realizing by a
dierent approach a scheme that does not have such a restriction and can
deal with any (polynomially bounded) number of signatures.
7.1.2 Our Contributions
We show that unrestricted sequential aggregate signature which is provably
secure in the standard model can be realized without multilinear maps. More
precisely, we revisit the Waters-hash-based sequential aggregate signature
scheme proposed by Lu et al. [64], the LOSSW06 scheme for short, which
does not use multilinear maps. We note that the original security proof
for the LOSSW06 scheme highly relies on a restriction that each message or
signer appears at most once, therefore the unrestricted property described in
Section 7.1.1 cannot be achieved by straightforward extensions of the original
proof (see Section 7.3 for details). We develop a new technique to prove the
security even in the presence of multiple messages and signers, which reveals
that the LOSSW06 scheme is in fact an unrestricted sequential aggregate
signature scheme. To the authors' best knowledge, this is the rst result to
provide an unrestricted sequential aggregate signature without multilinear
maps which is secure in the standard model.
Roughly speaking, our new proof technique implies the following: For
a sequential aggregate signature scheme in the standard model, if the hash
function used in the scheme can be chosen as a programmable hash func-
tion and the scheme has a certain re-randomization functionality, then the
scheme is an unrestricted sequential aggregate signature in the standard
model. In particular, the LOSSW06 scheme satises the condition, there-
fore the above-mentioned result is derived. We note that the reduction cost
of a security proof for unrestricted sequential aggregate signature by our new
technique is almost the same as that for sequential aggregate signature by
a standard proof technique. Moreover, as another example of applications
of our new proof technique, we also revisit an ID-based sequential aggregate
signature scheme proposed by Boldyreva et al. [15], the BGOY10 scheme
for short, in the random oracle model, and show that the scheme is also an
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unrestricted sequential aggregate signature scheme (we note that random
oracles can be seen as \ideal" programmable hash functions [40]). To the
authors' best knowledge, the BGOY10 scheme is the rst ID-based sequen-
tial aggregate signature scheme in the unrestricted setting. We also note
that the LOSSW06 scheme and the BGOY10 scheme can be extended to
the framework of ordered multisignature, which leads us to the notion of
unrestricted ordered multisignature via our results in the paper.
We emphasize that, in contrast to the case of the two schemes above,
it is not always true that sequential aggregate signature scheme is also un-
restricted sequential aggregate signature. Actually, we show that a scheme
by Lee et al. [54], which is secure in the sense of sequential aggregate signa-
ture, falls into insecure when multiple messages and signers are in addition
allowed (we note that we do not claim that a aw exists in the original
security proof in [54]).
7.1.3 Applications
For practical use of sequential aggregate signature, the unrestricted prop-
erty for multiple messages/signers is getting more eective as each signer
generates signatures more frequently. For such cases, when the scheme lacks
the unrestricted property, a signer needs all the data previously generated
by the signer for generating and aggregating a new signature, which is obvi-
ously too inecient. In contrast, for the unrestricted schemes, by utilizing
the Lazy Verication technique [18], it becomes possible to update the pre-
viously aggregated signatures by using the dierential data only. Hence the
eciency is signicantly improved, especially, for example, in the following
applications:
Content Editing Systems Here we discuss content marketing based on
content-editing systems [83], where aggregate signature authorizes each re-
editing of an already uploaded content such as a movie on YouTube [104].
In ordinary systems, when the same user re-edits a content and then gen-
erates a signature again, the user has to remove the previous signature be-
fore the editing and to generate a signature for the whole content after the
editing, which requires the user to possess (even temporarily) the whole
content. Since such a content is usually very large, the process of manip-
ulating the signatures is too memory-inecient [71]. On the other hand,
for such systems using unrestricted sequential aggregate signature, the cost
of updating a signature at each re-editing is much reduced owing to the
above-mentioned property that only the dierence data suce to update
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Known Sequential Aggregate Signature
Schemes. Here the two cells written in the bold fonts are due to our results
in the paper. In the column of type of scheme, we denote by Synchronized a
synchronized scheme, by General a general aggregate signature scheme, by
IB an ID-based signature scheme and by Sequential a sequential aggregate
signature scheme.
Schemes Type of Provable Secure Proof Multilinear
Scheme in Unrestricted Model? Model Maps
AGH10 [1] Synchronized No Standard No
BGLS03 [17] General Yes ROM No
HW13 [41] General Yes Standard Yes
LLY13-1 [54] Sequential No Standard No
LLY13-2 [55] Sequential No Standard No
LMRS04 [66] Sequential Yes ROM No
Neven08 [71] Sequential Yes ROM No
RS09 [82] General Yes Standard Yes
Schroder [85] Sequential No Standard No
LOSSW06 [64] Sequential Yes Standard No
BJ10 [6] IB,General Yes ROM No
GR06 [36] IB, Syncronized No ROM No
GLOW12 [37] IB, Sequential No ROM No
HW13 [41] IB, General Yes Standard Yes
BGOY10 [15] IB, Sequential Yes ROM No
the signature. Moreover, as a side eect derived from the property of se-
quential aggregate signature that only the signer (knowing the secret key)
can aggregate the generated signature, combining individual contents with
valid signatures by a third party can be prevented in comparison with un-
restricted general aggregate signature.
Privacy-Preserving Electronic Toll Pricing Systems Privacy-preserving
electronic toll pricing (PrETP) system [7] is a system that a user, who is an
on-board unit of a vehicle, can prove that they use genuine data and perform
correct operations while disclosing the minimum amount of time/location
data. Informally speaking, when the vehicle passes a gate on a road, a service
provider sends the time/location data with the provider's signature to the
on-board unit, and then the on-board unit of the vehicle generates a com-
mitment for the received data. A main advantage of utilizing unrestricted
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sequential aggregate signature is a compression of the signatures sent by the
same provider. It was discussed in [7] that, practically, each on-board unit
has only a small memory (e.g., 100 kilobytes) while it has to store all the
received data during a somewhat long time period (e.g., one month). Here
we focus on the issue of storing all the signatures associated to these data,
which was not intensively mentioned in [7] but would in fact be a serious
problem in practical situations. Unrestricted sequential aggregate signature
is expected to reduce the cost of on-board unit's aggregating the signatures
generated by the same provider.
7.1.4 Comparison with Priori Works
Comparison with the Dividing-Out Method : To deal with multi-
ple appearance of messages/signers by some sequential aggregate signature
schemes, it was proposed in [64] to remove the previous signature and then
re-generate a signature at each time to update a signature (called the divide-
out method). However, as already mentioned in [71], such a method is not
reasonable for some applications described in Section 7.1.3, since the method
requires each signer to possess the whole of previously used data to update a
signature. As discussed in Section 7.1.3, the data size in the content editing
systems may be too large, and the overloads of the memory become heavy.
In addition, in the PrETP system, each user has to submit to the service
provider all of the path data in order to compress the data. This results
in reveal of the user's privacy data to the provider. On the other hand, by
using unrestricted sequential aggregate signature schemes presented by our
result in the paper (combined with the Lazy Verication technique [18]),
each update of a signature requires the new data only as mentioned in Sec-
tion 7.1.3, therefore the usefulness is signicantly improved in comparison
with the previous technique. We describe the detail in Section 7.3.3.
Unrestricted Aggregation Without Random Oracles : The rst ag-
gregate signature scheme was proposed by Boneh et al. [17], and the signing
operation and the aggregation operation were separated. Such aggregate
signature schemes called the general aggregate signature, and signatures in
these schemes can be aggregated into a single signature by anyone. Mean-
while, Lysyanskaya et al. [66] proposed the rst sequential aggregate signa-
ture scheme where the aggregation operation is executed at the same time
as the signing operation. In other words, the aggregation operation can-
not be individually executed without the secret key. Although there are
many aggregate signature schemes, these schemes have a restriction that all
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messages as well as all signers have to be distinct. The known applications
of aggregate signature is secure-border gateway protocol [52] or certicate
chains. Messages to be signed in these systems are IP address or certi-
cate information which are unique information, and signers correspond to
routers of network service provider or certicate authority. Since these en-
tities do not appear more than once, the restriction has been ignored in
the existing works. Bellare et al. [9] formalized the problem as unrestricted
aggregate signature, and a main application of unrestricted aggregate sig-
nature is sensor networks. Neven [71] proposed an unrestricted sequen-
tial aggregate signature scheme with message recovery from permutations,
and his scheme was proposed in the random oracle model. In the stan-
dard model, Ruckert and Schroder [82] and Hohenberger and Waters [41]
proposed unrestricted general aggregate signature schemes with multilinear
maps. While the Ruckert-Schroder scheme [82] was proposed in the certi-
ed key model [13], the Hohenberger-Waters scheme [41] was proposed in
the plain public key model [10]. The certied key model is a model assuming
that each signer knows a secret key corresponding to an own public key, and
is the most discussed and practical model for a signature scheme with mul-
tiple signers [1, 13, 14, 54, 55, 64, 85]. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no unrestricted aggregate signature scheme without the multilinear maps
even in the certied key model. A main dierence between the certied key
model and the plain public key model is whether an adversary is allowed to
execute the rogue key attack or not. The plain public key model allows the
adversary to execute the rogue key attack, and thus the strongest security
can be guaranteed in this model. However, generally speaking, the rogue key
attack can be prevented by a zero-knowledge proof of secret information [67].
Unrestricted ID-based Sequential Aggregation : ID-based aggre-
gate signature [36] is aggregate signatures in ID-based cryptography [86].
The rst aggregate signature scheme by Gentry and Ramzan [36] was pro-
posed in the synchronized setting [36, 1] where each signer signs only once
per period. The scheme in the synchronized setting does not allow each
signer to appear multiple times for an aggregate signature. Although there
are schemes in [6, 41] which are secure without such an assumption, these
schemes have some problems for a practical scenario. In the scheme in [6]
signers themselves need to be designated in the signing algorithm, and a
signature of a new signer cannot be added in an aggregate signature. On
the other hand, the scheme in [41] is based on the multilinear maps, whose
cost is too much large. In addition to these problems, the schemes in [6, 41]
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are not sequential aggregate signature scheme but general aggregate sig-
nature scheme. ID-based sequential aggregate signature was formalized by
Boldyreva et al. [14]. Although they also proposed an ID-based sequential
aggregate signature scheme, their scheme was broken by Hwang et al. [45].
After, they revised the scheme [15], and their new scheme, the BGOY10
scheme, is provably secure in the restricted setting under a newly proposed
interactive assumption described in Chapter 2. We extend the BGOY10
scheme to an unrestricted ID-based sequential aggregate signature scheme.
More recently, Gerbush et al. [37] improved the security reduction of the
BGOY10 scheme, called the GLOW12 scheme, by the dual-system method-
ology [96], and hence the security of the GLOW12 scheme is reduced to a
static assumption in the restricted setting. A main dierence between the
BGOY10 scheme and the GLOW12 scheme is the security assumptions, but
these algebraic structures are essentially identical. Thus, we expect that the
security of the GLOW12 scheme can be proven in the unrestricted setting.
Providing such a proof is an open problem.
7.2 Unrestricted Sequential Aggregate Signature
Scheme
We dene a syntax of unrestricted sequential aggregate signature and its
security model. These are dened in the [64]. Whereas the LOSSW06
model [64] treats with only the restricted setting, unrestricted sequential
aggregate signature can be treated as discussed in detail below. We describe
the denitions in conjunction with the notion of lazy verication [18] in order
for an eciency discussion as described in Section 7.3.3.
7.2.1 Syntax
Sequential aggregate signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup(1k) Given a security parameter 1k, return a public parameter para.
KeyGeneration(para) Given para, return a secret key ski and its corre-
sponding public key pki.
Signing(ski;mi, fmjgi 1j=1; fpkjgi 1j=1, i 1; pki) Given ski, a message mi
to be signed, a set fmjgi 1j=1 of signed messages, a set fpkjgi 1j=1 of public
keys, an aggregate signature i 1 and pki, return a new aggregate
signature i on fmjgij=1 under fpkjgij=1.
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Verication(fmjgij=1; n; fpkjgij=1) Given a set fmjgij=1 of signed mes-
sages, an aggregate signature i and a set fpkjgij=1 of public keys,
return accept or reject.
Denition 26 (Correctness). In a sequential aggregate signature scheme,
we say that the scheme is correct if, for all para; ski and pki given by Setup
and KeyGeneration, Verication(fmjgij=1, Signing(ski;m; fmjgi 1j=1,
fpkjgi 1j=1; i 1; pki), fpkjgi 1j=1) outputs accept for all i 2 [1; n].
We note the eciency and the sequential aggregation as important prop-
erties of sequential aggregate signature. In a discussion of the eciency, the
size of an aggregate signature i should be as small as possible relatively
to the previously generated one i  1, i.e., jij = ji 1j holds. For the
sequential aggregation, one of main applications of sequential aggregate sig-
nature is certicate chains, and an ability to combine preexisting individual
signatures into an aggregate signature is unnecessary. More precisely, each
signer transforms a sequential aggregate signature into another that includes
a signature on a message of his choice, and the signing and the aggregation
are a single operation. Namely, only a signer who knows a secret key can
aggregate the signatures.
Lazy verication construction [18] is a construction removing the framed
text in Signing. The correctness holds even for adopting lazy verication.
Strictly speaking, lazy verication is an individual capability from unre-
stricted sequential aggregate signature, but as described in Section 7.3.3 the
applications become more practical by combining these techniques.
7.2.2 Security Model
In this paper, we follow the security model that was proposed by Lu et
al. [64]. We note that the security of an unrestricted sequential aggregate sig-
nature scheme can be guaranteed by an analysis under the following model.
The model is a variant of the certied key model [13], which assumes that
each signer knows a secret key corresponding to its own public key. As
described in Section 7.1, the following model is dierent from the model de-
scribed in [9]. A main dierence is that the following model does not allow
an adversary to execute rogue key attack while an adversary in the model
in [9] is allowed. However, in a high-level discussion, the rogue key attack
can be overcome utilizing a zero-knowledge proof [67] in general with respect
to a secret key corresponding to its own public key. In a majority of the
existing schemes, a public key corresponding to a secret key x is gx, which
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is a famous form. Hence, a knowledge of the secret key can be easily guar-
anteed by the Schnorr identication scheme [84]. In fact, as a related work,
Ruckert and Schroder proposed an unrestricted general aggregate signature
scheme under the certied key model [82].
There exist an adversary A and a challenger C in this model. The chal-
lenger C has a certied-key list L to register users and their own public keys,
including and A can get to know all the keys in L except for the one given
by C to the target signer. The advantage of A can be obtained with the
probability that C outputs accept in the subsequent game. Hereinafter, we
denote by x(i) the value of the i-th query for all x.
Initial Phase The challenger C generates a public parameter para by Setup
and a pair of challenge key (sk; pk) of a target signer by KeyGen-
eration. Then, C initializes L := pk, and runs A with para and pk
as input.
Certication Query A generates ski and its corresponding public key pki
for any signer. Then, A provides (ski; pki) to C, and C registers pki in
L.
Signing Query For all i, A generates a signing query (m(h); fmjgi 1j=1; fpkjgi 1j=1,
i 1; pk) as hth query for pk, where the following conditions hold for
the query: Verication algorithm outputs accept; For all pkj , pkj in
fpkjgi 1j 1 is included in L; i 1 < n holds. Given such a query by A, C
runs Signing(sk;m(h)i ; fmjgi 1j=1; fpkjgi 1j=1; i 1; pk), and obtains i.
Finally, C returns i on fm(h)j gij=1 under fpkjgij=1.
Output After qc iterations of the certication queries and qs iterations of
the signing queries, A outputs a forgery (fmi gni=1; n). Here, the
following conditions hold for the forgery where let an index of the po-
sition of the target signer be i: Verication(fmi gni=1; n; fpki gni=1)
outputs accept; there exists a set  of indexes corresponding to pk
such that 9j 2 [mj =2 fm(h)i gqsh=1] and jj > 0 holds; fpkigni=1 in-
cludes pk; For all pkj 2 fpkigni=1, pkj is included in L. If all conditions
hold, then C outputs accept. Otherwise, C outputs reject.
Denition 27. We say that an aggregate signature scheme is (t; qc; qs; `; n; )-
secure if there is no adversary A breaks with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ). Here, we say
that A breaks the scheme with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ) as that a challenger C outputs
accept, in the security game described above, with the probability greater
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than  within the execution time t. Here, A can generate at most qc certi-
cation queries and at most qs signing queries, ` is the length of the message
output by A, and n is the number of signers included in the forgery.
Extension to Ordered Multisignatures under Unrestricted Setting
Sequential aggregate signatures give rise to ordered multisignatures where
each signer guarantees the validity of a common message and its position in a
signing group [15]. A main dierence of the ordered multisignatures from the
above denition is conditions of queries. Since the ordered multisignatures
are multisignatures guaranteeing both the common message and the signing
order among the signing group, the queries are given as the form of (m; i)
for all i 2 [1; n], where  i is the signing order from the rst signer to ith
signer, instead of fmigni=1. We give the formal denition of unrestricted
ordered multisignatures in Section 7.5.
7.2.3 (In)Security of the Existing Schemes under Unrestricted
Setting
The model described in the previous section is the most utilized. In this sec-
tion, we show that there exist schemes which becomes forgeable by multiple
appearance of signers: more specically, we forge signatures in the LLY13
sequential aggregate signature scheme [54] and in the BGOY07 ordered mul-
tisignature scheme [14]. As described in Section 7.1.2, we note that we do
not claim that there is no aw in their security proofs. These original proofs
are correct, and the following discussion under the unrestricted setting is
outside of the scope of their models. We simply claim that a scheme se-
cure under the restricted setting does not imply an unrestricted sequential
aggregate signature scheme which is provably secure.
(In)Security of the LLY13 Scheme under Unrestricted Setting
Review of the LLY13 Sequential Aggregate Signature Scheme :
We briey review the LLY13 scheme [54].
Setup(1k) Generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ;e). Then, choose ran-
dom generators g; Y 2 G. Output (p;G;GT ; e; g; Y ) as the public
parameter para.
KeyGeneration(para) Pick random numbers i  Zp and compute Ai =
gi . Output i as ski and Ai as pki.
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Signing(ski;mi; fmjgi 1j=1; fpkjgi 1j=1; i 1; pki) Parse the secret key ski as
i, the previous signature 
0 as (Si 1; Ri 1;Wi 1) and pki as Ai, where
if i = 1, then set 0 = (1; g; Y ). Check if Verication(fmjgi 1j=1; i 1,
fpkjgi 1j=1) outputs accept. If not, output ?. Otherwise, pick a random
number r  Zp and compute as Si  
 
Si 1(Ri 1)i(Wi 1)iMi
r
; Ri  
Ri 1  gr and Wi  Wi 1. Output i = (Si; Ri;Wi) as an aggregate
signature.
Verication(fmjgij=1; n; fpkjgij=1) Parse i as (Si; Ri;Wi) and each pki
as Ai. Check if all of fpkjgij=1 are distinct , and output reject if not.
Otherwise, check if the following equations hold: e(Ri; Y )
?
= e(Wi; g)
and e(Si; g)
?
= e

Ri;
Qi
j=1Aj



Wi;
Qi
j=1 V
mj
j

. If the previous
equation holds, output accept. Otherwise, output reject.
The unrestricted setting is a construction removing the framed text in
Verication. Removing the check that the public keys are distinct is out
of the scope of the original construction in the LLY13 scheme [54]. In such
a situation, the following attack will occur.
Insecurity under Unrestricted Setting : We show that the LLY13
scheme becomes insecure under the unrestricted setting. The signature equa-
tion in the LLY13 scheme can be written as S = (gr)
Pi
j=1 j (Y r)
Pi
j=1 jmj
for any i. If the signers are allowed to sign in multiple positions for a
single signature, then the attacker can forge a signature as follows: where
the signing process is bosskboss: in this situation, the signature equation
can be written as S2 = (g
r)2a(Y r)am1+am2 , and then any user obtaining
the signature can generate another signature as S
1
2
2 = (g
r)a(Y r)a
(m1+m2)
2 ,
which is a value accepted as a signature on m0 := (m1+m2)2 . As described
in Section 7.1.2, the proof is correct but this attack is outside the proof.
Similarly, a signature S1 = (g
r)a(Y r)m1a is convertible into a new one
S21 = (g
r)2a(Y r)2m1a , which is a forgery on a new message m0 := 2m1,
under the unrestricted setting.
(In)Security of the BGOY07 Ordered Multisignature Scheme un-
der Unrestricted Setting
This attack is similar as that in the previous section. The construction of the
BGOY07 scheme utilizes indexes to represent a position for each signer, and
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these indexes can be arbitrarily manipulated by an adversary if any signer
appears more than once for a single ordered multisignature. As describe
above, their security proof is correct and this attack is outside of the scope
of the model in [14]. We show the details of the BGOY07 scheme and the
insecurity under the unrestricted setting in Section 7.5.3.
7.3 Construction without Random Oracles
In this section, we show that the LOSSW06 sequential aggregate signature
scheme, which was originally proposed as a restricted scheme, is actually an
unrestricted scheme in the standard model.
7.3.1 Basic Idea: Why the Original Proof Technique Is Not
Enough
Before explaining our idea for the proof, rst we note that the extension to
the unrestricted setting cannot be achieved by a straightforward generaliza-
tion of the original security proof in [64] by the following reason. In [64],
the security of their proposed scheme in the restricted setting was reduced
to the security of the Waters signature, therefore a signing oracle for the
Waters signature is available in the proof. However, the oracle can only
generate a new signature corresponding to the challenge key, but cannot
aggregate the new signature to the previously aggregated signatures, which
also requires the unknown challenge key. The original proof resolved this is-
sue by changing the order of the signature generation; the aggregation of the
signature corresponding to the challenge key can be skipped by generating
the signature rst among the sequential signing process. Now the remain-
ing signatures can be successfully aggregated to the former ones, since the
challenge key is not used again by the property of the restricted setting. In
other words, the original proof essentially relies on the assumption that each
signer appears at most once; if the challenge key is used twice, then the ag-
gregation of the second signature generated by the challenge key cannot be
skipped whatever the order of the signature generation is.
Our proof in the paper resolves the problem by a completely dierent
approach. Namely, instead of reducing the security to that of the Waters
signature as in the standard proof technique in the literature, we try to re-
duce the security of the scheme directly to the CDH assumption, by focusing
on the following two properties of the scheme by Lu et al.; (I) the hash func-
tion used in the scheme is a kind of programmable hash function; (II) the
structure of the scheme admits re-randomization of a signature. The rst
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step of the proof in the unrestricted setting is the same as the restricted
setting discussed above; changing the order of the signature generation in
such a way that a number of signatures for the challenge key have to be
generated rst and then signatures for the other signers are generated. The
essential part of the problem is how to generate and aggregate the signa-
tures for the challenge key. The authors found that the property (I) enables
us to emulate the sequential generation and aggregation of signatures by
just a single generation of a signature for the challenge key. Moreover, the
property (II) allows us to use the re-randomization of the obtained signa-
ture, and the true and the emulated aggregation of signatures can be made
indistinguishable. These reduce the argument for the unrestricted setting to
that for the restricted setting, the latter being already solved. This is an
outline of our new proof technique. (We note that, if the Waters signature
were equipped with a functionality to emulate the aggregation of signatures
as described above, then the original proof in [64] would be also extendible
to the unrestricted setting. However, the Waters signature does not satisfy
the requirement.)
7.3.2 New Proof of the LOSSW06 Scheme
Through the observation described in the previous section, we prove that
the LOSSW06 scheme is a secure unrestricted sequential aggregate signature
scheme. The following proof is our main contribution.
Unrestricted LOSSW06 Sequential Aggregate Signature Scheme
In this section, we show the construction of the LOSSW06 scheme under
unrestricted setting. The following construction is an improved version via
the new security proof. In this scheme, each signer signs an individual
document mi and a message m in this scheme will be dealt as a bit-string
of the form f0; 1g` for all `. We note that the signing order in this scheme
only represents a signing group and is not guaranteed by its verications.
Setup(1k) Generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e) described in Section
2.3. Generate random generators (g1; g2) 2 G, and output (p;G;GT ; e,
g1; g2) as para.
KeyGeneration(para) Choose i; v
0
i  Zp and `-bit vector (vi;1;    ; vi;`) 
Z`p, and compute Ai = g
i
1 ; V
0
i = g
v0i
1 ; Vi;1 = g
vi;1
1 ;    ; Vi;` = gvi;`1 .
ski is (g
i
2 ; v
0
i; vi;1;    ; vi;`), and a corresponding public key pki is
(Ai; V
0
i ; Vi;1;    ; Vi;`).
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Signing(ski;mi; fmjgi 1j=1; fpkjgi 1j=1; i 1; pki) Parsemi as a bit-string (mi;1,
   ;mi;`) 2 f0; 1g` and i 1 as (S0; R0). Check if pki =2 fpkjgi 1j=1 holds .
Then, generate a random number ri  Zp and compute as follows:
Ri = Ri 1  gri1 ;
Si = Si 1  gi2 (Ri 1)v
0
i+
P`
j=1 vi;jmi;j
0@ iY
j=1
 
V 0j
Y`
e=1
V
mj;e
j;e
!1Ari :
Otherwise, compute as follows:
Ri = Ri 1;
Si = Si 1  gi2 (Ri 1)v
0
i+
P`
j=1 vi;jmi;j :
Output  = (Si; Ri).
Verication(fmigni=1; n; fpkigni=1) Parsemi as a bit-string (mi;1;    ;mi;`) 2
f0; 1g` for i = [1; n] and  as (Sn; Rn). Extract each signer's public
key (Ai; V
0
i ; Vi;1;    ; Vi;`) from fpkigni=1 and verify that the following
equation holds:
e(Sn; g1)
?
= e
 
g2;
nY
i=1
Ai
!
 e
0@Rn; nY
i=1
0@V 0i Y`
j=1
V
mi;j
i;j
1A1A :
Note : The framed text in the signing algorithm and the equation (2)
are new computations via the proof under the unrestricted setting. As de-
scribed in Section 7.3.3, the computational cost can be reduced by these
computations in comparison with the divide-out method.
Security Analysis of the LOSSW06 Scheme
The LOSSW06 scheme described in 7.3.2 is a secure unrestricted sequential
aggregate signature scheme if the CDH assumption holds. This security is
not proven in the original proof of the LOSSW06 scheme, and, as described
above, the original proof of the LOSSW06 scheme does not imply the fol-
lowing proof. More precisely, whereas the proof goal of the original proof is
to forge a signature in the Waters signature scheme, that of the following
proof is to construct an algorithm to solve the CDH problem via a forgery
output by an adversary A. The following proof is our main contribution.
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Theorem 28. The LOSSW06 scheme is (t; qc; qs; `; n; )-secure if (t
0; 0)-
CDH assumption holds in G, where 0 = 16(`+1)qs , t
0 = t + texp((` + 1)qc +
6qs+2)+2qctP , texp is a computational time for a single exponentiation and
tP is that for a single pairing computation.
Proof. Given a challenge (g; ga, gb; p;G;GT ; e), B sets a key registration list
L = ; and d = 4qs, where d aects a probability to solve the problem and
we do not describe the detail here. Then, B generates s  f0;    ; lg, `-
length vectors (v1;    ; v` )  Z`d, (z1 ;    ; z` )  Z`p and v0  Zd; z0  
Zp, and then sets up polynomials G(mi) = v0 +
P`
i=1 v

imi;j   ds and
K(mi) = z
0 +
P`
i=1 z

imi;j for these values, where mi;j is j-th bit in mi.
Next, B sets (g1 = g; g2 = gb) as public parameter, and publishes Vi;1 =
(gb)vi;1gzi;1 ;    ; Vi;` = (gb)vi;`gzi;` as a public key pk of a target signer,
where

V 0i
Q`
j=1 V
mj
i;j

= (gb)G(m)gK(m) holds. B runs A with (p;G;GT ; e,
g1; g2; A
; V , Vi;1;    ; Vi;`) as input.
Certication Query: Given ski = (g
i
2 ; v
0
i; vi;1;    ; vi;`), pki = (Ai; V 0i ,
Vi;1;    ; Vi;`) by A for any signer, B check that e(gi2 ; g1) = e(g2; Ai); V 0i =
gv
0
i ; Vi;1 = g
vi;1 ;    ; Vi;` = gvi;` hold. If not B outputs ?, otherwise registers
(Ai; V
0
i ; Vi;1;    ; Vi;`) in L as a public key pki.
Signing Query: In this proof, B checks only that thatP
mj2fm(h)i g
G(mj) 6=
0 holds, where fm(h)i g means a set of messages to be signed by pk. Here,
we denote by  a set of indexes corresponding to pk in fpkjgi 1j=1 and by
jj the size of the set.
If
P
mj2fm(h)i g
G(mj) 6= 0 holds, B generates a random number r  Zp
and executes the following computations:
Ri = g
r(ga)
  jjP
mj2fm
(h)
i g
G(mj)
;
Si = (g
a)
 jj
P
mj2fm
(h)
i g
K(mj)P
mj2fm
(h)
i g
G(mj)
0B@ Y
mj2fm(h)i g
V 
Y`
e=1
V
mj;e
i;j
1CA
r
 (Ri)
Pi
j=1^j =2(v0j+
P`
e=1 vj;emj;e) g
Pi
j=1^j =2 j
2 :
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This signature can be written as follows:
Si = (g
ab)j
j

(gb)
P
mj2fm
(h)
i g
G(mj)
g
P
mj2fm
(h)
i g
K(mj)
  jjaP
mj2fm
(h)
i g
G(mj)

0B@ Y
mj2fm(h)i g
V 
Y`
e=1
V
mj;e
i;j
1CA
r
(Ri)
Pi
j=1^j =2 (v
0
j+
P`
e=1 vj;emj;e) g
Pi
j=1^j =2 j
2
= g
Pi
j=1 j
2
0@ iY
j=1
 
V 0j
Y`
e=1
V
mj;e
j;e
!1Ar 
jjaP
mj2fm
(h)
i g
G(mj)
:
This signature (Si; Ri) is accepted.
Output: After qc iterations of the certication queries and qs iterations
of the signing queries, A outputs a forgery (fmi gni=1; n), where fmig is a
set of the messages to be signed by pk. B checks thatPmj2fmigG(mj) 6= 0
holds for the forgery. If not, B aborts the process. Otherwise, B can solve
the CDH problem as follows:
From the verication equation holds and the setup in Initial Phase,
(Sn; Rn) can be written as follows:
R = gr;
S =

gab
jj nY
i=1^i=2
gi 

g
P
mj2fmig
K(mj)
r0@ nY
i=1^i=2
0@V 0i Y`
j=1
V
mi;j
i;j
1A1Ar ;
where r is a unknown random number. From the following computation, B
can solves the CDH problem.
gab =
0B@ SQn
j=1^j =2 gj

(R)
Pn
j=1^j =2 (v
0
j+
P`
e=1 vj;e)+
P
mj2fmig
K(mj)
1CA
1
jj
:
Finally, we evaluate the success probability 0. This analysis is almost the
same as that in [95], and the probability is given as 0    Pr [E1], where
E1 =
264 qs^
h=1
0B@ X
mj2fm(h)i g
G(mj) 6= 0
1CA ^ X
mj2fmig
G(mj) = 0
375 :
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Therefore, 0    116(`+1)qs holds. The execution time of B is that of A
plus `+1 exponentiation computations and two pairing computations for qc
certication queries, six exponentiation computations for qs signing queries
and two exponentiation computations in the nal step. Therefore, t0 =
t+ texp((`+1)qc+6qs+2)+2qctP holds, where texp is a computational time
of one exponentiation computation and tP is a computational time of one
pairing computation.
Extension to Ordered Multisignatures
As described in Section 7.2, any aggregate signatures can be converted into
ordered multisignatures by which each signer signs a concatenation of a mes-
sage and public keys of a signing group. Hence, we can construct an unre-
stricted ordered multisignature scheme from the LOSSW06 scheme through
the analysis in Section 7.3.2. The construction is provably secure without
random oracles.
7.3.3 Discussion
Eciency Comparison with Dividing-Out Method
Suppose the same signer generates two or more signatures successively in
the unrestricted LOSSW06 scheme described in Section 7.3.2. Then the ef-
ciency of such signature generation and aggregation can be improved by
combining our new technique with the Lazy Verication technique. By uti-
lizing the Lazy Verication technique, signer does not need to keep all the
previous messages for signing. As one can observe in Section 7.3.2, a simpler
procedure, the equation (7.1), can be used in the signing algorithm instead
of the less ecient one, the equation (7.1). Intuitively, this is possible since
the random number ri used in the equation (7.1) does not need to be se-
lected in every successive signing operation in the equation (7.1) and the
same Ri 1 can be treated as Ri. Moreover, the message mi 1 previously
signed by the same signer does not appear in the formula for Si in the equa-
tion (7.1) whereas the corresponding message appears in the last component
of the formula for Si in the equation (7.1). In the existing Dividing-out tech-
nique, the complicated procedure (7.1) is always required even for the case
of successive generation of signatures by the same signer, and the messages
previously signed by the same signer need to be kept by the signer during
the signing operation. Hence the construction based on our technique can
be signicantly more ecient than the Dividing-out-based construction if
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the same signer signs large amount of data consecutively as described in the
practical applications of Section 7.1.3.
Reducing the Size of the Public Parameter and Public Key
In some applications, even the size of the public parameter and of public key
creates a bottleneck. In order to reduce the size of these, we can adopt the
approach of Naccache [70]. In this construction, the messages are divided
into  chunks, and the size of each chunk is 32 bits. For 128-bit security, the
public parameter can be reduced from 256 generators to eight generators.
We omit the details of the scheme construction and the security proof,
but these are similar to details in [70]. However, we note that the Naccache
approach decreases the reduction cost in the security proof. Hence, we must
utilize that approach carefully.
Batch Verication and Batch Identication
A batch verication algorithm [8] takes as input n signatures on n messages
from n signers, and outputs accept if all individual signatures verify with
probability 1 and reject otherwise with probability 1 2  . Ferrara et al. [33]
showed the batch verication of the LOSSW06 scheme and the BGLS03
scheme, and their batch verications are useful for our analysis version. We
recall the batch verication in [33].
Let a security parameter of the batch verication be  , which in practice
could be 80. It works as follows, where there are  signatures and we denote
by x(j) j-th tuple about the signatures for all x:
Batch

fm(1)i gni=1; (1)n ; fpk(1)i gni=1

;    ;

fm()i gni=1; ()n ; fpk()i gni=1

For
all i = [1; n] and j 2 [1; ], parse m(i) as (m(i)j;1;    ;m(i)j;`) and (i)n as
(S
(i)
n ; R
(i)
n ). Then choose  random numbers 1;    ;  2 f0; 1g and com-
pute as follows:
e
0@ Y
j=1
(S(i)n )
j ; g1
1A ?= Y
j=1
e
 
g2;
nY
i=1
(A
(j)
i )
j
!


Y
j=1
e
0@(R(j)n )j ; nY
i=1
0@V 0(j)j Y`
j=1
(V
(j)
i;j )
mi;j
1A1A :
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Theorem 29. The above algorithm is a batch verication for the LOSSW06
scheme with error 2  .
As described in the next section, some applications such as the sensor
networks require a large amount of the signatures, and the batch verications
are quite practical in this scenario. As a weakness of the batch verications,
if there is even a single invalid signature in the batch instance, the the batch
algorithm will reject the entire batch with high probability. However, the
weakness can be overcome by a divide-and-conquer approach [76]. In this
approach, the verier shues the incoming batch of the signatures, and if
batch verications fails, divide the collection into two halves. Then the
verier recurse on the halves. Hence, the invalid signatures can be detected.
7.4 Construction of Identity-Based Scheme
7.4.1 Overview
Based on our new proof idea explained in Section 7.3.1, it is expected
that any sequential aggregate signature scheme (not only the LOSSW06
scheme [64]) secure in the restricted setting which satises the conditions
(I) and (II) in Section 7.3.1 becomes secure in the unrestricted setting as
well. A concrete example of such an existing scheme is the BGOY10 ID-
based sequential aggregate signature scheme proposed [15], whose original
security proof in the restricted setting was given in the random oracle model
under the IBSAS-CDH assumption mentioned in Chapter 2. We note that
random oracles can be interpreted as a special kind of programmable hash
functions, therefore our new technique is also applicable to the schemes using
random oracles. The reason why the original proof cannot be extended to
the unrestricted setting, and how we resolve the problem by our new proof
technique, are essentially the same as the case of the LOSSW06 scheme dis-
cussed in Section 7.3. To the authors' best knowledge, this is the rst result
to present an unrestricted ID-based sequential aggregate signature scheme
(even in the random oracle model).
7.4.2 Syntax
We recall the syntax in [15]. Similarly as that in Section 7.2, we describe
the denition in conjunction with the notion of lazy verication [18].
Setup(1k) Given a security parameter 1k, return a master secret key msk
and its corresponding master public key mpk.
7.4. CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY-BASED SCHEME 131
KeyDerivation(msk;mpk; IDi) Givenmsk;mpk and an identity-string IDi 2
f0; 1g, return a secret key ski for IDi.
Signing(mpk; ski;mi, fmjgi 1j=1; fIDjgi 1j=1; i 1) Given mpk; ski, a mes-
sage mi 2 f0; 1g and an aggregate signature i 1 of fIDjgi 1j=1 on
fmjgi 1j=1, return a new aggregate signature i of fIDjgij=1 on fmjgij=1.
Verication(fIDj ;mjgij=1; i) Given i identity-message pairs and i, out-
put accept or reject.
Denition 30 (Correctness). In an ID-based sequential aggregate signature
scheme, we say that the scheme is correct if, for allmsk;mpk given by Setup
and ski given byKeyGeneration for all IDi,Verication(fIDjgij=1; fmjgij=1,
Signing(mpk; skj ;mi; fmjgi 1j=1, fIDjgi 1j=1; i 1) ) outputs accept for all
i 2 [1; n].
Lazy-verication construction is a construction removing the framed text
in Signing. Similarly as Section 7.2, the correctness holds even for adopting
lazy verication.
7.4.3 Security Model
We describe a security model of an unrestricted ID-based sequential ag-
gregate signature scheme. Whereas the model described in [15] is for the
restricted setting, we extend the model in [15] to the unrestricted one. Our
model is a natural extension from the model in [15].
Initial Phase The challenger C generates a master secret key msk and its
corresponding master public key mpk, and run A with mpk as input.
Key Derivation Query A send any string ID(h)i to C, and C return a
secret key ski for ID
(h)
i .
Signing Query For all i, A generates a signing query (mpk;m(h)i ; ID(h)i ; i 1)
as h-th query, where the following conditions hold for the query: Ver-
ication algorithm outputs accept; i  1 < n. Given such a query, C
returns a signature i.
Output After qk iterations of Key Derivation Query and qs iterations
of Signing Query, A outputs a forgery (f(IDi ;mi )gni=1; n) where
the following conditions hold: Verication algorithm outputs accept;
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there exist at least ID such that ID =2 fIDhi gqkh=1 holds; there exist a
set of indexes  for (m; ID) such that (m; ID) =2 f(m(h)i ; IDhi )gqsh=1
holds. If all conditions hold, then C outputs accept. Otherwise, c out-
puts reject.
Denition 31. We say that an ID-based sequential aggregate signature
scheme is (t; qk; qs; qh; n; )-secure if there is no adversary A breaks with
(t; qk; qs; n; ). Here, we say that A breaks the scheme with (t; qk; qs; n; ) as
that a challenger C outputs accept, in the security game described above,
with probability greater than  with an execution time t. Here, A can
generate at most qk key derivation query, at most qs signing queries and at
most qh random oracle queries, and n is the number of signers included in
the forgery.
7.4.4 Unrestricted BGOY10 ID-based Sequential Aggregate
Signature Scheme
In this section, we show the construction of the BGOY10 scheme [15]. The
security of the scheme is guaranteed in the random oracle model, and the
unrestricted setting of the scheme is our contribution.
Setup(1k) Generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e). Choose random
numbers 1; 2 2 Zp, cryptographic hash functions H1;H2 : f0; 1g !
G and H3 : f0; 1g ! Zp, and compute A1 = g1 and A2 = g2 . Out-
put (1; 2) as a master secret key msk and (p;G;GT ; e; g; A1; A2;H1,
H2; H3) as a master public key mpk.
Key Derivation(msk;mpk; IDi) For a given string IDi 2 f0; 1g, output
(H1(IDi)
1 ; H2(IDi)
2) as a secret key ski.
Signing(mpk; ski;mi, fmjgi 1j=1; fIDjgi 1j=1; i 1) Parse i 1 as (Si 1; Ri 1,
Wi 1). Check if the verication algorithm return accept for the query.
If not, output ?. Otherwise, generate ri; xi 2 Zp and computes as
follows:
Wi = Wi 1  gwi ; Ri = Ri 1  gri ;
Si = Si 1  (Wi 1)ri  (Ri)wi H1(IDi)1 H2(IDi)2H3(IDikmi):
Output (Si; Ri;Wi).
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Verication(fIDj ;mjgij=1; i) Parse i as (Si; Ri;Wi), and check that the
following equation holds:
e(Si; g)
?
= e(Ri;Wi)  e
0@ iY
j=1
H1(IDj); A1
1A  e
0@ iY
j=1
H2(IDj)
H3(IDjkmj); A2
1A :
If so, output accept. Otherwise, output reject.
A Lazy verication in the above construction is to remove the framed
text in Signing. In this construction, to generate a new aggregate signature,
a set fmjgi 1j=1 of messages and a set fIDjgij=1 of IDs are not required unless
the verication algorithm is called for the signing process. Hence, the lazy
verication approach is more practical.
7.4.5 Security Proof of the BGOY10 Scheme
Theorem 32. The BGOY10 scheme is (t; qk; qs; qh1 ; qh2 ; qh3 ; n; )-secure if
(t0; q; 0)-IBSAS-CDH assumption holds, where 0 =

  (qs+qh3 )(qs+qh3 1)2p

1
e(z+1) ,
q = qs, t
0 = t+texp(qh1+qh2+qs(2(n+1))+2n+2) and texp is a computational
time for a single exponentiation.
Proof. The goal of this proof is to construct an algorithm B of solving the
IBSAS-CDH problem. In this proof, we utilize Coron's technique [28] where
an instance of the problem is randomly embedded with some distribution 
and  is optimized at the end of the proof.
Given an instance (p;G;GT ; e; g; ga1 ; gb1 ; ga2 ; gb2), B sets A1 = ga1 and
A2 = g
a2 , and handlesH1;H2 andH3 as random oracles whereH1-List[; ; ],
H2-List[; ; ], and H3-List[; ] are hash tables. B runs A with mpk =
(p;G;GT , e; g; A1; A2, H1;H2; H3) as input and interacts as follows:
H1-Hash Query, H2-Hash Query: Given any string IDi 2 f0; 1g,
check that IDi has been already queried. If so, return a corresponding value
from H1-List and H2-List. Otherwise, pick a random bit bi  f0; 1g with
some probability  which assigns bi = 1, and generate (i;1; i;2)  Z2p .
If bi = 1, then set H1[IDi] = g
i;1 and H2[IDi] = g
i;2 . Otherwise, set
H1[IDi] = g
b1gi;1 and H2[IDi] = g
b2gi;2 . Register (IDi; bi; i;1) in H1-List
and (IDi; bi; i;2) in H2-List, and return H1[IDi] and H2[IDi].
H3-Hash Query: Given any string IDi k mi, generate a random num-
ber di  Zp and register (IDj k mi; di) in H3-List.
Key Derivation Query: Given any string IDi 2 f0; 1g, check bi
for IDi in H1-List. If bi = 0, then abort the process. Otherwise, return
H1(IDi)
a1 = (ga1)i;1 and H2(IDi)
a2 = (ga2)i;2 .
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Signing Query: Given (IDi;mi; f(IDj ;mj)gi 1j=1; i 1), check bi for IDi
in H1-List. If bi = 1, then retrieve i;1; i;2 and di from each hash table, and
generate r; w  Zp and compute as follows:
Ri = Ri 1  gr;
Wi = Wi 1  gw;
Si = Si 1  (Wi 1)r  (Ri)w(ga1)i;1(ga2)i;2d:
Otherwise, check if there exists IDj in f(IDj ;mj)gi 1j=1 such that IDi 6=
IDj ^ bj = 0 for 1  j < i. If so, abort the process. Otherwise, let i
be a set of indexes corresponding to IDi in f(IDj ;mj)gij=1 and compute as
follows:
(S0; R0;W 0)  OIBSAS CDH
g;ga1 ;ga2 ;gb1 ;gb2
P
j2i dj
jij

Ri = (R
0)jij; Wi =W 0;
Si = (S
0)jij
iY
j=1
(ga1)j;1 (ga2)j;2dj :
These values can be written as follows and hence are a valid signature.
Si =

grxga1b1g
P
j2i dj
jij a2b2
jij iY
j=1
(ga1)j;1 (ga2)j;2dj
= grxjij(gb1)a1jij(gb2)a2
P
j2i dj
0@Y
j2i
(ga1)j;1 (ga2)j;2dj
1A

0@ iY
j=1^j =2i
H1(IDj)
a1H2(IDj)
a2H3[IDikmi]
1A
= grxjij
0@Y
j2i

gb1gj;1
a1 
gb2gj;2
a2dj1A

0@ iY
j=1^j =2i
H1(IDj)
a1H2(IDj)
a2H3[IDikmi]
1A
= grxjij
0@ iY
j=1
H1(IDj)
a1H2(IDj)
a2H3[IDikmi]
1A
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Output: Given a forgery (f(IDi ;mi )gni=1; n) by A, check that there
exists a set , where jj > 0, of indexes corresponding to IDi such that
bi = 0. If not, abort the process. Otherwise, compute as follows:
S0 =
SQn
i=1(g
a1)i;1(ga2)i;2H3[IDikmi]
= gr
w
Y
j2

gb1
a1 
gb2
a2H3(IDjkmj)
= gr
wga1b1j
jga2b2
P
j2 H3(IDjkmj)
) S =
 
S0
 1
jj = g
r
jjw

ga1b1g
a2b2
P
j2 H3(IDjkmj)
jj ;
R = (R)
1
jj = g
r
jj ;
W = W :
Output
P
j2 H3(IDjkmj)
jj ; S;R;W

as a solution of the IBSAS-CDH prob-
lem.
The success probability 0 and the execution time t0 of B can be obtained
similarly as that of the proof in [15]. Here, let Collide be an event that B
outputs (m;S;R;Z) such that it has been queried to OIBSAS CDH
g;ga1 ;ga2 ;gb1 ;gb2
, let
forge be an event that A outputs a forgery, and let abort be an event that
B aborts. Then, the following equation can be obtained as follows:
0  Pr[forge ^ collide ^ abort]
= Pr[forge ^ collidejabort]  Pr[abort]
= Pr[forgencollidejabort]  Pr[abort]
=
 
Pr[forgejabort]  Pr[collidejabort]  Pr[abort]
From the denition of the adversary A, Pr[forgejabort]   Pr[collidejabort]
is . Pr[collidejabort] can be obtained from the birthday paradox, and thus
Pr[collidejabort] = (qs+qh3)(qs+qh3 1)2p holds. The steps that B aborts are in
Key Derivation, Query, Signing Query and Output. In particular,
while the aborts in Key Derivation Query and Signing Query can be
avoided as long as bi = 1 holds, there must exist IDi in Output such that
bi = 0 holds. Hence, Pr[abort] = 
qk  qsn(1   ) holds. Here, we dene a
function f() := qk qsn(1 ). From its derived function, f() is optimized
at opt =
qk+qsn
qk+qsn+1
, and thus the following equation holds from the denition
of the base of natural logarithm where we denote by z := qk+ qsn for short:
f(opt) =

z
z + 1
z 
1  z
z + 1

 1
e(z + 1)
* lim
z!1

z
z + 1
z
=
1
e
;
) 0 

  (qs + qh3)(qs + qh3   1)
2p

1
e(z + 1)
:
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The number of queries to the oracle OIBSAS CDH
g;ga1 ;ga2 ;gb1 ;gb2
is at most qs signing
queries, and thus q = qs holds. The computational time of B is that of
A plus exponentiations in H1-Hash Query, H2-Hash Query, Signing
Query and Output, and thus the following equation can be obtained:
t0 = t+ texp(qh1 + qh2 + qs(2(n+ 1)) + 2n+ 2);
where texp is the computational time of one exponentiation.
7.5 Unrestricted Ordered Multisignature Scheme
7.5.1 Syntax
We recall the system model in [14]. Ordered multisignature is a digital signa-
ture where each a member among a signing group sings a common message
and its position in the group. Ordered multisignature scheme consists of the
following algorithms.
Setup(1k) Given a security parameter 1k, return a public parameter para.
KeyGeneration(para) Given para, return a secret key ski and its corre-
sponding public key pki.
Signing(ski;m;  i 1; i 1; pki) Given a secret key ski, a message m, a sign-
ing order  i 1 from the rst signer to ith signer, an ordered multisig-
nature i 1 on m in  i 1 and a public key pki, return a signature 
on m in  i.
Verication(m; i; i; fpkjgij=1) Given m,  i i and a set fpkjgij=1 of pub-
lic keys, return accept or reject.
Denition 33 (Correctness). In an ordered multisignature scheme, we say
that the scheme is correct if, for all para; ski and pki given by Setup and
KeyGeneration, Verication ((m; i, Signing (ski;m;  i 1; i 1; pki),
fpkjgij=1) outputs accept for all i 2 [1; n].
7.5.2 Security Model for Unrestricted Ordered Multisigna-
ture Scheme
The following security model is dened in [14]. An ordered multisignature
scheme must guarantee unforgeability with respect to the order of signers
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in addition to that of messages. Namely, it should not be possible to re-
order the positions of honest signers in an ordered multisignature scheme,
even if all other signers are malicious. Whereas the existing scheme is prov-
ably secure in the restricted setting, the security of unrestricted ordered
multisignature scheme can be guaranteed via the following model.
There exist an adversary A and a challenger C in this model. The chal-
lenger C has a certied-key list L to register users and their own public keys,
including and A can get to know all the keys in L except for the one given
by C to the target signer. The advantage of A can be obtained with the
probability that C outputs accept in the subsequent game. Hereinafter, we
denote by x(i) the value of the i-th query for all x.
Initial Phase The challenger C generates a public parameter para by Setup
and a pair of challenge key (sk; pk) of a target signer by KeyGen-
eration. Then, C initializes L := ;, and runs A with para and pk as
input.
Certication Query A generates ski and its corresponding public key pki
for any signer. Then, A provides (ski; pki) to C, and C registers pki in
L.
Signing Query For all i, A generates a signing query (m(h);  (h)i 1; i 1; pk)
as h-th query for the target signer, where the following conditions
hold for the query and for all h: Verication algorithm outputs
accept; For all pkj , pkj in  
(h)
i 1 is included in L; i   1 < n. Given
(m(h);  
(h)
i 1; i 1; pk
) byA, C runs Signing (ski;m(h);  (h)i 1; i 1; pki),
and obtains i and  
(h)
i =  
(h)
i 1 k pk. Finally, C returns i on m(h) in
 
(h)
i .
Output After qc iterations of the certication queries and qs iterations of
the signing queries, A outputs a forgery (m;  n; n). Here, let the
target signer be ith signer in  n, and the following conditions hold for
the forgery: Verication(m;  n; ; fpkigni=1) outputs accept; there
exist at least one index j 2  such that (m;  j ) =2 f(m(h);  (h)i )gqsh=1
holds, where  is a set of indexes corresponding to pk in  n and each
 j is extracted from  

n as a signer structure from the rst signer to
the target signer;  n includes pk; For all pkj , pkj in  n is included in
L. If all conditions hold, then C outputs accept. Otherwise, C outputs
reject.
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Denition 34. We say that an ordered multisignature scheme is (t; qc; qs; `; n,
)-secure if there is no adversary A breaks with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ). Here, we
dene that A breaks the scheme with (t; qc; qs; `; n; ) as that a challenger C
outputs accept, in the security game described above, with the probability
greater than  within the execution time t. Here, A can generate at most
qc certication queries and at most qs signing queries, ` is the length of the
message output by A, and n is the number of signers included in the forgery.
7.5.3 Insecurity of the BGOY07 Scheme
Review of the BGOY07 Ordered Multisignature Scheme
We briey review the BGOY07 scheme [14].
Setup(1k) Generate a pairing parameter (p;G;GT ; e). Then, choose a ran-
dom generator g 2 G and a cryptographic hash function H : f0; 1g !
G. Output (p;G;GT ; e; g;H) as the public parameter para.
KeyGeneration(para) Pick random numbers i; ti; vi  Zp and compute
Ai = g
i , Ti = g
ti , Vi = g
vi . ski is (i; ti; vi) and its corresponding
public key pki is (Ai; Ti; Vi).
Signing(ski;m;  i 1; i 1; pki) Parse the secret key ski as (i; ti; vi),  i 1
as fpkjgi 1j=1 and the previous signature 0 as (Si 1; Ri 1), where pkj as
(Ai; Ti; Vi) for j = [1; i]. Pick a random number r  Zp and compute
as Ri  Ri 1  gr and Si  Si 1 H(m)i(Ri)ti+ivi
Qi 1
j=1 Tj(Vj)
j
r
.
Set  i =  i 1 k pki and output  = (Si; Ri) as a signature on m in  i.
Verication(m; i; i; fpkjgij=1) Parse i as (Si; Ri) and pki as (Aj ; Tj ; Vj)
for j = [1; i]. Check that all of fpkjgij=1 are distinct and output reject
if not. Otherwise, check that the following equation holds:
e(Si; g)
?
= e
0@H(m); iY
j=1
Aj
1A  e
0@ iY
j=1
Tj(Vj)
j ; Ri
1A :
If the previous equation holds, output accept. Otherwise, output
reject.
The unrestricted setting is a construction removing the framed text z in
Verication. Similarly as the LOSSW06 scheme, removing the check of the
public keys is out of the scope of the original construction of the BGOY07
scheme.
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Insecurity under Unrestricted Setting
The signature equation in the BGOY07 scheme can be written as S =
H(m)
Pi
j=1 i
Qi
j=1 T
j
j Vj
r
for any i. If signers are allowed to sign in mul-
tiple positions for one signature generation, then bossksubordinatekboss
is allowed as the signing order, for example. Such a multiple appear-
ance of signers encourages the following attack described below. In the
case of  3 =bossksubordinatekboss, the signature equation for  3 becomes
S = H(m)2a+b
 
T 4aV
2
a T
2
b Vb
r
, where a is the secret key of the boss and
b is that of the subordinate. Then, a malicious signer can forge the sig-
nature of the subordinate for another signing order  2 =subordinatekboss
as follows: the attacker computes S
1
2H(m)
b
2 (R)
vb
2 , where vb is an individ-
ual secret key corresponding to Vb, and this value is equal to H(m)
a+b
  T 1b VbT 2aVar, which is accepted on m in  2. As noted in Section 7.1.2,
the proof by Boldyreva et al. [14] is correct but this attack is outside the
proof.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed constructions of signature schemes for multiple
signers. Signature scheme for multiple signers has been expected to provide
various applications as a generic construction of digital signature. In this
work, we discuss these constructions from the viewpoint of (1) optimized
constructions for the applications and (2) mathematical property toward a
generic construction. In particular, we considered, for the former case, an
ordered multisignature scheme, a structured multisignature scheme, a BGP-
aiding aggregate signature scheme and a certicateless aggregate signature
scheme, and for the latter case an unrestricted aggregate signature scheme.
As the results, we pointed out the problems of the existing schemes and
solved the open problem described in each construction. More precisely,
we proposed the ordered multisignature scheme without random oracles in
Chapter 3, the structured multisignature scheme without a restriction in
the number of signers in Chapter 4, the BGP-aiding aggregate signature
scheme optimized for the specication of BGP in Chapter 5, and the cer-
ticateless aggregate signature scheme secure against the super adversaries
who are the strongest adversary in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, in Chapter 7,
we also discussed a construction which allows each signer to sign multiple
times. The construction consists of common properties of the schemes from
Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, and the properties seem to be a generic property
to prove the security of the schemes for multiple signers. The properties
are programmable hash function [40] and re-randomization, and are implied
in the random oracle model. Finally, we describe an open problem. The
problem is to construct a generic construction of signature scheme for mul-
tiple signers by utilizing the formalization of the re-randomization described
in [16]. We consider such a construction is a properly generic construction
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of digital signature.
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